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Chapter 1
Introduction and Summary
1
Introduction and Summary
Economists must not only know their economic models,
but also understand politics, interests, conflicts, passions
– the essence of collective life. For a brief period of time you
could make changes by decree; but to let them persist,
you have to build coalitions and bring people around.
You have to be a politician.
Alejandro Foxley, former Chilean Minister of Finance
(quoted in Drazen, 2000)
1.1 General Remarks
‘Political Economy’ is not a novel concept. To the contrary, for centuries re-
searchers have been studying the effects of politics on economic outcomes. What
today is known as ‘economics’ has been known in the days of Adam Smith as
‘political economy’. Still today, the French word for ‘economics’ is ‘e´conomie
politique’.
Economics and politics have hence not been seen as distinct fields in the
early days of the economic literature, or at least, economics and politics were
not perceived as separable from each other. Beginning with the introduction
of formal models and rigorous mathematical analysis, this view changed. Neo-
classical economists focused their work on the optimizing behavior of firms and
consumers, not only ignoring any political factors, but actively assuming them
away by the introduction of such concepts as the omniscient and benevolent
social planner.
The interest in the interplay between economics and politics began to rise
again in the 1960s and 1970s following the seminal contributions of Arrow
(1951), Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Kydland and Prescott (1977). These
contributions laid the foundations for three strands of the literature1 that have
been increasingly integrated since the mid 1980s, which has lead to an over-
1See e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2002), on which the presentation of the three fields in the
following draws.
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whelming flood of new studies in the field that is nowadays known as the ‘New
Political Economy’.
The work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) founded the stream of macroeco-
nomic policy analysis and is based on the contributions of Lucas, who studied
economic policy outcomes as the consequence of different policy rules. Kyd-
land and Prescott (1977) however argued that not all of these policy rules are
implementable or sustainable, as they lack credibility. This lack of credibility
arises if the policymaker has an incentive to change the rule after its imple-
mentation, i.e., if the optimality of the policy from the viewpoint of the policy-
maker is time dependent. Hence, the concept of Kydland and Prescott (1977)
has become known as ‘time-consistency’. As rational agents base their behav-
ior on their expectations of the future, including expectations about the future
behavior of policymakers, time-inconsistent policy rules will lead to adverse
economic outcomes. This insight has led to a large body of political economic
literature analyzing macroeconomic phenomena, such as inflation, unemploy-
ment and the business cycle (see e.g. Barro and Gordon, 1983a,b).
The works of Buchanan and Tullock (1962), and also Olson (1965), have
pioneered ‘Public Choice’ theory. The literature in this field focuses on the
principal-agent relations between citizens and government, providing analyses
of a multitude of political fields, such as trade policy, regulation of markets and
fiscal policy. Specifically, it studies the effects of rent-seeking, both by politicians
and interest groups, the effects of imperfect information about policy programs
on the side of the electorate, and the effects of different constitutional setups
on economic and political outcomes. Thereby, however, oftentimes less strict
assumptions about the rationality of the agents are made, as is the case in the
model of politically induced business cycles as presented by Nordhaus (1975),
where voters are repeatedly fooled by politicians.
‘Rational Choice’ is the field of analysis that has emerged from the political
science literature. Since the contribution of Arrow (1951), the focus in political
science has shifted away from the formulation of a general theory of collec-
tive choice, and has concentrated on the analysis of collective choice within the
framework of different political institutions. The institutions analyzed in this
branch of the literature include, among others, voting procedures and legisla-
3
tive processes. Thereby, not economic outcomes were in the center of interest,
but the analysis of political institutions using the rationality-assuming methods
known in economics.
Hence, by combining these three strands of the literature, the ‘New Political
Economy’ is not a mere revival of what was known as political economy two
hundred years ago. The common denominator is still the analysis of the effects
of politics on economic outcomes. The contribution of the new political econ-
omy is rather the transfer of modern methods of economic analysis, including
the rational choice approach, to the analysis of political behavior of politicians,
voters and interest groups and economic outcomes subject to the incentives and
constraints set by political institutions, as defined by Alt and Shepsle (1990, p.2).
This doctoral thesis adds to this literature in several aspects. Chapter 2 gives
an analysis of labor market regulation, specifically the protection of workers
from being dismissed, and its interplay with globalization, looking not only at
its economic dimension, but also at the effects of international political insti-
tutions and the internationalization of social values. In Chapters 3 and 4, we
argue that personal values and attitudes of politicians are an additional expla-
nation for differences in political behavior and the resulting economic outcomes
and provide an analysis of the effects of the education and profession of poli-
cymakers on reform activity and fiscal policy. Chapter 5 demonstrates how the
strategic interaction between multiple jurisdictions influences the choice of res-
idence of different groups of the society, while Chapter 6 analyses the effect of
the institutions for the promotion of research on the behavior of research insti-
tutions. The next section gives an outline of the thesis.
1.2 Outline of the Thesis
This thesis is composed of five main chapters, each studying a separate topic
from a political economy perspective.
In Chapter 2, we study the effect of globalization, measured by its economic,
political and social dimensions, on regulation in the labor market, specifically
on the protection of workers against being dismissed or being exploited by the
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use of short-term contracts. From a political point of view, this is an interest-
ing topic, as unionists and politicians frequently claim that globalization lowers
employment protection. The economic rationale behind this argument is that
labor standards, which in addition to legislation against unjustified and mass
dismissals also comprise workers’ right to form unions and regulations of the
maximum number of working hours, impose additional production costs and
threaten the international competitiveness of firms, which in turn lobby for a
decrease in employment protection. Consequently, international competition
among producers in countries with heterogeneous labor standards may trigger
a race-to-the-bottom. To prevent such development, governments attempt to
harmonize international legislation through international organizations, such
as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Labour Organi-
zation (ILO). These institutions try to set bindingminimum labor standards, but
often do not have the necessary legal means to enforce them. This leaves room
for individual gains if policymakers deviate from the common policy, which
then results in the same (undesired) equilibrium as in the situation without in-
ternational coordination, or in a situation where the effects of economic glob-
alization are attenuated at best. Similar arguments hold for the international
spreading of ideas and values. If there is an international consensus on the
need for a minimum level of labor protection, policymakers will have the sup-
port from the electorate to ensure such a minimum standard.
To gauge these possibly counteracting effects of globalization and its sub-
components on labor protection, in Chapter 2 we estimate panel regressions for
28 OECD countries from 1985 to 2003, differentiating between three dimensions
of globalization and protection in two segments of the labor market. With this
chapter we are among the first to test the hypothesis that globalization leads
to such a race-to-the-bottom process that weakens workers’ employment pro-
tection. In our estimations, we find a substantial influence of globalization on
employment protection. A novelty is that this influence is found to differ both
across the dimensions of globalization (economic, political, and social) as well
as across the different labor market sectors (short-term contract and regular-
contract workers). While the economic and political dimensions of globaliza-
tion are shown to loosen protection of the regularly employed, we find that
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political and social globalization tighten the laws regulating the possibility of
offering or extending limited- or short-term contracts. We argue that these
differential effects by dimension of globalization and labor market sector are
well in line with recent political economy models of international trade, which
have three characteristics: lobbying of agents (workers, producers), credibility
of politicians necessary to fulfill their transmission channel functions with re-
spect to the agents’ opposing preferences, and taking into account the relative
economic importance of the two labor market sectors. Specifically, we argue
that stricter protection of the economically less important group of short-term
workers may serve as symbolic political act by vote-maximizing politicians in-
tending to ‘buy’ workers’ acceptance of labor market liberalization for the reg-
ularly employed. As further results, we are able to show that globalization
amplifies the effects of macroeconomic conditions on labor protection. Finally,
Chapter 2 shows that political ideology does not matter only per se for labor
market regulation, but that politicians of different ideology react differently to
the downward pressure on labor protection through globalization. Specifically,
we show that left-wing governments attempt to counteract the liberalization
pressure exerted by economic globalization, while the negative effect of right
wing governments on labor protection is aggravated by globalization.
Ideology, or personal values, plays also the dominant role in the analyses of
Chapters 3 and 4. However, we proxy personal values of politicians not only
with their political leaning, but introduce the education and profession of politi-
cians as a newmeans to explain economic policy outcomes. In doing so, we add
to the recent literature connecting personal traits of politicians with actual pol-
icy outcomes. So far, the literature has found that, for economic growth, the per-
son of the head of government matters per se, as an unexpected change in the
leadership of a country due to the death of the incumbent can trigger substan-
tial changes in the variance of this variable. Further studies examine the effect
of the reservation of parliament seats for women and socially disadvantaged
groups in India or the influence of daughters on US congressmen, all finding ef-
fects of peer-group oriented policies. Significant effects are also found in papers
studying the effect of personal career ambitions, education and profession on
the performance of central bankers. Another strand of the literature looks at the
6
effect of different fields of study of current and former university students on
their social behavior, finding that especially economists are significantly more
selfish than students of other fields.
In Chapter 3, we compile and present a novel data set covering the educa-
tion and profession of more than 500 political leaders from 73 countries over the
period 1970-2005 and analyze whether the educational and professional back-
ground of a head of government matters for the implementation of market-
liberalizing reforms. Our results show that reforms are more likely during the
tenure of former entrepreneurs. Political ideology, in combination with profes-
sion, is also shown to have a significant effect, as entrepreneurs belonging to
a left-wing party are more successful in inducing reforms than a member of a
right-wing party with the same previous profession. Former professional scien-
tists also foster reforms, the more so, the longer they stay in office.
Chapter 4 extends the analysis to fiscal policy. So far, the political economy
literature can only claim partial success in the analysis of the determinants of
public deficits and public debt, as all politico-economic approaches taken to-
gether can only explain about fifty percent of international differences in gov-
ernment debt, leaving room for further research. The past research has first
focused on politicians and their opportunistic or partisan motives, has then
moved on to the analysis of distributional conflicts between politicians, vot-
ers and interest groups and has recently concentrated on the institutions of the
budgetary process.
In Chapter 4, we take a step further by going back to the analysis of policy-
makers’ motives. So far, the existence of different preferences or values of pol-
icymakers has only been assumed in the literature, but no explanation of their
origins has been given. As in Chapter 3, we argue that one source of different
preferences, and hence different policy outcomes, lies in the different social-
ization of policymakers, which is reflected by their education and profession.
Consequently, we test whether the education and profession of politicians is a
determinant of fiscal policy using panel data for 22 OECD countries over the
period 1970-2004. The results show that education and profession indeed mat-
ter for fiscal policymaking. Former civil servants and military officers generate
higher deficits than the other groups of politicians, the policies of professional
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politicians differ depending on their education, partisanship depends on the
former profession and peer group of the politician, and institutional sclerosis
reduces the positive influence of economists on the budget surplus.
The subsequent Chapter 5 also studies a topic in fiscal policy, this time at the
local level. Furthermore, we do not analyze the determinants of fiscal policy
in this chapter, but evaluate the effect of the strategic interaction in fiscal poli-
cymaking between local governments on the choice of location of individuals.
Specifically, we ask whether income taxes, which differ between Swiss commu-
nities, influence the income distribution in the communities of the Swiss canton
of Zurich in the way predicted by Tiebout (1956). In Chapter 5, we are the first
to study income sorting using panel data for a small and culturally homoge-
neous region. Therefore, unlike the previous literature, we are not only able to
make use of cross-sectional variation, but can also take account of variations in
tax rates and income shares over time. We also include the house price chan-
nel, which is often ignored in the literature, into our analysis. Furthermore, by
using data from one single canton we avoid having to take account of factors
determining the decision to move that are hard to measure or even not mea-
surable, such as differences in mentality, attachment to the local community,
family ties, or differences in the school system. Finally, we control for spatial
interdependence between the different communities.
Using our data set covering the years 1991-2003, 14 different income classes
and all 171 communities in the canton of Zurich, we provide evidence that high
income earners are more likely to reside in low tax communities, especially if
neighboring communities in the same district have higher taxes. The opposite
holds for low-income earners: they are more likely to settle in high tax com-
munities. In addition, we find that land prices exert a significant effect on the
choice of residence of different income groups, and hence on the income distri-
bution. The fact that both land prices and tax rates exert a significant effect on
the choice of residence leads us to the conclusion that the capitalization of tax
rates in house prices is imperfect.
The final main chapter of this thesis, Chapter 6, also deals with the incen-
tives set by fiscal policy. In this chapter, we study the effect of public and private
spending on research institutions. Specifically, we examine the effect of public
8
and private third-party funding on the productivity of public research institu-
tions in Switzerland. We do so, as the measurement and evaluation of uni-
versity productivity has become increasingly important during the past years,
both in the academic discussion and in research policy. Third party funding
is frequently used as a proxy for research output and quality in both fields.
However, while the relevance of third-party funding has increased both in the
political sphere and the academic literature, there are few articles analyzing
the impact of different sources of third-party funding on research productiv-
ity. Furthermore, both the theoretical and empirical findings are ambiguous,
indicating that further research in this area is required to allow policymakers to
make evidence-based decisions.
For our analysis in Chapter 6, we use data from a survey by KOF Swiss
Economic Institute, conducted among Swiss research institutions in 2005. The
survey covers all types of public research institutions in Switzerland: cantonal
universities, federal institutes of technology, universities of applied sciences
and federal research institutions. We add to the existing literature by includ-
ing a measure for technology transfer into our analysis. By distinguishing be-
tween public and private third-party funding, our approach allows us to iden-
tify the differences between the two funding sources in the innovation stages
of basic research and applied research, measured by scientific publications and
technology transfer intensity. Using a simultaneous equations (three stage least
squares) approach, we account for the possible endogeneity between the differ-
ent outputs. Furthermore, using a simultaneous equations approach enables us
to estimate the effect of different funding sources on the output categories sep-
arately. This is also a novel addition to the literature on research productivity,
which has so far either ignored simultaneity by focusing on single outputs, or
has used aggregate measures of output. In our regressions, we find significant
effects of both public and private third party funding on research productivity.
The effects are found to differ between the different output categories. Produc-
tivity in teaching is found not to be related to differences in public or private
third party funding. Both public and private funds are found to increase pro-
ductivity in basic research, as measured by the number of scientific publica-
tions. The findings for teaching and basic research are robust to the inclusion of
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technology transfer, which proxies applied research output, into the estimated
system. For the productivity in this field, we find a positive effect of private
funds, and no significant effect of public funding. Our results also reveal that
productivity of each output type differs across institution types and scientific
fields. The results are robust to a battery of robustness checks, and remain also
unaltered once we control for the possible endogeneity between the ability to
acquire third-party funding and productivity.
1.3 Further Research
With our analysis of the interplay between the three dimensions of globalization
and employment protection legislation, we make an additional step into the
direction of a more detailed analysis of the effects of an increasing international
integration on labor conditions. Further research might be extended to other
domains, such as child labor and safety in the workplace.
The extension of the analysis of the effect of the education and profession
to other fields of policy is also an obvious path for further research. Promising
areas of study could be the size and scope of government, and the composition
of the public budget. Furthermore, the data set could be extended to the entire
cabinet.
An interesting way to go in the field of income sorting and tax competi-
tion would be to link this literature to the literature on the adverse effects of
income sorting in education economics. There, it is argued that the opportu-
nities of an individual are highly correlated with his or her neighborhood and
social background. Hence, if tax competition induces strong sorting by income,
it might also contribute to social problems such as persistent inequality and
poverty traps.
Finally, further research in the domain of university funding might delve
deeper into the effects of different procedures of funds distribution on research
productivity, and might analyze the impact of more accurately specified fund-
ing sources on the behavior of researchers.
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Chapter 2
Globalization and Protection of
Employment
11
Globalization and Protection of Employment1
2.1 Introduction
The question of a harmonization of labor standards is on the agenda of nearly
all intergovernmental meetings on international trade, be it in the framework of
the EuropeanUnion (EU), theNorth American Free TradeAgreement (NAFTA),
or the World Trade Organization (WTO). Such labor standards comprise work-
ers’ right to form unions, fix maximum number of working hours and pro-
tect against unjustified and mass dismissals – from a producer’s point of view
thereby imposing additional production costs and threatening the international
competitiveness of their firms. Consequently, international competition among
producers in countries with heterogeneous labor standards may trigger a race-
to-the-bottom (Sinn, 2001; OECD, 2000; ILO, 2009). To prevent such develop-
ment some international organizations, for example the WTO and the Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ILO), try to set minimum labor standards, but often
do not have the necessary legal means to enforce them (see Krueger, 1996, on
the missing enforcement of compulsory schooling laws to prevent child labor).
As described in ILO (2009), the means of international enforcement are weak as
they include only instruments of ‘social dialogues’ and ‘technical assistance’.2
In response, domestic politiciansmainly from the political left typically demand
a legally binding harmonization of labor standards above the minimum level,
or argue even against further expansion of free trade.
With this chapter we are among the first to test the claim that globalization
leads to such a race-to-the-bottom process that weakens workers’ employment
protection. Using a panel on measures of globalization and employment pro-
1This chapter is based on Fischer and Somogyi (2009).
2The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, adopted in 1998 and
laid down in several separate conventions (no. 29, 87, 98, 105, 111, 138), covers only so-called
core labor standards, in particular “1) freedom from forced labor in the form of compulsory
labor and slavery, (2) the abolition of exploitative forms of child labor that put the safety and
health of children at significant risk, (3) equal opportunity in employment, and (4) fundamental
union rights like freedom of association and collective bargaining” (Busse, 2004, p.212). Thus,
certain aspects of protection of employment are not covered. The ILO labor standards are sum-
marized and introduced in ILO (2009).
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tection of 28 member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) from 1985 to 2003, we find a substantial influence
of globalization on employment protection. A novelty is that this influence is
found to differ both across the dimensions of globalization (economic, politi-
cal, and social) as well as across the different labor market sectors (short-term
contract and regular-contract workers). While the economic, political and so-
cial dimensions of globalization are shown to loosen protection of the regularly
employed, we find that political and social globalization tighten the laws reg-
ulating the possibility of offering/extending limited- or short-term contracts.
We argue that these differential effects by dimension of globalization and labor
market sector are well in line with recent political economy models of inter-
national trade, which have three characteristics: lobbying of agents (workers,
producers), credibility of politicians necessary to fulfill their transmission chan-
nel functions with respect to the agents’ opposing preferences, and taking into
account the relative economic importance of the two labor market sectors.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: the next two sections
describe previous mostly empirical literature, illustrates more thoroughly the
research gap to be filled, and derives testable hypotheses that guide our em-
pirical analysis. Section 2.4 describes the data on globalization, employment
protection and the controlling variables that form part of the empirical model,
which is also introduced in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 presents the empirical results
for the direct effects of economic, political and social globalization on workers’
employment conditions, while Section 2.6 investigates how globalization may
amplify the pressure exerted by domestic economic or political conditions. The
findings in this chapter are finally discussed and concluded in Section 2.7.
2.2 Literature Review
Most theoretical models of international trade such as the ones by Bhagwati and
Srinivasan (1995) and Stern (2003) predict that globalization lowers labor stan-
dards, due to a race-to-the-bottom in regulatory competition along the lines of
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the seminal Tiebout (1956) model.3 As already argued in the review by Brown
(2000), free trade prevents passing the additional production costs of comply-
ing with certain labor standards on to the consumer, who has the possibility to
substitute with cheaper imported goods. Therefore, in open economies these
additional production costs have to be borne by the firms and their workers
alone. The race to the bottom of labor standards is then the outcome of a pris-
oners’ dilemma game, in which the firm/country that deviates first reaps exces-
sive profits/welfare gains from trade. However, trade theorists emphasize that
such race to the bottom does not occur among small open economies – labor
standards are then not able to spill-over across borders, – but well in the case of
large countries or when small countries have formed large trading blocks that
strategically interact. In the case of the economically advanced OECD countries,
the latter arguments apply.
In contrast to the theoretical models that predict a negative relation between
globalization and labor standards, existing empirical evidence is rather scarce
and provides mixed results.4
Most of the early empirical studies employ only flows of foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) as measure of economic globalization and focus only on core
labor standards set by the ILO (see footnote 1), but not on general employment
protection. Moreover, the research question is rather how costs of labor and so-
cial stability affect location decisions of investors, not how globalization affects
the level of labor standards in a country (for an example, see Kucera (2002), and
literature cited therein).
One of the first contributions to empirically relate trade openness, replacing
FDI of the previous analyses, with some specific core labor standards appear
to be Shelburne (2001), and Cigno et al. (2002): both papers find independently
from each other that trade openness reduces the prevalence of child labor –
abolition of child exploitation is one of the core ILO labor conventions.
3Theoretical arguments may well go into the opposite direction, predicting the impact of
labor standards on trade volume, see also Krueger (1996).
4Early empirical analyses on the effect of international trade on relative wages (skilled vs.
unskilled) in the USA, wage inequality worldwide, wage stability for production workers,
trade and freedom-of-association-rights, trade and rights to non-discrimination are described
in Brown (2000).
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Busse (2004) uses this research as a starting point and extends it to incor-
porate also the remaining core labor standards covered by the ILO conventions.
He finds in a fixed effects panel analysis of 71 developing countries from 1970 to
2000 that more openness to trade appears to lead to increased gender discrim-
ination in the labor market, growing prevalence of child labor, and less unions
rights (freedom of association). Providing the rationale for the deterioration of
certain labor standards as national economies become more globalized, Busse
and Spielmann (2006) show in a panel fixed effects analysis of a world sample
(1975-2000) that gender inequality in wages creates a comparative advantage in
the production of labor-intensive commodities. While the empirical analysis by
Busse (2004) is an important contribution to the literature on the impact of trade
on core labor standard, it does not cover the effects on general employment pro-
tection.
Turning to the question of union rights which comes closest to measur-
ing general ‘employment protection’ of adult workers against e.g. mass dis-
missals and exploitative work contracts, Dreher and Gaston (2005) find in a
cross-section time-series of 17 OECD countries from 1980 to 1999 (with coun-
try fixed effects) that globalization adversely affects density and attractiveness
of unions – as a consequence of, as they argue, their lower (relative) bargain-
ing power. Testing several dimensions of globalization, one of the few empir-
ical contributions making such a distinction, they find that this development
is driven by the social dimension of globalization, which includes worldwide
communication, exchange of ideas, and convergence of local cultures. In con-
trast, the economic and political dimensions do not appear to exert any impact.
This is a noteworthy result given that most arguments that link globalization
with deunionization are rather economic or political (see e.g. Wallerstein and
Western, 2000). In this chapter, we will equally distinguish between three di-
mensions of globalization, using an updated version of the index used in Dreher
and Gaston (2005).
Contradictory findings to the analysis of Dreher and Gaston (2005) are re-
ported in the preceding empirical studies by e.g. Wallerstein andWestern (2000)
or Golden (2000). Wallerstein and Western (2000) study the development of
union density and coverage during the post-war period until 1992 for 18 OECD
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countries. They find that, first, an increase occurred until the seventies, followed
by a decline in the eighties, on average. Wallerstein andWestern (2000) provide
then verbal-descriptive arguments for why trade openness may have such a
positive or negative impact. Similarly, in a cross-section of 15 OECD countries
for the 1980s (1980-1990) Golden (2000)’s empirical model reveals a convergence
of union strength towards a certain mean, but a divergence in union density. In
her study, this union development appears rather unaffected by growing eco-
nomic integration (measured by trade openness and the absence of restrictions
of capital mobility).
In the light of our research question, the main critique of these preceding
studies is that none of them provides a direct linkage between the phenomenon
‘globalization’ and the economic outcome ‘employment protection’ through laws
and administrative regulations: In particular, these studies focus largely on as-
pects of union strength – aiming to capture wage levels, wage inequality, and
job security (e.g. Blau and Kahn, 1996; Fortin and Lemieux, 1997) as labor mar-
ket outcomes of globalization – in other words, these studies merely assume a
positive link between unionization and labor protection, but fail to empirically
show that this link actually exists.
These studies do also not account for the multifacetedness of globalization,
focusing on either trade or FDI, ignoring additional economic channels of glob-
alization and their interplays. In addition, these studies entirely neglect the
social and political aspects of globalization. Furthermore, the literature either
largely disregards worker heterogeneity or focuses only on differential effects,
if at all, on low-skilled and high-skilled workers, and ignore effects on different
sectors of the labor market. Finally, from a methodological viewpoint, most of
these studies do not take the problem of potential endogeneity of international
trade into account, as the study by e.g. Dewit et al. (2009) suggests.5
Taken altogether, an issue that has not yet been in the focus of empirical stud-
ies on the effects of economic integration is legislation that aims at protecting av-
erage workers’ employment. In addition, previous studies have approximated
5Their empirical analysis for OECD countries with the same index of employment protection
used in this study suggests that relatively stricter protection of workers’ rights deters foreign
direct investment, and keeps domestic firms anchored in their home countries.
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international economic integration only incompletely. To fill this gap, we ad-
dress the question to what extent globalization (in place of international trade)
affects workers’ employment protection (in place of union power or child labor).
While the violations of core labor standards employed in the previous literature
(e.g. child labor) rather address differences between developed and developing
countries, we use a measure of employment protection that varies even across
economically and institutionally well advanced countries: Employment pro-
tection of workers measures e.g. the difficulty of (unfairly) dismissing them,
their rights for compensation payments, and their exploitation through ‘flexi-
ble contract’ arrangements. To take account of the economic phenomenon of a
growing importance of temporary work contracts in the European economies,
we do not only look at the protection of regular (mostly permanent-contract)
employment, but equally analyze the effects for short-term contracts and tem-
porary work agency (TWA) employment. By using the sub-indices of the KOF
Index of Globalization6, we take account of the multifacetedness of economic
integration that goes beyond simple trade openness and foreign direct invest-
ment flows. In addition, using this index allows us to study whether the effects
of globalization differ across its various dimensions, specifically its economic,
social and political dimensions. A battery of robustness tests completes the em-
pirical analysis.
2.3 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
As argued above, strict employment protection legislation comes at a cost to
domestic firms, possibly leading to their competitive disadvantage. Producers
will hence lobby for a reduction of employment protection the stronger, the
more intense international economic integration is. Workers can be assumed
to have an interest in strong labor protection, in being employed in the regular
sector and in being employed in the first place. Consequently, if their jobs are
put under competitive pressure due to economic globalization, we suspect that
workers will favor policies that ensure the international competitiveness of their
6See Dreher (2006).
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jobs and that keep regular employment contracts relatively more attractive than
short-term ones for the producers.
Combining these interests of the electorate, we conjecture politicians to in-
troduce policies that decrease overall employment protection,7 but that increase
labor protection in the atypical employment (limited-term contract and tempo-
rary work agency) sector relative to protection in the regular sector. The latter
aspect is facilitated by the fact that regulation in the relatively new atypical
employment sector is initially quite low, i.e. politicians deliberately set incen-
tives for employers that are overall welfare-improving: Politicians might rela-
tively increase regulation in the temporary-contract sector with the intention
to make employers not substitute regular employment with short-term con-
tract/temporary work agency (TWA) positions. This argument rests on the styl-
ized fact that, even though employment protection for the regularly employed
has declined over the last years, their job security still remains substantially
higher than that for those in ‘atypical’ employment.
Similar reasoning can be derived from a more political economy approach.
Domestic politicians and unions might trade off the detrimental effects of glob-
alization in one sector with stronger protection in the other sector. Although the
share of the active labor force with temporary employment and atypical work
contracts has increased over the last 20 years in developed countries (according
to Franco andWinqvist (2002), in the EU-15 the share of temporary employment
in total dependent employment has risen from 4 percent in 1983 to 15 percent in
2007),8 employment in the regular sector is still by far larger than in the atypical
sector. It may thus well be that producer-supporting politicians buy support of
the electorate for labor market deregulation in the (traditional and economically
more important) regular employment sector by granting stronger employment
protection in the ’younger’ temporary employment sector, – a strategy, which,
given this latter sector’s minor economic importance, still leads to an increase
7A conjecture which is supported by the weakening effect of international trade on some
core labor standards (Busse, 2004).
8Recent numbers for Germany (2008) indicate that the share of regularly employed (per-
manent contracts with at least 20 working hours per weak) has declined since 1998 from 72.6
percent to 66 percent, while the share with ‘atypical’ contracts has increased from 16.2 per cent
to 22.2 per cent. The same study reveals that the atypically employed earns only about 2/3 of
the wage of a regularly employed (see Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009).
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in overall labor market flexibility.
From a theoretical political economy viewpoint, the hypothesis that global-
ization exerts a protectionist impact on one labor market sector, but a deregu-
lative one on the other, can be derived from linkage politics. This phenomenon
was first described in the political science and political economy literature on
international negotiations between two countries. Stein (1980) argues that con-
sent to a specific reform or treaty that benefits one group (here: the producers)
can be reached by linking the decision to reciprocal consent on a second reform
that benefits the other group (here: the workers/the unions). Mayer and Riez-
man (1987) take a more formal approach and find that such policy mixtures
(two interlinked reforms) constitute an equilibrium outcome of a bargaining
game between two players, which makes both players better off compared to a
situation without an agreement and without any reform.
Hence, we formulate the following hypotheses concerning overall globaliza-
tion:
Hypothesis 1: Globalization leads to an overall decrease of employ-
ment protection.
Hypothesis 2: Globalization leads to a relative increase in protection
of the temporary sector to protection in the regular sector.9
Applied to the subject of this study, ‘linkage politics’ interpretation above
rests on the general assumption that unions and workers might prefer stricter
regulation, whereas the opposite is the case for producers. Lobbying pressure
exerted by producers may be the stronger, the fiercer international competition
and economic globalization is. This is the reason why we formulate the follow-
ing hypothesis concerning economic globalization:
Hypothesis 3: Economic globalization leads to an overall decrease of
employment protection in both sectors.
9Note: This does not exclude a decrease in both sectors, if the decrease is larger in the regular
sector than in the atypical sector.
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In contrast, the lobbying pressure exerted by unions or the dependently em-
ployed might rise with exposure of a wider public to the forces of globalization,
reflected in the social dimension of globalization. People may mainly experi-
ence or become aware of globalization through own cross-national travel and
information exchange through mass media and the internet. Notably, without
this international communication infrastructure, the existence and success of
non-governmental organizations such as attac, Greenpeace or Amnesty Inter-
national would be unthinkable. Hence, political and social globalization might
lay the grounds for an international coordination of workers’ demands and a
more forceful formulation, based on a larger support, of demands for an in-
crease in labor protection. A similar argument does also hold for producers.
The easier international policy coordination becomes, the easier it is to sustain
higher levels of labor protection, as the cost of protection, if it equally applies
to all international producers, ensured by international treaties, does not bias
international trade.
Social and political globalization might even increase labor protection, if
countries with stricter regulation manage to impose an increase in regulation
on other countries through international organizations, which are a key aspect
of political globalization. This often implies the signing of agreements to pro-
mote the integration of markets (e.g. the EU), but also to strengthen core labor
standards (e.g. the ILO conventions). Put differently, such international orga-
nizations might help the international coordination and harmonization of labor
standards, preventing a race-to-the-bottom among economically well advanced
countries, or even increasing standards overall. Hence, we formulate the fol-
lowing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4: Political globalization has a non-negative effect on
employment protection.
Hypothesis 5: Social globalization has a non-negative effect on em-
ployment protection.
In a second step, we investigate whether the forces of globalization interplay
with the economic and political condition a country is in, or whether the effects
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of globalization are independent from such developments at the local level. In
particular, we test whether globalization aggravates the pressure to liberalize
labor markets exerted by growing unemployment spending. In addition, we
conjecture that the adverse effects of globalization are diminished if national
governments are left-wing.
2.4 Data and Empirical Strategy
2.4.1 Employment Protection Legislation
For our analysis, we use the index of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL),
Version 1, provided byOECD (2004) for 28 OECD countries, from 1985 to 2003.10
The EPL is based on government information andmeasures, in general, the pro-
tection of workers against specific forms of economic and financial exploitation
through their employers.11
For regularly employed workers, the relevant EPL index (‘EPLreg’) mea-
sures the overall strictness of protection with respect to four areas: The diffi-
culty of individual dismissals, notice and severance pay for no-fault individual
dismissals, the overall strictness of protection against dismissals, and regular
procedural inconveniences. Thus, this measure takes into account the possible
reasons for an individual lay-off, the regulation of advance notice and severance
pay, trial periods, conditions under which lay-offs are unjustified, and compen-
sation payment in case of such unjustified dismissals.
In contrast, for workers holding fixed-term work contracts or that are em-
ployed by temporary work agencies (so-called atypical work contracts), EPL
10The excluded countries are Iceland and Luxembourg with no observations of EPL. The in-
cluded countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg,
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States of America.
11This index excludes aspects of mass dismissals that are taken into account in a more recent
version of the EPL index (“Version 2”), which, however, covers a much smaller time span. The
first time point of measurement of EPL version 2 is 1998, that of version 1 the year 1985. Notably,
as stated in OECD (2004) p.102, the regulation of mass dismissals forms only an additional
protection against a rather rare form of lay-off, and in many countries regulations of individual
and mass dismissals are fairly identical.
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(‘EPLtemp’) captures the overall strength of restrictions on establishing andmain-
taining such temporary employment. OECD names the three areas covered by
this EPL index ‘fixed-term contracts’, ‘overall strictness of regulation’, and ‘tem-
porary work agencies’. These areas include the regulation of the number of
possible renewals of fixed-term contracts, the maximum accumulated contract
duration (in months), whether fixed-term contracts are generally permitted or
restricted to certain industry sectors only, or restricted to certain types of work
(e.g. to temporarily replacing a long-term sick worker or a worker on parental
leave).
Each EPL index (EPLreg, EPLtemp) ranges from 0 to 6 with continuous in-
tervals, and higher values indicate a stronger employment protection of work-
ers. In general, each EPL index is calculated as an average of points awarded
to its specific sub-dimensions in a four-step aggregation procedure (see OECD,
2004, chapter 2). Due to the four-step construction procedure of the index, small
changes in the overall index may reflect considerable institutional changes: For
example, a change from the oral notification of dismissal to a procedure where
a written statement giving reasons must be provided and a work council must
be notified increases the EPL index of regular employment by just 0.33 points
(see also OECD, 2004, p. 103 and p. 106). Similarly, a move from restricting
the number of (consecutive) short-term contracts renewals to having no restric-
tions decreases the EPL for temporary employment by only 0.125 points. Table
2.10 of Section 2.8 provides descriptive statistics of the indices of employment
protection in OECD countries.
An overview of the legal and institutional changes in OECD countries with
respect to employment protection from 1985 on is reported in Table 2.9 in section
2.8. Table 2.9 also illustrates in what directions these institutional changes influ-
enced the two EPL indices of regular and temporary employment. The general
impression is that, on average, since 1985 the EPL index has been falling, for
either type of employment. However, in some countries specific labor mar-
ket reforms had a neutral effect on the index (e.g. Belgium, Germany, Ireland,
Japan, Norway, Sweden), while, contrary to the general impression, a few re-
forms even improved on workers’ employment protection (Australia, France,
Great Britain, New Zealand). Notably, the effects of these labor market reforms
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are not even heterogeneous across countries or time, but also within a coun-
try across types of employment. For example, Finland and Portugal appear to
have liberalized the regular employment sector, while the employment protec-
tion index for temporary employment remained unaffected. Similarly, in Korea
the reduction in protection in the regular sector was significantly larger than
in the temporary sector. The exact opposite observation is made for Germany,
Italy and Japan, in which only the protection of the temporarily employed was
lowered. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the development of employment protection
in both sectors for a selection of countries. Figure 2.1 displays the development
of employment protection in the regular sector during the time span studied.
There is substantial variation between the countries. Within the time series, we
see that employment protection has stayed constant over time in some coun-
tries (Japan, USA), regardless of the initial level of regulation in these coun-
tries, while others have seen substantial decreases in protection (Finland, Korea,
Spain), and a few countries have even experienced small increases in employ-
ment protection (Australia, Germany, France). Furthermore, there seems to be a
convergence to a common level of labor protection for the European and Asian
countries, decreasing average employment protection in the regular sector.
Figure 2.2 shows the development of regulation in the atypical employment
sector between 1985 and 2003. There is substantial variation between the coun-
tries, even larger than in the regular employment sector. We also see substantial
deregulation in some countries (Germany, Japan and to some extent Korea),
while there has been no change in countries that already had a low level of
regulation at the beginning of the time span of the sample (Australia, Finland,
USA). In France, regulation has increased, while in Spain, an increase followed
a decrease in regulation. Hence, there seems to be no clear trend in the change
in regulation in this sector.
2.4.2 Globalization: Economic, Political and Social Dimensions
Globalization is measured by the annual KOF Index of Globalization developed
by Dreher (2006), which measures the degree of globalization from 1970 on-
wards, on a 0 to 100 scale. Its three sub-indices cover a country’s economic, po-
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Figure 2.1: Employment protection, regular employment, selected countries, 1985–2003
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litical, and social dimensions of globalization. All three dimensions contribute
with equal weights to the overall index of globalization.12
Economic globalization includes not only the traditional aspects of cross-
national flows of goods and services, but also measures of foreign investment
(direct, portfolio), the absence of traditional barriers to trade and capital flows,
as well as indicators of internationalization of a country’s labor force. The po-
litical dimension of globalization is captured mainly by a country’s number of
memberships in international organizations, foreign embassies, and participa-
tions in UN peace missions. Finally, social globalization aims at measuring the
spread and exchange of ideas, values, images and people. This aspect is cap-
tured by, for example, fast food chain prevalence (as indicator of U.S. culture
influence), cross-national trade in books and newspapers, but also international
tourism and number of internet users. Overall, aspects of social globalization
can be grouped into ‘personal contacts’, ‘information flow’ and ‘cultural prox-
imity’ (see also Dreher and Gaston, 2005).
12The index is now widely used, e.g. by Aidt and Gassebner (2007), Torgler (2007), Gemmell
et al. (2008) and Lamo et al. (2008).
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Figure 2.2: Employment protection, atypical employment, selected countries, 1985–2003
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Table 2.10 of Section 2.8 at the end of this chapter provides descriptive statis-
tics of the globalization measures in our sample of OECD countries, which all
endorse the principles of free trade. The index of economic globalization has
a considerably large mean of 73.5 points, but ranges still from 37.8 to 96.0, re-
sulting in a standard deviation of 12.5. The development of globalization is not
uniform in our sample: the speed by which a nation opened itself economically
(as well as politically and socially) varies by country and world region, even
among OECD member states which share, by definition of their membership,
similar economic and political institutions.
Figure 2.3 shows the development of overall globalization and its three sub-
categories for the same selection of countries as in Figure 2.1 and 2.2 from 1970
to 2003. Generally, we see substantial variation both between countries and
within the time series, and a trend towards a higher level of globalization in
all four panels. Except for social globalization, Japan seems to be far less in-
ternationally integrated than the rest of the countries. The US, starting with a
relatively high level of globalization in all fields, is overtaken by all countries
except for Japan in overall, economic and political globalization over time. At
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the end of the period studied, even the former communist-block Czech Repub-
lic is more globalized in these fields, after a rapid catch-up during the nineties,
than the US. Also Spain has experienced a substantial increase in international
integration, both in absolute terms and relative to other countries. The Scandi-
navian countries show the highest level of overall, economic and political glob-
alization. Somewhat different from the other three panels is the graph for polit-
ical globalization. Here, there is no time trend, and large variation in the time
series for some of the countries. Here, however, the US is in the top position
both at the beginning and at the end of the time series, while the Scandinavian
countries are only in the midfield. The pattern for Spain and the Czech Republic
is the same as in the other fields of globalization: A large absolute and relative
increase in social globalization. Hence, there is not only substantial variation
within the time series and across countries, there is also variation over time in
the relative levels of globalization between the single countries, i.e. variation in
the data is not only cross-sectional (constant distance between lines), but also
across time (local differences in steepness), even when the model includes time
fixed effects that take out the common development pattern.
2.4.3 Controlling Variables
In this analysis, as controlling variables we also employ data on unemploy-
ment rate, unemployment benefit spending (as share of gross domestic product
(GDP)), population size, and national income (GDP), its 5-year growth rate, all
obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI) database
(World Bank, 2009). Furthermore, we measure the political leaning of the gov-
ernment in two different ways. First, we use a dummy indicating a left-wing
government, which has been constructed from data available in the updated
version (2005) of Beck et al. (2001). Second, we use the index developed in
Bjørnskov (2008), which is based on the number of seats held by the parties in
government and, thus, continuous. This index of government ideology ranges
between the values -1 and 1, where -1 indicates a fully left-wing government
and 1 a right-wing government. Although the maximum number of observa-
tions is 486 country-years, due to some missing values in the remaining ex-
26
Figure 2.3: Globalization and its sub-components, 1970–2003
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Source: KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher, 2006), own calculations.
planatory variables, we obtain an unbalanced panel with a maximum of 480
observations. The unemployment rate and unemployment spending (in log),
are used to proxy pressure to loosen employment protection emerging from the
situation in the domestic labor market, where the unemployment rate is meant
to proxy pressure coming from the electorate, while unemployment spending is
supposed to proxy budgetary pressure. We furthermore control for the five year
GDP growth rate and national income, as faster growing and richer countries
are more likely to have strong unions, possibly leading to stricter employment
protection (see Dreher and Gaston, 2005; Wallerstein and Western, 2000).13 We
13The direct inclusion of unionization as a controlling variable would reduce the sample size
from 26 to 20 countries. We introduce unionization in a separate regression as a robustness
check later. The main results remain the same.
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use the five year growth rate as we want to control for structural aspects of
the economy. The business cycle is controlled for by the unemployment rate
and year fixed effects. We also include the logarithm of the population size
that accounts for the size of the domestic market, with a larger domestic de-
mand possibly implying less ‘need’ for domestic firms to internationally expand
and hence lower competitive pressure by foreign competitors on domestic labor
standards. The exact definitions of the variables in the empirical model and de-
scriptive statistics are provided in Table 2.10.
2.4.4 Model
In our model we view employment protection legislation in country i at time
t (EPLit) as a function of globalization in the same country (GLOBit), and a set
of country-specific controlling factors (Xit) that might be correlated with both
the focal variable and the dependent variable. Country (FEi) and year (Tt) fixed
effects account for unobserved country heterogeneity due to time-invariant na-
tional characteristics (such as certain labor market regulations and features of
the insurance system) and year-specific (but country-unspecific) factors (such
as world-wide economic shocks). A preliminary Hausman test rejected the ran-
dom effects specification in favor of the fixed effects model, which we employ.
An F-test of joint significance indicates that the year effects should not be omit-
ted from the equation.14 An error term (ǫit) completes the model.
Potential simultaneity might bias the estimated coefficient vector. We ad-
dress this issue by employing country fixed effects and lagging the explanatory
variables by two periods.15 This specific lag structure is chosen on theoretical
grounds, particularly because in most OECD countries the legislature period is
four years, so that a 2-year lag might account for the duration of the legislat-
ing process and politicians’ response time to changes in their party majorities
triggered by new economic developments, particularly changes in the degree
of globalization. Furthermore, as robustness test for the effects of globalization
14A Tobit model would yield inconsistent estimates due to the inclusion of fixed-effects.
15Lack of suitable instruments does not allow for testing the exogeneity assumption. Al-
though the dependent variable may be viewed as truncated below 0 and above 5, a fixed effects
estimation using unconditional Tobit might yield biased estimates.
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we estimate a more parsimonious model that excludes some of the potentially
endogenous determinants. The complete model looks as follows:
EPLit = α + βGLOBit−2 + γXit−2 + FEi + Tt + ǫit, (2.1)
where EPLit denotes the different indices of employment protection, and
GLOBit−2 is the respective (sub-)index of globalization. The vector Xit−2 con-
tains the controlling variables, FEi and Tt represent country and time fixed ef-
fects, ǫit is the error term, α is a constant and β and γ are parameters.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Main Results
In general, the results of our estimations confirm our predictions made in Sec-
tion 2.3. In Tables 2.1 and 2.2 we find empirical support for our hypotheses. Ac-
cording to Table 2.1, column 1, the protection of regular employment appears
lowered by globalization, while column 1 of Table 2.2 suggests that the net effect
of globalization on protection of the temporarily employed is not significantly
different from zero, leading to an overall decrease of employment protection in
the economy, but also to a relative increase of protection in the atypical sector
compared to the regular sector. This supports Hypotheses 1 and 2.
For the regularly employed, we find the protection-lowering effect of over-
all globalization (Table 2.1 column 1) to be driven by all sub-dimensions, eco-
nomic, political and social globalization. All three exert a significant negative
impact on employment protection - independently as well as when simulta-
neously included in the regressions (Table 2.1 columns 2 to 5). Simultaneous
inclusion lets us rule out the possibility that one dimension simply proxies the
other in the single dimension regressions (Table 2.1, column 2).16 For the regular
employment sector, a simple comparison of the estimated coefficients indicates
16The similarity of coefficients on globalization measures across models 2, 3, 4, and 5 suggests
that the three dimensions do not approximate each other in the single-dimension regressions,
despite of their considerable correlation, particularly of the economic dimension with the polit-
ical one (rho = 0.72).
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Table 2.1: Globalization and protection of regularly employed, 1985–2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP (-2) -0.345 -0.224 -0.588** -0.732*** -0.827***
[1.21] [0.79] [2.13] [2.62] [2.97]
Unemployment rate (-2) 0.003 0.006 0.007 -0.002 -0.001
[0.48] [1.03] [1.15] [0.39] [0.14]
Log unemployment spending (-2) -0.087*** -0.100*** -0.130*** -0.087*** -0.099***
[2.75] [3.11] [4.07] [2.63] [3.03]
GDP growth (-2) 0.006 0.002 0.018 0.024 0.027*
[0.39] [0.13] [1.19] [1.57] [1.74]
Left-wing government (-2) 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.042** 0.053*** 0.042**
[2.60] [2.77] [2.13] [2.62] [2.07]
Globalization, overall (-2) -0.021***
[5.73]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.014*** -0.013***
[5.27] [4.93]
Political glob. (-2) -0.007*** -0.006***
[3.71] [3.22]
Social glob. (-2) -0.004* -0.005**
[1.83] [2.28]
Constant 7.144*** 6.336** 8.610*** 9.459*** 10.148***
[2.88] [2.57] [3.49] [3.77] [4.05]
Observations 401 401 401 401 401
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 26
R-squared (within) 0.24 0.26 0.23 0.20 0.18
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for regularly employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year
fixed effects (not reported). Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
that economic globalization has quantitatively the largest effect on employment
protection. The size of the effect is quite considerable: An increase in economic
globalization (running from 0 to 100) by 10 score points lowers employment
protection by roughly 0.14 points, a change in EPL that could be triggered by
e.g. liberalizing the dismissal procedure from one in which a third party ap-
proval is required to a regulation according to which only a simple notification
of a work council is needed (decreases EPL by 0.15 points).
Taking the results of Table 2.1 together, mainly economic, but to some ex-
tent also political and social globalization appear to weaken the laws protecting
regular employment. This finding is in support of traditional and political econ-
omy models of international trade suggesting that fiercer international market
competition makes domestic firms lobby for more domestic labor market flexi-
bility, and supports our hypotheses 3, 4 and 5.
In contrast, Table 2.2 shows that protection of fixed-term and temporary-
work-agency employed workers (‘atypical contracts’) is not affected by global-
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Table 2.2: Globalization and protection of atypically employed, 1985–2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP (-2) 2.700*** 2.908*** 3.615*** 2.616*** 2.783***
[3.31] [3.59] [4.63] [3.37] [3.61]
Unemployment rate (-2) -0.016 -0.001 -0.002 -0.011 -0.014
[0.98] [0.05] [0.14] [0.68] [0.87]
Log unemployment spending (-2) -0.162* -0.239*** -0.179** -0.194** -0.170*
[1.78] [2.60] [1.98] [2.12] [1.88]
GDP growth (-2) -0.100** -0.107** -0.139*** -0.097** -0.102**
[2.24] [2.43] [3.24] [2.27] [2.37]
Left-wing government (-2) 0.062 0.048 0.067 0.043 0.068
[1.09] [0.85] [1.19] [0.77] [1.21]
Globalization, overall (-2) 0.013
[1.24]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.019** -0.019**
[2.46] [2.55]
Political glob. (-2) 0.011** 0.013**
[2.06] [2.43]
Social glob. (-2) 0.011* 0.011*
[1.93] [1.93]
Constant -23.918*** -25.213*** -29.574*** -23.264*** -24.524***
[3.35] [3.57] [4.24] [3.34] [3.54]
Observations 401 401 401 401 401
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 26
R-squared (within) 0.31 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.31
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for atypically employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year
fixed effects (not reported). Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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ization, measured by its general index (column 1), in line with Hypothesis 2.
However, this time it is not the economic dimension of globalization that gives
rise to this finding, which again exerts a negative effect (Table 2.2 column 3),
in line with Hypothesis 3. Instead, it is the social and political dimensions of
globalization that strengthen employment protection (Table 2.2, columns 4 and
5), outweighing the labor standards lowering effect of economic globalization.
This supports hypotheses 4 and 5. Again, an increase in political or globaliza-
tion of 10 points would result in an substantial increase in EPL for ‘atypical’
forms of employments that mirrored, for example, restricting the number of
contract renewals, or changing the maximum of cumulated contract duration
from ‘no limitation’ to ‘24 months’ (= + 0.125 points). Column 2 includes all
three dimensions of globalization. It confirms the preceding single-dimension
analyses, i.e. the zero net effect of globalization on protection of temporary
employment, being driven entirely by its non-economic dimensions (social and
political).
Taking the results of Table 2.2 altogether, we find support for hypotheses 3-
5. Globalization in its social and political dimensions puts an upward pressure
on protection of workers with ‘atypical’ contracts. In contrast, the economic
dimension appears to decrease labor standards, yielding a zero net effect of
globalization on labor protection in this sector.
Combining the results of Tables 2.1 and 2.2, we find that economic global-
ization decreases labor protection, while political and social globalization influ-
ence protection negatively in the regular sector, and positively in the atypical
sector, leading to a relative increase of protection in the latter sector compared
to protection in the first sector.
Turning to the effects of our controlling variables, we observe some similar-
ities and some dissimilarities across the two different labor market segments.
For both segments, Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show that a larger burden of unemploy-
ment spending in the economy, measured as share of GDP, exerts a pressure
to deregulate labor markets, while the unemployment rate seems to exert no
effect. The negative correlation between the generosity of unemployment ben-
efits and employment protection was already reported in OECD (2004, p. 92).
Furthermore, we find that as countries grow richer, as measured by GDP, pro-
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Table 2.3: Globalization and protection of regularly employed, 1985–2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP (-2) -0.235 -0.111 -0.538* -0.744** -0.798***
[0.78] [0.37] [1.84] [2.50] [2.67]
Unemployment rate (-2) 0.003 0.008 0.009 -0.004 -0.001
[0.57] [1.31] [1.46] [0.61] [0.21]
Log unemployment spending (-2) -0.077** -0.092*** -0.127*** -0.076** -0.092***
[2.48] [2.91] [4.03] [2.31] [2.84]
GDP growth (-2) 0.004 0.001 0.020 0.025 0.027
[0.25] [0.05] [1.22] [1.47] [1.62]
Right-wing govt., continuous (-2) -0.084*** -0.091*** -0.067** -0.060* -0.054*
[2.67] [2.93] [2.13] [1.85] [1.67]
Globalization, overall (-2) -0.023***
[6.09]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.016*** -0.015***
[5.88] [5.46]
Political glob. (-2) -0.007*** -0.006***
[3.78] [3.07]
Social glob. (-2) -0.004** -0.005**
[2.13] [2.42]
Constant 6.273** 5.493** 8.283*** 9.585*** 9.896***
[2.38] [2.11] [3.20] [3.61] [3.71]
Observations 396 396 396 396 396
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 25
R-squared (within) 0.25 0.27 0.23 0.19 0.18
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for regularly employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year
fixed effects (not reported). Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Political orientation of the government is measured by the continuous
ideology index developed by Bjørnskov (2008). Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 2.4: Globalization and protection of atypically employed, 1985–2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP (-2) 1.816** 1.970** 2.912*** 1.697** 1.989**
[2.07] [2.27] [3.51] [2.07] [2.40]
Unemployment rate (-2) -0.023 -0.004 -0.006 -0.015 -0.021
[1.44] [0.21] [0.34] [0.94] [1.31]
Log unemployment spending (-2) -0.162* -0.257*** -0.181** -0.214** -0.163*
[1.80] [2.81] [2.02] [2.35] [1.81]
GDP growth (-2) -0.076 -0.076 -0.118** -0.069 -0.083*
[1.59] [1.61] [2.56] [1.49] [1.78]
Right-wing govt., continuous (-2) 0.188** 0.186** 0.133 0.200** 0.177**
[2.07] [2.08] [1.49] [2.25] [1.98]
Globalization, overall (-2) 0.016
[1.46]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.019** -0.021***
[2.42] [2.64]
Political glob. (-2) 0.016*** 0.018***
[2.80] [3.13]
Social glob. (-2) 0.010* 0.010*
[1.76] [1.73]
Constant -15.906** -16.928** -22.898*** -15.205** -17.000**
[2.09] [2.26] [3.11] [2.08] [2.30]
Observations 396 396 396 396 396
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 25
R-squared (within) 0.31 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.31
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for atypically employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year
fixed effects (not reported). Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Political orientation of the government is measured by the continuous
ideology index developed by Bjørnskov (2008). Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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tection of temporarily employed workers increases, as predicted. In contrast, an
increase in a country’s wealth is associated with a decrease in the protection of
regularly employed. Economic performance in the past five years, as measured
by the five year growth rate of GDP, seems to have no influence on protection in
the regular sector, while an increase in the growth rate is associated with lower
protection in the atypical sector (no causal interpretation intended here). For
regular employment, supporting our reasoning above, we also find that left-
wing governments tend to support a higher level of employment protection
in the regular sector. In tendency, this effect is also observable for temporary
employment, albeit statistically much weaker. When we employ a continuous
variable as alternative measure of government ideology instead of the dummy
variable (Tables 2.3 and 2.4), we find that right wing governments significantly
decrease employment protection in the regular sector, and increase employment
protection in the atypical sector.
Apparently, our analyses of the direct effects of globalization on employ-
ment protection show that the economic forces of globalization and interna-
tional competition lower protection of both regular and temporary employ-
ment, as argued in Hypothesis 3. In contrast, it is the political and social di-
mensions of globalization that are most decisive for a stronger (relative) protec-
tion of employees with ‘atypical’ work contracts, which supports Hypothesis 5.
Political international integration affects both labor market segments likewise:
It works in the same protection lowering direction as economic globalization
for regular employment, but strongly in the opposite direction for temporary
employment. For overall globalization, we find a negative effect on protection
in the regular sector, and a zero net effect in the atypical sector. These findings
support Hypotheses 1 and 2.
2.5.2 Robustness
Our main results are robust to several changes in the specification of the regres-
sion and in the sample. The Tables presenting the results of the robustness check
can be found in Section 2.8 at the end of this chapter. We obtain results that are
qualitatively similar (in terms of coefficient sizes and direction of influence of
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globalization measures) if a more parsimonious model is estimated that omits
those variables that are potentially endogenous to employment protection, such
as the unemployment rate, GDP growth, and left-wing ideology of the govern-
ment (see Tables 2.11 and 2.12). Moreover, the findings are robust to estimating
our models with a reduced sample that excludes the former communist coun-
tries Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovak Republic (see Tables 2.13
and 2.14); this test rejects the claim that our findings were driven by transition
countries that, from 1991 on, underwent extreme changes in their international
economic integration, as discussed in Section 2.4. The results are also qualita-
tively unaltered when we take the autocorrelation of the residuals into account
or when we replace the dichotomous indicator of government ideology with a
continuous measure (see Tables 2.3 and 2.4).
Our results remain also unaltered when we include union density as an ad-
ditional control variable (see Tables 2.15 and 2.16). Again, we find a negative
effect of the overall index of globalization on protection of regularly employed
workers and an a zero net effect for the temporary-contract sector. Turning
to the sub-indices of globalization, in line with our previous findings, the co-
efficients of economic, political and social globalization turn out negative and
significant for the regular employment sector. For the atypical-contract sector,
we find again that the negative effect of economic globalization is compensated
by a positive effect of political globalization, the difference to our main results
here being the now insignificant effect of social globalization.
2.6 The Aggravating Effect of Globalization on Em-
ployment Protection
The impact exerted by globalization might not only be direct, but also indirect.
More specifically, the effects of domestic macroeconomic and political factors
that weaken employment protection might be amplified through the pressures
of the international market and international politics. Put differently, we can
expect interplays of these domestic factors with the three dimensions of glob-
alization. In the following we test this conjecture for unemployment spending
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and a right-wing ideology of the government, both of which were previously
found to lower employment protection, at least of the regularly employed.
Tables 2.5 through 2.8 show the results of this exercise. We employ the con-
tinuous measure of right-wing government ideology by Bjørnskov (2008) in
place of the previously employed dichotomous indicator for left-wing govern-
ments. The models with the odd numbers (1, 3, and 5) report the findings for
the baseline specification of Tables 2.3 and 2.4, while the models with the even
numbers (2, 4, and 6) add interaction terms to the empirical model.
2.6.1 Globalization and Unemployment Spending
In Table 2.5, unemployment spending lowers protection of the regularly em-
ployed in all model specifications. This finding was already observed in Table
2.3. Indeed, inclusion of the interaction term with globalization makes this re-
sult even more statistically robust. Again, overall, economic, political and social
globalization are negatively associated with employment protection of regular
workers (columns 1 to 4).
In line with our hypothesis, we find negative (and significant) interaction
terms between unemployment spending and the economic dimension of global-
ization for the protection of the regularly employed (column 2). Thus, stronger
linkages with international markets aggravate the pressure to deregulate labor
markets exerted by domestic macroeconomic structures such as a generous and
budget-burdening unemployment benefit system.17 Overall, the main finding
of Table 2.5 is that in a globalized world particularly international economic
linkages add to the pressure of a bad labor market performance to lower pro-
tection of regularly employed workers.
Table 2.6 analyzes the same question for workers with ‘atypical’ work con-
tracts. As in Table 2.4, it is the political and social dimensions of globalization
that lead to an increase in regulation of the temporary sector (columns 3 to 6),
while the economic dimension decreases regulation (columns 1 and 2). Again,
unemployment spending is associated with lower employment protection in
17As we have controlled for the unemployment rate, unemployment spending is also inter-
pretable as a measure of generosity rather than sheer size.
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Table 2.5: Interaction between globalization and unemployment spending for regular employ-
ment, 1985–2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log GDP (-2) -0.235 -0.237 -0.538* -0.688** -0.744** -0.684** -0.798*** -0.807***
[0.78] [0.79] [1.84] [2.28] [2.50] [2.28] [2.67] [2.71]
Unemployment rate (-2) 0.003 0.005 0.009 0.007 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 0.000
[0.57] [0.91] [1.46] [1.10] [0.61] [0.65] [0.21] [0.08]
Log unemployment spend-
ing (-2)
-0.077** -0.095*** -0.127*** -0.127*** -0.076** -0.081** -0.092*** -0.105***
[2.48] [3.02] [4.03] [4.04] [2.31] [2.45] [2.84] [3.12]
GDP growth (-2) 0.004 0.005 0.020 0.023 0.025 0.022 0.027 0.029*
[0.25] [0.31] [1.22] [1.40] [1.47] [1.34] [1.62] [1.73]
Right-wing govt., contin-
uous (-2)
-0.084*** -0.075** -0.067** -0.053* -0.060* -0.053 -0.054* -0.051
[2.67] [2.38] [2.13] [1.66] [1.85] [1.64] [1.67] [1.57]
Globalization, overall (-2) -0.023*** -0.025***
[6.09] [6.52]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.015*** -0.012***
[5.46] [3.83]
Political glob. (-2) -0.006*** -0.007***
[3.07] [3.38]
Social glob. (-2) -0.005** -0.006***
[2.42] [2.77]
Globalization (-2) * log
unemp. spending (-2)
-0.003*** -0.004* -0.002 -0.001
[2.68] [1.92] [1.42] [1.39]
Constant 6.262** 6.387** 8.266*** 9.464*** 9.574*** 9.121*** 9.883*** 10.011***
[2.38] [2.44] [3.19] [3.56] [3.61] [3.42] [3.71] [3.76]
Observations 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
R-squared (within) 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for regularly employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year
fixed effects (not reported). Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Political orientation of the government is measured by the continuous
ideology index developed by Bjørnskov (2008). Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 2.6: Interaction between globalization and unemployment spending for atypical employ-
ment, 1985–2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log GDP (-2) 1.816** 1.809** 2.912*** 2.461*** 1.697** 2.024** 1.989** 1.934**
[2.07] [2.10] [3.51] [2.87] [2.07] [2.46] [2.40] [2.36]
Unemployment rate (-2) -0.023 -0.016 -0.006 -0.012 -0.015 -0.016 -0.021 -0.011
[1.44] [0.98] [0.34] [0.70] [0.94] [1.03] [1.31] [0.70]
Log unemployment spend-
ing (-2)
-0.162* -0.235*** -0.181** -0.180** -0.214** -0.240*** -0.163* -0.236**
[1.80] [2.59] [2.02] [2.02] [2.35] [2.65] [1.81] [2.56]
GDP growth (-2) -0.076 -0.073 -0.118** -0.109** -0.069 -0.081* -0.083* -0.072
[1.59] [1.54] [2.56] [2.37] [1.49] [1.76] [1.78] [1.55]
Right-wing govt., contin-
uous (-2)
0.188** 0.226** 0.133 0.174* 0.200** 0.235*** 0.177** 0.196**
[2.07] [2.51] [1.49] [1.91] [2.25] [2.64] [1.98] [2.21]
Globalization, overall (-2) 0.016 0.009
[1.46] [0.80]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.021*** -0.012
[2.64] [1.30]
Political glob. (-2) 0.018*** 0.012*
[3.13] [1.95]
Social glob. (-2) 0.010* 0.003
[1.73] [0.50]
Globalization (-2) * log
unemp. spending (-2)
-0.014*** -0.011** -0.010*** -0.008***
[3.72] [2.04] [2.84] [3.01]
Constant -15.928** -15.433** -22.923*** -19.313** -15.234** -17.716** -17.022** -16.267**
[2.09] [2.06] [3.11] [2.56] [2.08] [2.43] [2.30] [2.23]
Observations 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
R-squared (within) 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.31 0.33
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for atypically employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year
fixed effects (not reported). Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Political orientation of the government is measured by the continuous
ideology index developed by Bjørnskov (2008). Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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all regressions. The estimates of the interaction terms show that unemploy-
ment spending in its interplay with globalization lowers the protection of the
temporarily employed (column 2). The same is the case when we look at the
different dimensions of globalization separately. Unemployment spending ag-
gravates the negative effect of economic globalization, and decreases the pos-
itive effects of political and social globalization, which turn insignificant if the
interaction term is included (columns 4, 6 and 8).
While the coefficients of Tables 2.5 and 2.6 give the average effect of the in-
terplay between unemployment spending and globalization, Figures 2.4 and 2.5
show the effect of the various measures of globalization on employment protec-
tion conditional on the size of unemployment spending. Figure 2.4 shows the
effect on protection in the regular employment sector, Figure 2.5 illustrates the
effect on regulation of the atypical employment sector. Panels (a)-(d) represent
the regressions including measures of overall, economic, political and social
globalization, respectively.
Figure 2.4 reveals that the effect is negative throughout, though statistically
significant only for overall and economic globalization. Furthermore, we see
that the magnitude of the negative effect increases with unemployment spend-
ing. Figure 2.5 shows that while the effect is negative and significant for all
measures of globalization when evaluated at the mean, regulation seems to be
tightened by an increase in globalization, the lower unemployment spending
is.
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Taken altogether, Tables 2.5 and 2.6 and Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show that glob-
alization interplays with the domestic macro-economic condition: the employ-
ment protection lowering effect of unemployment spending appears aggravated
by the forces of globalization, by economic globalization for the regularly em-
ployed and by all dimensions of globalization for the temporarily employed.
2.6.2 Globalization and Government Ideology
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 include interactions between globalization and government
ideology in the baseline model.
For the regularly employed, the odd numbered columns of Table 2.7 show
the negative and significant direct effects of economic, political and social glob-
alization on employment protection, which have already been observed in Table
2.3. Analogous to Table 2.3, the direct effect of right-wing government ideology
on employment protection appears negative and significant. Looking at the
interactions between globalization and government ideology, we find that em-
ployment protection is reduced further with increasing economic globalization,
the more right-wing the government is (column 4). We find no such interaction
effect for the political and social dimensions of globalization (columns 6 and 8)
and for the overall index of globalization (column 2).
For the temporarily employed, as already shown in Table 2.4, social and po-
litical globalization increase regulation (columns 5 and 7 of Table 2.8), while
economic globalization leads to a decrease in regulation (column 3). Again,
right-wing governments are found to increase regulation in the temporary sec-
tor in all specification except for the one including economic globalization. Con-
cerning the interaction terms, political globalization is found to increase the
strengthening effect of right-wing governments on the regulation of short-term
work contracts (column 6), or, put the other way round, right-wing government
ideology aggravates the protection increasing effect of political globalization.
Taken altogether, investigating the interplay between the political position-
ing of national governments and globalization, with respect to employment
protection of permanent contract workers we find that right-wing governments
respond more strongly to the forces exerted by economic globalization, as one
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Table 2.7: Interaction between globalization and government ideology for regular employment,
1985–2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log GDP (-2) -0.235 -0.210 -0.538* -0.547* -0.744** -0.721** -0.798*** -0.771**
[0.78] [0.69] [1.84] [1.85] [2.50] [2.40] [2.67] [2.58]
Unemployment rate (-2) 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.009 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001
[0.57] [0.60] [1.46] [1.45] [0.61] [0.59] [0.21] [0.18]
Log unemployment spend-
ing (-2)
-0.077** -0.080** -0.127*** -0.127*** -0.076** -0.081** -0.092*** -0.093***
[2.48] [2.54] [4.03] [4.02] [2.31] [2.41] [2.84] [2.87]
GDP growth (-2) 0.004 0.002 0.020 0.020 0.025 0.023 0.027 0.025
[0.25] [0.14] [1.22] [1.24] [1.47] [1.36] [1.62] [1.48]
Right-wing govt., contin-
uous (-2)
-0.084*** -0.084*** -0.067** -0.066** -0.060* -0.059* -0.054* -0.054*
[2.67] [2.68] [2.13] [2.12] [1.85] [1.84] [1.67] [1.68]
Globalization, overall (-2) -0.023*** -0.023***
[6.09] [6.06]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.015*** -0.014***
[5.46] [5.01]
Political glob. (-2) -0.006*** -0.006***
[3.07] [3.11]
Social glob. (-2) -0.005** -0.005**
[2.42] [2.50]
Globalization (-2) * right-
wing govt. (-2)
0.002 -0.006* 0.002 0.003
[0.86] [1.79] [0.74] [1.40]
Constant 6.251** 6.039** 8.266*** 8.343*** 9.569*** 9.380*** 9.881*** 9.682***
[2.37] [2.28] [3.19] [3.19] [3.60] [3.51] [3.70] [3.63]
Observations 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
R-squared (within) 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.27 0.27
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for regularly employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year
fixed effects (not reported). Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Political orientation of the government is measured by the continuous
ideology index developed by Bjørnskov (2008). Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 2.8: Interaction between globalization and government ideology for atypical employment,
1985–2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log GDP (-2) 1.816** 1.983** 2.912*** 3.066*** 1.697** 1.891** 1.989** 2.036**
[2.07] [2.26] [3.51] [3.67] [2.07] [2.30] [2.40] [2.45]
Unemployment rate (-2) -0.023 -0.022 -0.006 -0.005 -0.015 -0.014 -0.021 -0.021
[1.44] [1.37] [0.34] [0.30] [0.94] [0.87] [1.31] [1.29]
Log unemployment spend-
ing (-2)
-0.162* -0.178** -0.181** -0.182** -0.214** -0.250*** -0.163* -0.164*
[1.80] [1.98] [2.02] [2.03] [2.35] [2.72] [1.81] [1.83]
GDP growth (-2) -0.076 -0.088* -0.118** -0.127*** -0.069 -0.082* -0.083* -0.086*
[1.59] [1.84] [2.56] [2.74] [1.49] [1.77] [1.78] [1.85]
Right-wing govt., contin-
uous (-2)
0.188** 0.187** 0.133 0.127 0.200** 0.202** 0.177** 0.177**
[2.07] [2.06] [1.49] [1.43] [2.25] [2.28] [1.98] [1.98]
Globalization, overall (-2) 0.016 0.016
[1.46] [1.51]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.021*** -0.020**
[2.64] [2.52]
Political glob. (-2) 0.018*** 0.017***
[3.13] [3.03]
Social glob. (-2) 0.010* 0.010*
[1.73] [1.68]
Globalization (-2) * right-
wing govt. (-2)
0.016** 0.013 0.013** 0.005
[1.99] [1.44] [2.26] [0.86]
Constant -15.856** -17.262** -22.863*** -24.237*** -15.152** -16.723** -16.953** -17.292**
[2.08] [2.26] [3.10] [3.26] [2.07] [2.29] [2.29] [2.34]
Observations 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
R-squared (within) 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.31
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for atypically employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year
fixed effects (not reported). Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Political orientation of the government is measured by the continuous
ideology index developed by Bjørnskov (2008). Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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would expect. Put differently, left-wing governments attempt to counteract the
liberalization pressure exerted by economic globalization.
For workers with atypical contracts, the protection-increasing effect of politi-
cal globalization is reinforced by a right-wing government. This result indicates
that the ‘policymixture’ strategy (see Section 2.3) of particularly right-wing gov-
ernments, which is to appease the work force and unions by stronger protecting
the (economically far less important) ’atypical contract’ employees, works the
better, the stronger the political international integration of a country is, i.e. the
better the politicians can signal their credibility to the opposing interest groups.
While the coefficients of Tables 2.7 and 2.8 give the average effect of the inter-
play between government ideology and globalization, Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show
the effect of the various measures of globalization on employment protection
conditional on government ideology. Figure 2.6 shows the effect on protection
in the regular employment sector, Figure 2.7 illustrates the effect on regulation
of the atypical employment sector. Panels (a)-(d) represent the regressions in-
cluding measures of overall, economic, political and social globalization, re-
spectively.
Panel (a) of Figure 2.6 reveals that the effect of overall globalization on em-
ployment protection in the regular sector does not vary conditional on govern-
ment ideology. This net effect is however due to the effects of the single domains
of globalization cancelling each other out. While the magnitude of the negative
effect of economic globalization increases the more conservative a government
is (Panel (b)), Panels (c) and (d) show that the effects of political and social tend
to increase from left to right (though the interaction term itself is insignificant).
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Corroborating our conclusion from Table 2.8 that right wing governments
tend to trade off deregulation in the more important sector against an increase
in regulation in the smaller sector, Figure 2.7 shows that for the atypical employ-
ment sector, for all measures of globalization, right wing governments increase
regulation more (or deregulate less) than left wing governments if confronted
with increasing globalization.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have empirically investigated whether globalization exerts a
downward pressure on the protection of workers’ employment conditions. It
is the first contribution to account for the various dimensions of globalization,
the economic, the political and the social one, in this field. It is also the first to
differentiate between regular and atypical employment.
Using a panel of 28 OECD countries from 1985 to 2003, we test for the impact
of globalization in its economic, political and social dimensions on the strict-
ness of employment protection legislation. We reveal that overall globalization
lowers employment protection of the regularly employed, but has no signifi-
cant net effect on that of workers in ‘atypical’ employment relations. We argue
that relative increase in the protection of the economically less important group
of short-term workers may serve as symbolic political act by vote-maximizing
politicians intending to ‘buy’ workers’ acceptance of labor market liberalization
for the regularly employed.
The analysis for the single dimensions of globalization is supportive of this
political economy interpretation: We find that it is mainly the economic dimen-
sion of globalization, possibly triggering producer’s lobbying activities, that
lowers employment protection for regularly employed workers, as predicted
by international trade models. We also find that political globalization, possibly
one of the transmission channels of producer preferences, adds to this down-
ward pressure. However, for workers in atypical employment, the negative
effect of economic globalization is outweighed by the effects of international
political and social integration, where the latter possibly makes the common
49
workers aware of the phenomenon of globalization through international travel
and worldwide communication, while political globalization acts as transmis-
sion channel of workers’ preferences.
Furthermore, we find that globalization aggravates the effects of domestic
political or economic determinants of labor protection: The deregulative influ-
ence of adverse macroeconomic conditions is the larger, the more globalized a
country is. This result holds for both sectors of the labor market, with the dereg-
ulative effects for the regularly employed enforced by the economic dimension,
and for the temporarily employed by all three dimensions. In line with com-
mon expectations, we find that right-wing governments decrease protection of
the regular labor market sector the stronger, the more the country is integrated
into the world market. In contrast, right-wing governments make regulation
of the temporary employment sector the stricter, the more the country is glob-
alized in the political dimension. We view the relevance of political globaliza-
tion in its interplay with local economic and political conditions for increasing
the protection of the ‘atypical’ and economically less important employments
as another support for the political economy interpretation of our results, now
suggesting that particularly right-wing politicians trade off deregulation of one
labor market sector by a stronger regulation of the other.
Overall, this analysis suggests that the economic and societal effects of glob-
alization are not as clear-cut as some public discussions may suggest. The com-
mon intuition that globalization is detrimental to the well-being of the depen-
dently employed can only be partly supported. It appears that workers in atyp-
ical employment contracts, commonly viewed as more vulnerable as compared
to the regularly employed, are not negatively affected by the forces exerted by
globalization. Our analysis also reveals that it is rather domestic economic and
political conditions that are the main drivers of labor market liberalization, the
impact of which is the stronger the more globalized a country is. Furthermore,
our interplay analysis also suggests that the process of globalization is used as
an argument in the political debate, so that, depending on government ideology,
government response either aggravates or counteracts the effects of globaliza-
tion. Our analysis also reveals that this government response does not necessar-
ily follow traditional ideological lines, contradicting common views and simple
50
truths. However, to identify the exact mechanism behind this development in
greater detail, and to analyze whether these developments continue in a linear
fashion beyond 2003, further research is needed.
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2.8 Tables
Table 2.9: Break points of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indices
Reform description EPL overall EPL regular contracts EPL temp. contracts
Australia 1996 Workplace Relations Act 1996 set out factors that Australian In-
dustrial Relations Commission must have regard to when deter-
mining whether a termination is unfair
+ + =
2004 The scale for employers with 15 or more employees has also in-
creased in March 2004 (the small business exemption to sever-
ance pay has been removed, now requiring employers with less
than 15 employees to pay).
+ + =
Austria 2003 Employees Income Provision Act eliminated severance paid and
integrated into individual saving accounts accessible during un-
employment spells
- - =
Belgium 1997 Restriction on TWA were reduced and FTC were made renew-
able
- = -
2000 Tightening of rule concerning notice period and compensation in
case of unjustified dismissal for blue collar workers
= = =
2002 The maximum total duration of TWA was lengthened for con-
tracts justified by temporary increase in work-load (Dec. 2001)
= = =
Canada No changes
Czech Republic No changes
Denmark 1995 Since the mid-1990s the role of TWA has been recognized by so-
cial partners and their scope increased
- = -
Finland 1991 The delay before notice can start was shortened from 2 months
(as set in the Act on the Dismissal Procedure) to 1-2 weeks (as set
in the Act of Employment Contracts)
- - =
1996 Notice period was halved for workers with tenure less than 1
year
- - =
2001 The new employment contract act came into force reducing no-
tice periods further
- - =
France 1986 Prior administrative authorization for dismissals for economic
reasons was abolished
- - =
1990 The list limiting the circumstances in which the use of FTC and
TWA is permissible is restored and the maximum total duration
of FTC and TWA was reduced
+ = +
2001 Severance pay entitlements were increased = + =
Germany 1985 FTC were allowed without specifying an objective reason
1993 Notice period for blue collar workers was extended and aligned
with that of white collar workers
= + =
1994 TWA legislation was loosened - = -
1996 The renewal period for FTC and TWA and admissible frequency
of renewals were increased
- = -
2002 Maximum total duration of TWA was brought to 24 months - = -
2004 The limit on the maximum total duration of TWA was lifted.
(from 1. Jan 2004)
- = -
Greece 1990 Notice period or severance pay entitlements were reduced (law
1989) amending law 3198/55 of 1955)
- - =
2003 National General Collective Labour Agreement (2002-2003)
changes dismissal rules and raises slightly entitlements to sev-
erance pay
- - =
2003 PD 81/2003 changes FTC and TWA - = -
Hungary 2003 The amended labour code introduced stricter regulations on re-
newal of fixed term contracts
+ = +
Ireland 2003 The Protection of Employees act tightened regulation on valid
cases for FTC and limited their maximum overall duration to 4
years
+ = +
2003 The Redundancy Payments Bill (dismissal laws) raised severance
pay entitlements
= = =
Italy 1987 Fixed term contracts use was widened through collective agree-
ments specifying target groups and employment shares
= = =
1997 Treu package on FTC widened the number of valid cases for the
use of FTC
- = -
1998 TWA were permitted - = -
2000 Reform of TWA 2000 extended the use of TWA and removed the
restrictions concerning unskilled workers
- = -
Notes: Source: OECD (2004), pp.119-120. The equal sign indicates that the change in a sub-item was not large enough to be visible in the overall EPL index ; ‘-’ (‘+’) indicates
less (more) protection. Empty fields are also empty in the original source.
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Break points of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indices, continued.
Reform description EPL overall EPL regular contracts EPL temp. contracts
Japan 1985 TWA were permitted for 13 occupations only
1996 The use of TWA was extended to 26 occupations - = -
1999 The use of TWA was extended to all occupations with some ex-
clusions
- = -
Korea 1998 TWA were liberalized - = -
1998 Dismissals for managerial reasons are allowed (i.e. redundancy
and economic restructuring). Whereas this new lawmay be used
for dismissing a single person for urgent business needs, it was
mainly introduced with collective dismissals in mind
- - =
Mexico No changes
Netherlands 1999 The flexibility and security law increased the maximum possible
number of FCT and lengthened the maximum total duration of
contracts with TWA
- = -
2001 The EU directive on fixed-term work came into effect reducing
the maximum total duration of TWA contracts
= = =
New Zealand 2000 Employment relations act tightened the legislation on individual
and collective dismissals
+ + =
2000 Employment relations act also tightened the legislation on FTC
and TWA
+ = +
Norway 1995 TWA legislation was eased - = -
2000 TWA legislation was further eased - = -
Poland 2002 The new labour code lifted some restrictions in the use of FTC
(from 2 renewals permitted to unlimited – until accession)
- = -
2003 A new law tightened regulations on temporary work agencies
limiting the cases when TWA contracts are allowed and reducing
their maximum total duration
+ = +
Poland 2002 The new labour code lifted some restrictions in the use of FTC
(from 2 renewals permitted to unlimited – until accession)
- = -
2003 A new law tightened regulations on temporary work agencies
limiting the cases when TWA contracts are allowed and reducing
their maximum total duration
+ = +
Portugal 1989 Firing restrictions were eased (dismissals for individual redun-
dancy were authorised)
1991 Firing restrictions were eased further (dismissals for unsuitabil-
ity were authorised)
- - =
1996 A strategic social plan between social partners was agreed to
widen the use of FTC and TWA
- = -
2004 New Labour Code came into force in December 2003 - = -
Slovak Republic 2003 A mew Labour code was approved that relaxed regulations on
dismissal of regular contract employees and collective dismissals
- - =
2003 The new Labour code also increased valid cases for FTC, raised
the number of possible renewals and the maximum overall du-
ration of FTC
- = -
Spain 1984 Restrictions for FTC were substantially relaxed
1994 Procedural requirements for dismissals for economic reasons
were relaxed, notice periods shortened
- - =
1994 Rules governing renewals of FTC were tightened and temporary
work agencies permitted
- = -
1997 Maximum compensation for unfair dismissal was reduced and
some changes were made to the definition of fair dismissal
- - =
2001 Law 12/2001 tightened the rules governing valid cases for the
use of FTC
+ = +
Sweden 1993 TWA were permitted - = -
1997 FTC were made possible without objective reason - = -
Switzerland No changes
Turkey No changes
Great Britain 1985 The period of service to claim unfair dismissal increased to 2
years
2000 Trial period was halved + + =
2002 Maximum total duration of FTC was reduced to 4 years (from
unlimited)
= = +
United States No changes
Notes: Source: OECD (2004), pp.119-120. The equal sign indicates that the change in a sub-item was not large enough to be visible in the overall EPL index ; ‘-’ (‘+’) indicates
less (more) protection. Empty fields are also empty in the original source.
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Table 2.11: Globalization and protection of regularly employed, 1985–2003, parsimonious
model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP (-2) -0.374*** -0.396*** -0.434*** -0.386*** -0.401***
[3.11] [3.31] [3.61] [3.10] [3.24]
Globalization, overall (-2) -0.017***
[6.07]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.013*** -0.013***
[5.62] [5.99]
Political glob. (-2) -0.004** -0.004**
[2.40] [2.54]
Social glob. (-2) -0.003** -0.006***
[2.03] [3.22]
Constant 7.298*** 7.740*** 7.615*** 6.376*** 6.599***
[6.00] [6.38] [6.23] [5.12] [5.31]
Observations 480 480 480 480 480
Number of countries 28 28 28 28 28
R-squared (within) 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.10 0.11
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for regularly employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year
fixed effects (not reported). Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Table 2.12: Globalization and protection of atypically employed, 1985–2003, parsimonious
model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP (-2) 0.793** 0.724** 0.804** 0.756** 0.795**
[2.47] [2.27] [2.51] [2.36] [2.48]
Globalization, overall (-2) 0.010
[1.31]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.012** -0.010*
[1.97] [1.66]
Political glob. (-2) 0.008* 0.009**
[1.77] [2.01]
Social glob. (-2) 0.009* 0.008*
[1.88] [1.79]
Constant -6.913** -5.780* -5.359 -6.473** -6.755**
[2.13] [1.78] [1.65] [2.02] [2.10]
Observations 480 480 480 480 480
Number of countries 28 28 28 28 28
R-squared (within) 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for atypically employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year
fixed effects (not reported). Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 2.13: Globalization and protection of regularly employed, 1985–2003, OECD countries
with no communist past
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP (-2) -0.337 -0.311 -0.741** -0.873** -0.887**
[0.95] [0.89] [2.21] [2.56] [2.52]
Unemployment rate (-2) 0.002 0.004 0.005 -0.004 -0.002
[0.30] [0.68] [0.75] [0.67] [0.29]
Log unemployment spending (-2) -0.097*** -0.104*** -0.132*** -0.089** -0.109***
[2.71] [2.86] [3.62] [2.36] [2.92]
GDP growth (-2) 0.004 0.005 0.024 0.029 0.028
[0.21] [0.27] [1.35] [1.58] [1.48]
Left-wing government (-2) 0.054** 0.055** 0.041* 0.053** 0.044**
[2.52] [2.59] [1.92] [2.40] [1.97]
Globalization, overall (-2) -0.021***
[5.40]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.014*** -0.013***
[5.14] [4.78]
Political glob. (-2) -0.007*** -0.006***
[3.61] [3.05]
Social glob. (-2) -0.003 -0.005**
[1.53] [2.02]
Constant 6.754** 6.778** 9.867*** 10.760*** 10.668***
[2.18] [2.21] [3.29] [3.52] [3.39]
Observations 370 370 370 370 370
Number of countries 22 22 22 22 22
R-squared (within) 0.25 0.27 0.23 0.20 0.19
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for regularly employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year
fixed effects (not reported). Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 2.14: Globalization and protection of atypically employed, 1985–2003, OECD countries
with no communist past
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP (-2) 2.942*** 2.987*** 3.954*** 2.965*** 2.925***
[2.91] [3.01] [4.19] [3.15] [3.03]
Unemployment rate (-2) -0.012 0.002 0.002 -0.005 -0.011
[0.66] [0.11] [0.12] [0.30] [0.62]
Log unemployment spending (-2) -0.204** -0.273*** -0.222** -0.245** -0.203**
[1.99] [2.63] [2.17] [2.36] [1.99]
GDP growth (-2) -0.112** -0.110** -0.155*** -0.115** -0.109**
[2.11] [2.11] [3.09] [2.28] [2.11]
Left-wing government (-2) 0.060 0.042 0.067 0.044 0.064
[0.99] [0.70] [1.11] [0.71] [1.06]
Globalization, overall (-2) 0.014
[1.28]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.018** -0.019**
[2.28] [2.38]
Political glob. (-2) 0.012** 0.014**
[2.05] [2.43]
Social glob. (-2) 0.012* 0.012*
[1.87] [1.86]
Constant -24.723*** -24.759*** -31.873*** -25.097*** -24.349***
[2.79] [2.84] [3.77] [2.98] [2.82]
Observations 370 370 370 370 370
Number of countries 22 22 22 22 22
R-squared (within) 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.32
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for atypically employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year
fixed effects (not reported). Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 2.15: Globalization and protection of regularly employed, 1985–2003, controlling for
union density
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP (-2) -1.168*** -1.198*** -1.647*** -1.969*** -1.740***
[3.10] [3.16] [4.16] [5.25] [4.53]
Unemployment rate (-2) 0.008 0.006 0.008 -0.003 0.004
[1.34] [1.00] [1.11] [0.46] [0.64]
Log unemployment spending (-2) -0.049 -0.035 -0.104*** -0.035 -0.067*
[1.45] [0.99] [2.89] [0.95] [1.91]
Union density (-2) -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.015*** -0.019*** -0.020***
[7.62] [7.18] [5.33] [6.98] [7.35]
GDP growth (-2) 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.068*** 0.085*** 0.077***
[2.66] [2.72] [3.16] [4.14] [3.68]
Right-wing govt., continuous (-2) -0.124*** -0.127*** -0.077** -0.092*** -0.097***
[3.86] [3.93] [2.32] [2.76] [2.88]
Globalization, overall (-2) -0.030***
[7.48]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.010*** -0.013***
[3.19] [4.03]
Political glob. (-2) -0.011*** -0.010***
[5.08] [4.49]
Social glob. (-2) -0.010*** -0.011***
[4.15] [4.53]
Constant 15.337*** 15.712*** 18.496*** 21.490*** 19.307***
[4.59] [4.67] [5.23] [6.34] [5.60]
Observations 342 342 342 342 342
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 20
R-squared (within) 0.39 0.40 0.31 0.32 0.32
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for regularly employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year
fixed effects (not reported). Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 2.16: Globalization and protection of atypically employed, 1985–2003, controlling for
union density
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP (-2) 1.312 1.699 2.208* 1.319 1.450
[1.15] [1.50] [1.97] [1.24] [1.32]
Unemployment rate (-2) -0.006 0.009 0.006 0.001 -0.005
[0.29] [0.46] [0.32] [0.08] [0.25]
Log unemployment spending (-2) -0.168 -0.273** -0.185* -0.230** -0.164
[1.65] [2.57] [1.82] [2.20] [1.61]
Union density (-2) -0.023*** -0.015* -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.023***
[3.01] [1.89] [2.65] [2.79] [2.88]
GDP growth (-2) -0.034 -0.058 -0.072 -0.037 -0.040
[0.56] [0.95] [1.18] [0.63] [0.67]
Right-wing govt., continuous (-2) 0.151 0.182* 0.124 0.172* 0.145
[1.55] [1.88] [1.31] [1.81] [1.50]
Globalization, overall (-2) 0.009
[0.72]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.018* -0.015*
[1.94] [1.72]
Political glob. (-2) 0.015** 0.015**
[2.45] [2.40]
Social glob. (-2) 0.009 0.004
[1.20] [0.57]
Constant -9.284 -13.005 -16.001 -9.996 -10.224
[0.92] [1.29] [1.59] [1.04] [1.03]
Observations 342 342 342 342 342
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 20
R-squared (within) 0.35 0.37 0.35 0.36 0.35
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for atypically employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year
fixed effects (not reported). Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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The Impact of Political Leaders’ Profession and Edu-
cation on Reforms1
3.1 Introduction
Market-liberalizing reforms have been shown to boost economic growth by in-
creasing trade, reducing prices and improving productivity, as well as attract-
ing foreign direct investment.2 Nevertheless, some countries are more reluctant
than others to implement such reforms. The economics literature provides var-
ious insights as to why this might be the case. For example, reform deadlocks
can be explained by the uncertainty over the distribution of gains and losses
from policy changes (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991), or the fear of policy persis-
tence (Coate and Morris, 1999).3
In modern democracies, elected politicians decide on policies and reform-
strategies. When it comes to designing reform policy, in particular, politicians’
education and professional experience is likely to be important. As Kotsogian-
nis and Schwager (2006, p. 485) argue, “the implementation of new and un-
known policies is more demanding than running ‘business as usual’ since it re-
quires imaginative leadership on the part of a governor, rather than operational
routine.” Politicians with a certain educational or professional backgroundmay
be more likely than others to demonstrate such kind of leadership. These politi-
cians thus may have an advantage in fostering reforms. According to Rajan
(2004), for example, the “gains from reform are never as clear to the wider pub-
lic as they are to economists.” Hence, reforms might be delayed due to a lack of
understanding and education. Some background education in economics could
be advantageous for politicians in implementing reforms as they are more likely
1This chapter is based on Dreher et al. (2009).
2See Wacziarg and Welch (2008), Megginson and Netter (2001) and Henry (2003). See also
McMillan (2004) and de Haan and Sturm (2000). De Haan et al. (2006) provide an excellent
survey on the relationship between market-oriented institutions and economic growth.
3“For the initiator [of a new system] has the enmity of all who would profit by the preser-
vation of the old institution and merely lukewarm defenders in those who would gain by the
new ones.” Machiavelli, The Prince, 1513, cited in Feinberg (2006). Even if a policy is pareto
dominating in the short-run, the fear of its persistence might lead to this policy failure.
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to distinguish good from bad advice and might be more able to resist the pres-
sure of lobbying groups preferring the status quo. This knowledge might bring
them into a better bargaining position as well. They might also have an ad-
vantage in communicating the consequences of reforms to the public and the
parliament, thus decreasing uncertainty and overcoming the deadlock.
Recently, there is a growing literature connecting personal traits of politi-
cians with actual policy outcomes. Jones and Olken (2005) find that unpre-
dictable changes in a country’s leadership due to the incumbent’s death can
trigger changes in gross domestic product (GDP) growth. They show that who
is the head of government matters for economic growth.4 Pande (2003), Chat-
topadhyay and Duflo (2004), and Washington (2006) study the relationship be-
tween politicians’ peer groups and policies that either benefit the respective
group or are in line with the peer groups’ views.5 The impact of education and
profession on policy has also been in the focus of previous literature. Go¨hlmann
and Vaubel (2007) provide recent empirical evidence. Their results show that
education and profession of the central bank’s governing council members mat-
ter for the effectiveness in controlling inflation.6 Regarding education of politi-
cians, Duflo (2005) shows that reservation of political power for historically dis-
advantaged groups and women in India does not come at the expense of the
quality of decision making, even though reservation brings to power a group
of relatively inexperienced and less educated politicians. Besley et al. (2005), to
the contrary, use household survey data from India and find that differences in
the performance of Indian village politicians are systematically linked to politi-
cians’ education. In particular, education significantly reduces the probability
that a politician uses his power opportunistically. This evidence leads a corre-
4According to the findings of Jones and Olken (2005), the consequences of unexpected
changes in leadership are substantial: Variability of GDP growth increases by 31 percent fol-
lowing a leader’s death.
5Pande (2003) shows that the reservation of political mandates for members of disadvan-
taged castes and tribes in India has increased targeted transfers to these groups. According
to Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), a similar regulation for women in India has led to poli-
cies benefiting especially women. Studying voting behavior of US congressmen, Washington
(2006) finds that congressmen with daughters are substantially more likely to vote in-line with
feminist views.
6In a related study, Adolph (2004) shows that personal career ambitions affect the perfor-
mance of central bankers.
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spondingWorld Bank (2005) report to conclude “that more educated politicians
are better” adding to “a growing appreciation among economists that education
[of politicians] may be important because of its role in inculcating civic values.”
In this study, we go one step further and analyze why it would matter for
policy outcomes who is the chief executive of a country. A potentially impor-
tant channel by which politicians can affect growth rates is on deciding about
whether or not to pursue reform-oriented policies. Investigating the link be-
tween leading politicians’ background and reforms is thus important. Surpris-
ingly, this question has so far not been investigated with respect to heads of
national governments. It is this question our analysis deals with.
Specifically, we test the extent to which the educational and professional
background of heads of governments is associated with the implementation of
reforms. Employing panel data over the period 1970–2002, we present empir-
ical evidence based on a novel data set covering profession and education of
more than 500 political leaders prior to entering office from 73 countries. In
a nutshell, our results show that reforms are more likely during the tenure of
former entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs belonging to a left-wing party are more
successful in inducing reforms than a member of a right-wing party with the
same previous profession. Former professional scientists also foster reforms,
the more so, the longer they stay in office. To the contrary, there is no robust
impact of education on reforms.
We proceed as follows. The next Section describes our method and data.
Section 3.3 shows the results and discusses their relation to political-economic
theory, while Section 3.4 provides extensions. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data and Methodology
We estimate pooled time-series cross-section (panel data) regressions. The data
cover the years 1970–2002 and extend to 64 countries.7 All data are averages
7Sample selection is driven by data availability. While data on profession and education are
available for 73 countries, we lose the observations for 8 countries due to missing control vari-
ables, and drop one countrywhere no single head of government can be identified (Switzerland,
which is governed by a federal council comprising seven members of equal rights).
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over five years (as the dependent variable is not available on a yearly basis) and
the regressions include a dummy for each sub-period. The basic equations take
the following form:
re f ormit = α + β1pro fit + β2educit + γXit + ηt + ǫit, (3.1)
where re f ormit represents our measure of reforms (as introduced below),
pro fit is the vector of professions of the head of government in country i at time
t, and educit represents education. X is the vector of control variables, ηt are
fixed period effects, while ǫit is the disturbance.
The regressions are estimated using various estimators, to test for the robust-
ness of our results. First, we employ feasible generalized least squares (FGLS).
This allows estimation in the presence of AR(1) autocorrelation within panels
and cross-sectional heteroskedasticity across panels.8 We also report results us-
ing three alternative estimators: pooled OLS with clustered standard errors, the
within-groups (country fixed effects) estimator, and the fixed effects estimator
including the lagged dependent variable.
In our analysis, we focus on the heads of government and extract informa-
tion concerning their education and profession. Clearly, chief executives do not
rule a country alone. However, they have a prominent position and dominate
the political agenda of the government.9
Concerning the choice of professions and education to focus on, we slightly
adopt the categories by Go¨hlmann and Vaubel (2007). They distinguish the
8The FGLS estimator has been shown to perform efficiently under heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation as compared to standard panel estimators. Note that the FGLS correction for
a single AR(1) term is unlikely to cause the standard errors to be flawed as would be the case
employing the Parks correction with individual AR(1) terms for each country (Beck and Katz,
1995, p. 637). In all specifications a likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis of no AR(1) at
conventional levels of significance. The procedure of estimation employed here is standard in
the recent literature. See e.g. Kilby (2006). Note, however, that employing the Parks correction
with individual AR(1) terms for each country does not change the results.
9Chappell et al. (2004) show that the chairman exercises 40 percent to 50 percent of the voting
weight in Committee decisions. Of course, the power of the head of state varies by country. Ger-
many’s chancellor, for instance, has the constitutional power to set the overall policy direction.
In Switzerland, to the contrary, there exists only a formal head of government (the president of
the federal council) has no particular power over the stance of economic and fiscal policy. For
this reason we exclude Switzerland from the analysis.
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following categories with respect to education: economics, business, law, en-
gineering, and other. Regarding profession their categories comprise bankers,
insurance executives, businessmen, farmers, lawyers, economic scholars, cen-
tral bank staff, union leaders, ministerial public servants, other public servants,
politicians, and unknown. We initially employed the following professional
categories: entrepreneurs, white collar workers, blue collar workers, union ex-
ecutives, economics scientists, other scientists, lawyers, military professionals,
politicians, and no or other professions. With respect to education, we distin-
guish economics, law, politics, natural science, not university, other and un-
known education. To reduce complexity (and after testing for the - statistically
insignificant - impact of some of the individual categories), we subsumed white
and blue collar workers in the category “other profession;” lawyers have been
merged into the category “other scientists.” Regarding education, the category
“other university” also comprises education in law and politics.
Our reasoning for building these categories is as follows: Military leaders are
included as they have been quite common in many governments for some time.
We do not code the finance sector separately, as we do not expect experience
in this sector to make a difference regarding market-oriented reforms (while
it obviously does with respect to central bank policies). We presume that en-
trepreneurs and scientists in economics should foster reform due to their strong
economic background. Furthermore, it is likely that union executives impede
market liberalizing reforms, while the impact of professional politicians is not
obvious a priori. On the one hand, they frequently lack economic knowledge.
On the other hand, they are usually better connected with the political basis.
The data for this study are drawn from a wide array of sources. Descrip-
tive statistics, data sources and definitions are shown in the respective tables
in Section 3.6 at the end of this chapter. The names and tenure of politicians
is taken from numerous publicly available sources. We compared our results
with those in Goemans et al. (2009), who provides extensive data and informa-
tion on individual leaders. When there were multiple leaders in a particular
year and country we chose the leader who has been in office for the longest
time period within the year. With few exceptions, our data coincide with those
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in Goemans et al. (2009).10 Profession and education of the chief government
executives are drawn from publicly available sources, including official govern-
ment web pages and various lexica. We were able to obtain data for more than
500 chief executives from 73 countries. Clearly, classification sometimes has to
rely on judgement to some extent, as some of the sources remain rather vague.
We have hence assigned more than one profession to several heads of govern-
ment if we judged these professions to be important in shaping the politician’s
mindset. For example, the former British prime Minister John Major worked
as an insurance broker and bank employee, but also spent some time working
in his father’s garden gnome business and has also been unemployed for some
time. Hence, Major was put in the categories “white collar” and “other.” On the
other hand, many chief executives had a long career in politics before becoming
heads of the government. We did not include them in the category “profes-
sional politician,” if they have had substantial professional experience before
becoming professional politicians. For example, we put the late Israeli prime
minister Yitzhak Rabin into the category “military professional.” Rabin served
as high-ranked military in the Israeli army, as ambassador to the United States,
member of the parliament, and labor minister before becoming Prime Minis-
ter. Whether Rabin has to be classified as military professional or professional
politician is thus not obvious, but based on the large influence that his mili-
tary career had on his work as a politician, we opted for military professional.
The category “professional politician” is thus reserved for politicians with no
additional substantial professional job experience outside of politics.
One possibility that comes immediately to mind is the selection problem.
If profession and education of the head of state is non-random, some outside
factors could cause both reforms and politicians’ background. While Equation
3.1 assumes reforms to be determined by politicians’ background, crises or cer-
tain economic or social circumstances might affect both the probability of a spe-
10The exceptions are Portugal and Romania. For Portugal, Goemans et al. (2009) lists the
presidents as leaders. We chose to use the prime ministers instead, as these are responsible for
all government policies in Portugal, while the president is head of the army. Concerning Ro-
mania, Goemans et al. (2009) switches between listing the prime minister and the president. In
line with the Romanian constitution, we consistently focus on presidents. Note that excluding
these countries from the analysis does not change the results.
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cific type of politician to be elected and the probability of reforms at the same
time.11 As shown in Dreher and Lamla (2007), however, selection of politicians
with various backgrounds seems almost idiosyncratic. In Table 3.11 in Section
3.6, we replicate their main analysis.12 As can be seen, profession and educa-
tion of politicians is clearly not related to variables that also affect crises and
reforms.13 As only exceptions, GDP per capita growth and civil liberties affect
the election probability of certain types of incumbents. We control for these fac-
tors in our analysis. Moreover, (lagged) economic crises (as defined in Section
3.4 below) do not significantly affect the incumbent’s background in our sam-
ple. Arguably, while politicians with different profession and education pursue
different policies, voters can usually choose between few candidates running
for office only. Hence, they can only choose among a limited, pre-selected num-
ber of candidates, and not among the entire set of professions and educations.14
Thus, while spurious correlation can not be ruled out completely, it is unlikely
to be an issue here. Nevertheless, we employ the GMM estimator as suggested
by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) as test for robust-
ness below. Note that the Sargan test and the Arellano-Bond test clearly do not
reject our models, indicating that the estimator is consistent (and endogeneity
does not seem to be an issue here). Overall, we are quite confident that reverse
causality is not of major importance here. However, we must admit that we can
not completely rule out the possibility of reverse causality. We will interpret our
results in light of this limitation.
Table 3.1 provides the number of politicians classified in the various groups
11In the economics literature there is some evidence that, for instance, poor economic growth
reduces the likelihood of being re-elected (e.g. Dreher (2004); Brender and Drazen (2008)).
12Note that this estimation is the least conservative regression amongst the results shown in
Dreher and Lamla (2007). By using pooled Logit (with clustered standard errors), they make
it as easy as possible for any explanatory variable to reveal a significant relationship. When
they instead employ fixed effects Logit almost no variable remains statistically significant at
conventional levels.
13In addition to the variables reported in the Table 3.11, Dreher and Lamla (2007) employ
various crises variables (coups, revolutions, strikes), government debt and government frac-
tionalization.
14Note that this argument has limitations. While at the end only a very small group of can-
didates “survives” there might have been many candidates that have “tested the waters” and
decided to not run for office.
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Table 3.1: Heads of government, profession and education, 1970–2005, summary
number of politicians percent left-wing average tenure
profession
entrepreneur 11 6 3.00
union executive 9 65 6.33
science economics 20 22 3.70
science other 89 34 4.01
military 87 22 6.44
politician 194 52 4.85
none/ other 103 34 4.56
summary 513 38 4.86
education
economics 77 37 4.51
natural science 17 52 4.41
other university 255 37 4.91
unknown 59 54 3.26
not university 105 31 5.97
summary 513 38 4.86
Note: The summary line reports the sum of the number of politicians in column 1, the average share of left wing politicians in row 2, and the average tenure of all groups of
politicians in the sample in column 3. Percent left-wing refers to a smaller sample as data on political leaning is missing prior to 1975 and after 2002.
of profession and education, and their average tenure. As can be seen, the by far
biggest group in the professions category in our sample is professional politi-
cians - people who never worked in any area outside politics prior to becoming
head of government. The second largest group comprises people with no prior
profession or a profession that is not classified in any other category. The sample
encompasses 89 scientists from an area other than economics, 87 formermilitary
officers, 20 economists, 11 entrepreneurs and nine union executives. Regarding
education, the huge majority of politicians in our sample have university de-
grees. Average tenure ranges from 3 years for entrepreneurs to 6.4 years for
military officers. Table 3.1 also reports the percentage of professions and types
of education belonging to left-wing parties. Among military professionals and
entrepreneurs, 22 and, respectively, 6 percent are members of left-wing parties.
Unsurprisingly, the share of union executives amounts to 65 percent.
Turning to measures of market-liberalizing reforms, recent studies suggest
using changes in the economic freedom index as calculated by the Fraser Insti-
tute (e.g. Heinemann (2004); Belke et al. (2005); Heckelman and Knack (2008);
Dreher and Rupprecht (2007)). The data is available in five year-intervals over
the period 1970–2002 for all our 73 sample countries. It covers five broad cat-
egories of market-oriented policies and institutions: Size of Government (Area
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1), Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights (Area 2), Access to Sound
Money (Area 3), Exchange with Foreigners (Area 4), and Regulation of Credit,
Labor and Business (Area 5). Each index ranges from 0-10, with 10 showing
higher values of economic freedom. Table 3.10 in Section 3.6 contains the indi-
vidual sub-components.
The average change in the economic freedom index among our sample is an
improvement of 0.20. Improvements were largest in Area 3 (with an average of
0.36), while - on average - reforms inArea 1 andArea 5 have been least prevalent
(0.13). Table 3.9 in Section 3.6 reports initial values and changes for all areas.
The selection of covariates follows Heckelman and Knack (2008). Heckel-
man and Knack employ the average annual growth rate in per capita income,
linguistic fractionalization, the initial level of civil liberties and the changes
thereof, and development aid. Growth is included as it may disrupt special in-
terests blocking reforms.15 As an alternative hypothesis, reforms might be more
likely in times of recession, as voters do not accept reforms when the economy
prospers. Linguistic polarization might reflect societies where efficient policy
reforms are more difficult to achieve. Civil liberties might increase the proba-
bility of reforms but might also reduce it.16 Development aid is often granted to
induce reforms. However, aid induces some degree of moral hazard and might
thus lead to less instead of more reforms.17 In addition, the initial value of the
economic freedom index is included to capture potential reversion-to-the-mean
effects, as countries with greater economic freedom have less room for improve-
ments than countries with less freedom.
15Clearly, growth might be endogenous to economic freedom. For example, de Haan and
Sturm (2000) find that economic freedom robustly determines growth. Dawson (2003) also
shows that economic freedom fosters growth, while changes in freedom are jointly determined
with growth. Following Heckelman and Knack (2008) we include growth to the regressions and
test the stability of our results without the growth variable. We alleviate the problem by lagging
this variable by one five-year period.
16For example, de Haan and Sturm (2003) report that political freedom significantly improves
economic freedom. Case study evidence by Devarajan et al. (2001), to the contrary, suggests that
autocratic rulers might be more inclined to reform.
17See Boockmann and Dreher (2003) and Dreher and Rupprecht (2007) for a discussion and
an empirical application to IMF andWorld Bank lending. Clearly, aid might also concentrate on
more reform-oriented countries. Heckelman and Knack (2008) employ instrumental variables
to take this potential endogeneity into account. As aid is not the key focus of this paper, we take
aid as exogenous regressor.
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Data for economic growth rates are taken from the World Bank’s World De-
velopment Indicators (World Bank, 2006). Linguistic Fractionalization is from
Alesina et al. (2003), the index of civil liberties is taken from Freedom House
(2002). We transform the original scale of the civil liberties index, so that higher
values represent more liberty, on a scale from 1 to 7. The next Section presents
the results.
3.3 Results
Table 3.2 presents results where the dummies for profession and education of
the chief government politician are included at the same time in addition to the
covariates discussed in the previous section. We omit the categories ‘no and
other profession’ and ‘no university education’. Hence, the interpretation of all
results regarding the impact of a politician’s profession or education is relative
to these baseline groups.
In column 1 we report the results for the FGLS estimation. As can be seen,
market-oriented reforms are significantly more likely with less initial economic
freedom, with a coefficient significant at the one percent level. Also, the lagged
growth rate has a significantly negative effect on reforms. Hence, countries
which suffer from economic downturns are more likely to pass reforms. The
coefficient on initial civil liberties is not significantly different from zero. The
same applies for the coefficient on the change in civil liberties, linguistic frac-
tionalization and aid. This is contrary to Heckelman and Knack (2008) who find
reforms to be significantly more likely with increasing civil liberties and less
aid.18 The covariates are, however, jointly significant at the one percent level in
all our regressions.
Concerning our specific research question our results reveal that profession
and education of politicians indeed matter. The dummies are jointly significant
at the one percent level. Turning to the individual impact, it can be seen from
column 1 that reforms are significantly more likely when the incumbent has
an entrepreneurial or scientific background compared to politicians with ‘no
18However, many countries in our sample did not receive any aid during the period under
study. The difference to Heckelman and Knack (2008) is thus not surprising.
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Table 3.2: Reforms, Profession, and Education, 1970–2002, 64 countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Economic Freedom, intitial -0.130*** -0.128***
(6.37) (4.47)
Lagged dependent variable -0.144**
(2.48)
Growth p.c. (t-1) -0.028*** -0.022* -0.059*** -0.067***
(3.60) (1.73) (3.80) (3.51)
Linguistic fractionalization 0.007 0.019
(0.09) (0.31)
Civil liberties, initial 0.020 0.027*
(1.55) (1.77)
Civil liberties, change -0.006 -0.027 -0.050 -0.104
(0.18) (0.48) (0.89) (1.58)
Aid (percent of GDP) -0.002 0.004 0.029 0.002
(0.24) (0.58) (2.29)** (0.12)
Profession
entrepreneur 1.058*** 0.814** 0.846** 0.750
(3.36) (2.48) (2.05) (1.42)
union executive -0.143 -0.116 -0.180 -0.117
(1.78)* (1.05) (1.30) (0.63)
science economics -0.084 -0.056 0.002 -0.022
(0.56) (0.40) (0.01) (0.08)
science other 0.220*** 0.209** 0.417*** 0.427***
(3.54) (2.32) (3.09) (2.96)
military 0.146* 0.067 0.146 0.205
(1.86) (0.59) (0.78) (0.88)
politician 0.061 0.035 0.051 0.126
(1.13) (0.48) (0.39) (0.89)
Education
economics 0.267*** 0.223** 0.119 -0.005
(3.42) (2.09) (0.67) (0.03)
natural science 0.279** 0.082 -0.114 -0.100
(2.03) (0.39) (0.44) (0.37)
other university 0.035 0.007 -0.109 -0.154
(0.51) (0.07) (0.63) (0.86)
unknown 0.115 -0.044 -0.089 0.014
(0.98) (0.22) (0.37) (0.05)
Method FGLS pooled OLS fixed effects fixed effects
Number of observations 342 342 342 282
R-squared 0.26 0.30 0.34
Joint sign. (Prob>chi2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%. *** significant at 1% level. ‘Economic Freedom, intitial’ gives the level of economic
freedom in 1970. ‘Lagged dependent variable’ gives the change in economic freedom between t− 2andt− 1.
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and other profession’. In this specification, also former military leaders foster
reforms, while the tenure of former union executives seems to be associated
with fewer reforms (at the ten percent level of significance). However, as will be
discussed in the paragraphs below, these results are not robust to the different
methods of estimation. Regarding education, reform activity is higher when
politicians with degrees in economics and natural science are in office. The
interpretation of these results is straightforward: Entrepreneurs are likely to
seek for efficiency and have a proven record of experience in leading a company.
Moreover, due to the high correlation between being entrepreneur and having
business education they have basic knowledge of economic principles. Hence,
it is a reasonable finding that during their tenure, reform activity is higher than
during the tenure of politicians with no or other profession.19 Similar reasoning
applies to professional and educational background in science. Such experience
provides in general some problem solving skills enabling the politician (to some
extent) to infer the right choices. Regarding education, economic training is
associated with a higher chance for market liberalizing reform. Again this fits
in the context of previous research, as trained economists are more rational and
less emotional in taking economic decisions.20
In column 2 we estimate the model employing pooled OLS with standard
errors clustered at the country level.21 Regarding education and profession,
the impact of former military leaders, union executives, and natural science
education is no longer significant at conventional levels, while the other results
are in line with those reported in column 1. Regarding our control variables,
initial civil liberties are now significant at the ten percent level, with a positive
coefficient.
In columns 3 and 4 we include country fixed effects (and thus have to omit
variables without time series variation).22 In column 4 we additionally include
19However, our results for entrepreneurs have to be handled with care, as there are only
eleven observations for this group in our sample.
20See, e.g., Frey and Meier (2003) and Rubinstein (2006).
21Note that we also estimated the equation with Newey-West corrected standard errors. The
results are not affected.
22Note that the standard errors are again clustered at the country level.
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the lagged dependent variable to control for autocorrelation.23 As can be seen
from column 3, our results regarding the positive significant relationship be-
tween entrepreneurial and science profession and market liberalizing reforms
are unchanged. The results also show, however, that the association between
reforms and economics education vanishes. When including the lagged depen-
dent variable, the impact of former entrepreneurs is marginally insignificant.24
Overall, while part of our results are completely robust to the choice of method,
some are not. In particular, the effect of education clearly depends on the choice
of the estimator.
Previous research suggests that policy outcomes also depend on the time
a politician spent in office. For example, Roubini and Sachs (1989) suggest
that there is a tendency towards larger deficits in countries characterized by
a short average tenure of government. They argue that budget reductions re-
quire political consensus which is harder to achieve by weaker governments,
which can (inter alia) be proxied by expected tenure of office. We thus aug-
ment the set of regressors by a variable measuring the time a political leader
has spent in office. Furthermore, we include an interaction term between pro-
fession/education and the time in office.
The results are reported in Table 3.3. In the first column we present results
for the FGLS estimation. The results show that the impact of time spent in of-
fice is negative and significant at the ten percent level for the baseline group.
Interestingly, time in office is indeed relevant for the impact of some types of
politicians. According to our results, reforms become more likely with each
year a professional economist spends in office. Overall, the impact on reforms
becomes positive when economists stay in office for at least five and a half years.
The impact of other scientists also depends on time in office. According to the
estimates, the impact of other scientists is positive from the first year, and in-
creases by 0.04 points with each additional year in office.
23The within-groups estimator is biased and inconsistent with the inclusion of the lagged
dependent variable in a short panel (Nickell, 1981). We test for the robustness of our results
employing a system GMM estimator below. Our results are not affected.
24The marginal insignificance is due to the substantial loss of observations rather than due
to controlling for the lagged dependent variable per se. When excluding the lagged dependent
variable while restricting the regression to the same sample, the results are unchanged.
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The remaining columns of Table 3.3 again report results with different meth-
ods of estimation. As can be seen, only the correlation between professional
economists and reforms is fully robust to the choice of method and all estimates
suggest that the effect becomes positive after about four years. However, while
the interaction of time in office and other scientists becomesmarginally insignif-
icant in pooled OLS model of column 2, it is again significant at the five percent
level once fixed country effects are included. Economists and other scientists
seem to lack experience when starting their time in office and then significantly
improve their performance the more experience they collect as political leaders.
These findings are in line with several theoretical arguments brought forth in
the literature. Based on Alesina and Drazen (1991), delay of stabilization can be
modeled as the outcome of a war of attrition between two parties who disagree
over how the adjustment costs of a reform have to be divided. In their recent
overview about the different extensions and empirical applications of the ‘war
of attrition’ model, Alesina et al. (2006) highlight the role of political institu-
tions and elections for the outcome of the game. They argue that “. . . in political
systems where the executive has strong powers and cannot be blocked by the
opposition easily, the opposition that does not hold the executive faces high
costs of fighting the war of attrition . . . Then stabilization would occur very
soon . . . ” Alesina et al. (2006) thus clearly underline the importance of execu-
tives in the political process. This implies that strong executives may be able to
reduce delay in reforms.25 The power of politicians is likely to depend on their
political experience and personal skills, as such skills influence arguments that
can be brought forth in negotiations, and enhance the standing of the politician
among the electorate. Hence, the longer politicians are in office, the stronger
they are.
25Spolaore (2004) points out that a dominant executive is not necessarily beneficial in terms
of welfare. His model shows that for instance in a political system in which political power is
condensed in a very small group, reforms may be inefficiently frequent. This result is basically
driven by missing internalization of society’s welfare.
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Table 3.4 tests whether controlling for the political leaning of the party of a
head of government influences our results. We add a dummy that is one if the
chief executive party is left-wing, and zero otherwise, to our basic specification,
and interact the dummy for government leaning with the dummies for educa-
tion/profession.26 Again, we report results employing four different techniques
of estimation.
As can be seen, there is no significant impact of left-wing party affiliation
on reforms for our baseline group. However, according to all regressions, left-
wing politicians with a professional background as entrepreneurs increase the
probability of reform as compared to the base category of right-wing politi-
cians with no or other profession/education. Interestingly, the coefficient of
the interaction between left-wing parties and entrepreneurs is also substantially
greater in magnitude than the linear coefficient of the entrepreneur dummy.
This implies that left-wing entrepreneurs may be more reform-oriented than
right-wing ones. The literature provides a ready explanation for this finding:
Market-liberal reforms are typically the domain of center and right-wing par-
ties. Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) suggest that political announcements and
reform proposals are more likely to be implemented when they are formulated
by an incumbent who is not expected to follow an ideology that is compatible
with that specific reform.27
Finally, Table 3.5 replicates the basic analysis for area-specific reforms. To
keep the results tractable, we only report results using the fixed effects estima-
26Party orientation is provided by Beck et al. (2001) and is identified with respect to economic
policy. Right-wing parties are those that are described as conservative, Christian democratic, or
right-wing in the party name, program, or orientation. Left-wing parties are those identified as
communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing. See also Bjørnskov (2005, 2008).
27They argue that policymakers cannot always credibly communicate that a proposed policy
is beneficial for society. This is due to the fact that there may be the perception of partisan bias
in the reform proposal, which leads to the non-adoption of a socially optimal policy. A policy
proposal that has a certain ideological flavor and is proposed by a policymaker on the other side
of the range of political positions is perceived as being more likely to be optimal. This hypoth-
esis has also found empirical support. Tavares (2004) finds that left-wing governments tend to
reduce a country’s deficit by raising tax revenues while right-wing governments rely mostly on
spending cuts. Hence, according to the theoretical argument, cabinets can signal commitment
by undertaking fiscal reforms in ways that are not favored by their constituencies. According
to Tavares (2004), left-wing governments indeed gain credibility when they cut spending while
right-wing governments become more credible when they increase tax revenues.
78
Table 3.5: Areas of Reform, Profession, and Education, 1970–2002, 64 countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Government size Legal Structure Money Trade Regulation
Growth p.c. (t-1) -0.062** -0.057 -0.031 -0.068** -0.050***
(2.19) (1.65) (0.79) (2.45) (2.90)
Civil liberties, change -0.011 0.076 -0.386** 0.019 -0.035
(0.14) (0.63) (2.51) (0.20) (0.65)
Aid (percent of GDP) 0.036 0.010 0.153*** -0.003 -0.016
(1.61) (0.32) (5.54) (0.12) (1.14)
Profession
entrepreneur 1.227** 0.214 2.276* -0.447 0.893*
(2.14) (0.46) (1.82) (1.31) (1.72)
union executive -0.167 -0.049 -0.840 0.289 0.047
(0.58) (0.19) (1.62) (1.29) (0.22)
science economics -0.258 0.645* -0.102 -0.020 -0.330*
(0.69) (1.80) (0.15) (0.07) (1.77)
science other 0.307 0.230 1.000** 0.117 0.180
(1.57) (0.78) (2.16) (0.58) (1.52)
military 0.175 0.651* -0.109 -0.124 0.017
(0.79) (1.76) (0.17) (0.48) (0.11)
politician 0.219 0.272 -0.558 0.305 0.072
(1.05) (0.91) (1.36) (1.31) (0.56)
Education
economics 0.073 0.256 0.001 -0.125 0.029
(0.28) (0.77) (0.00) (0.68) (0.15)
natural science -0.021 0.074 -0.531 -0.408** 0.133
(0.06) (0.28) (0.67) (2.16) (0.48)
other university -0.101 0.072 -0.329 -0.139 -0.139
(0.47) (0.27) (0.62) (0.91) (0.80)
unknown -0.445 0.378 -0.043 -0.274 -0.581
(1.18) (0.96) (0.07) (1.00) (2.15)**
Number of observations 350 333 351 346 331
R-squared 0.26 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.32
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the respective area of the economic freedom index (“reforms”). Standard errors are clustered at the country level, * denotes
significant at 10% level ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. Base categories are “no and other profession” and “no university education.” All regressions
include a dummy for each country and five-year-period.
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tor (clustering standard errors at the country level). The breakdown allows us
to analyze which areas are associated with a specific profession or education.
The results show that reforms of government size, access to sound money and
regulations of credit, labor and business are associated with the tenure of for-
mer entrepreneurs. As entrepreneurs are aware of the impediments of running
a business it makes sense that our results suggest that they concentrate on re-
forms with respect to regulation and the financial system. When economics sci-
entists hold office, reforms regarding the legal structure are more likely, while
reforming activity concerning the regulations of credit, labor and business is
lower. During the tenure of other scientists access to sound money is improved.
Surprisingly, the legal structure is improved when military professionals are
the head of government. Turning to education, a background in natural science
correlates negatively with reforms regarding free trade.
3.4 Further Discussion
One difficulty with the analysis so far is that the perception among the ma-
jority of the economics profession of what sound economic policy actually is
did change substantially since the 1970s. The impact of education on market-
liberal reforms might thus change over time, and the same is true with respect
to professional background. Ideally, we would want to control for the school of
thought according to which the respective politician has been educated. How-
ever, we lack the data for such analysis. In order to check the robustness of our
results with respect to changing views over time we split the sample along the
time dimension. In Table 3.6 we report results separated for the periods before
1991 (column 1) and after 1990 (column 2).28 According to the results, reforms
aremore likely to occur during the time in office of former entrepreneurs in both
sample periods, although their impact is substantially greater in the earlier pe-
riod as compared to the later one. The coefficient of ‘other’ scientists is positive
in both periods, but marginally insignificant. During the tenure of a leader with
economic education reforms are less likely after 1990, at the five percent level of
28This and the estimations in columns 5 and 6 of Table 3.6 also checks for the robustness of
our results to the exclusion of post-communist transition countries.
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Table 3.6: Reforms, Profession, and Education, sub-samples, 1970–2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Growth p.c. (t-1) -0.045 -0.066)*** -0.042 -0.063*** -0.052*** -0.026
(1.01) (3.22) (1.67) (3.27) (3.38) (0.72)
Civil liberties, change -0.051 -0.126 0.003 -0.093 -0.066 0.010
(0.56) (1.48) (0.02) (1.56) (0.71) (0.17)
Aid (percent of GDP) 0.048 -0.013 0.326*** 0.023 0.040*** 0.046
(0.86) (0.94) (3.03) (1.70)* (3.30) (1.14)
Profession
entrepreneur 2.531* 0.762** 1.006*** 0.686 0.797** 1.630***
(1.88) (2.02) (2.91) (0.60) (2.49) (3.09)
union executive -0.450 -0.200 -0.190 0.325 -0.028 0.356
(0.99) (0.70) (1.83)* (0.69) (0.30) (0.54)
science economics -0.228 0.057 0.207 -0.241 0.096 -0.459
(0.75) (0.18) (0.68) (0.93) (0.33) (1.31)
science other 0.438 0.364 0.282** 0.568** 0.364** -0.222
(1.13) (1.48) (2.38) (2.44) (2.27) (0.60)
military 0.160 -0.005 -0.105 0.179 0.273 -0.152
(0.55) (0.01) (0.53) (0.65) (1.45) (0.46)
politician 0.083 -0.051 0.253 -0.006 0.299** -0.154
(0.24) (0.24) (1.65) (0.02) (2.55) (0.50)
Education
economics 0.370 -0.693** -0.051 0.158 0.034 0.180
(1.19) (2.37) (0.33) (0.46) (0.22) (0.37)
natural science -0.176 -0.606 -0.014 -0.316 -0.031 0.526
(0.35) (1.12) (0.08) (0.53) (0.16) (0.70)
other university 0.037 -0.511* -0.318* -0.006 -0.060 -0.157
(0.10) (1.73) (1.98) (0.02) (0.33) (0.42)
unknown 0.467 -0.866* -0.088 -0.074 0.110 -1.144
(0.91) (1.86) (0.34) (0.22) (0.51) (1.51)
<1991 >1990 OECD w/o OECD free unfree
Number of observations 156 186 140 202 215 127
Number of countries 57 64 26 38 54 39
R-squared 0.22 0.43 0.48 0.30 0.50 0.30
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the respective area of the economic freedom index (“reforms”). Standard errors are clustered at the country level, * denotes
significant at 10% level ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. Base categories are “no and other profession” and “no university education.” All regressions
include a dummy for each country and five-year-period.
significance.
Furthermore, Table 3.6 reports tests for the robustness of our results with
respect to the choice of countries, by separating the sample according to OECD
membership (columns 3 and 4), and respectively, the initial level of economic
freedom (columns 5 and 6).29 Our major results remain rather unaffected - re-
forms are significantly more likely when the head of government has work ex-
perience as entrepreneur or scientist (except the sample excluding OECD coun-
tries reported in column 4, where the impact of entrepreneurs is no longer sig-
nificant at conventional levels).
29As cut-off we choose the sample median of economic freedom (5.85).
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As additional test for robustness we employ the GMM estimator as sug-
gested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). We present
results employing the two-step estimator implemented by Roodman (2005) in
Stata, including the finite sample correction by Windmeijer (2005). As before,
we include time dummies in the regression. We report results of the Sargan-
Hansen test on the validity of the instruments (amounting to a test for the exo-
geneity of the covariates), and the Arellano-Bond test of second order autocor-
relation, which must be absent in order for the estimator to be consistent.
Column 1 of Table 3.7 reports the results employing the GMM estimator. As
can be seen, the results mirror those reported above, while the lagged depen-
dent variable is not significant at conventional levels.
Finally, we test for the influence of adding further control variables to the
analysis. Specifically, we test for the impact of currency crises to control for the
effect of countries that experienced serious economic crises, which are likely to
trigger reforms. Our index of currency crises is based on the rate of change of
the nominal exchange rate and the level of international currency reserves (as
calculated in Dreher (2006)).
According to Drazen and Grilli (1993) and Hsieh (2000), crises which in-
crease the welfare loss of delaying stabilization reduce the probability of such
reform delay. Following Dreher (2006) we measure political instability by the
first principal component of the number of assassinations, strikes, guerilla war-
fare, major crises, riots, and revolutions in a particular country and year, and
the number of successful coups d’e´tat (taken from Banks (1999)).
Another aspect that has to be taken into account is the effect of different po-
litical systems on reform activity. Proportional political systems are more likely
to lead to short lived governments and coalition governments than majoritar-
ian ones, which typically lead to one party governments. Alesina and Tabellini
(1990) show that greater uncertainty regarding re-election leads governments to
discount the future more heavily. Consequently, reforms requiring actions with
short-term costs exceeding short-term benefits become less likely to be imple-
mented. Empirically, this argument is supported by Grilli et al. (1991), who find
that the average durability of a government has a negative effect on debt accu-
mulation. Moreover, Spolaore (1993) shows in a war-of-attrition model that the
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Table 3.7: Reforms, Profession, and Education, further variables, 1970–2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Economic Freedom, intitial -0.093**
(2.57)
Growth p.c. (t-1) -0.048** -0.058*** -0.057*** -0.033* -0.059*** -0.057*** -0.059*** -0.025
(2.48) (3.75) (3.46) (1.68) (3.58) (3.66) (3.48) (1.05)
Linguistic fractionalization -0.076
(0.71)
Civil liberties, initial 0.010
(0.59)
Civil liberties, change -0.019 -0.050 -0.051 -0.059 -0.049 -0.046 -0.048 -0.060
(0.29) (0.90) (0.84) (1.04) (0.87) (0.84) (0.85) (0.86)
Aid (percent of GDP) 0.003 0.029** 0.027 0.034*** 0.041 0.030** 0.029** 0.020
(0.44) (2.29) (0.98) (3.10) (1.65) (2.39) (2.31) (1.06)
Lagged dependent variable 0.015
(0.22)
Profession
entrepreneur 0.839** 0.849** 0.765 0.878** 0.846** 0.847** 0.841** 0.799*
(2.24) (2.06) (1.63) (2.30) (2.00) (2.06) (2.01) (1.78)
union executive -0.085 -0.184 -0.166 -0.194* -0.157 -0.186 -0.180 -0.165
(0.67) (1.26) (1.22) (1.68) (1.08) (1.31) (1.27) (1.36)
science economics 0.144 -0.008 0.115 -0.133 0.016 0.023 0.029 -0.031
(0.94) (0.04) (0.46) (0.67) (0.07) (0.10) (0.13) (0.12)
science other 0.300** 0.414*** 0.394*** 0.505*** 0.432*** 0.400*** 0.434*** 0.490***
(2.64) (2.97) (3.00) (3.61) (3.17) (3.05) (3.05) (3.48)
military 0.038 0.137 0.011 0.208 0.158 0.156 0.162 0.153
(0.22) (0.71) (0.05) (1.15) (0.86) (0.84) (0.84) (0.74)
politician 0.069 0.046 0.096 0.136 0.059 0.045 0.067 0.207
(0.75) (0.33) (0.73) (1.03) (0.46) (0.35) (0.49) (1.42)
Education
economics 0.015 0.129 0.086 0.139 0.106 0.115 0.125 0.153
(0.09) (0.71) (0.46) (0.99) (0.59) (0.66) (0.67) (1.12)
natural science -0.123 -0.114 -0.052 -0.158 -0.122 -0.120 -0.118 -0.113
(0.40) (0.44) (0.21) (0.65) (0.48) (0.47) (0.45) (0.49)
other university -0.141 -0.106 -0.129 -0.131 -0.118 -0.101 -0.122 -0.119
(1.05) (0.61) (0.71) (0.91) (0.67) (0.60) (0.69) (0.84)
unknown -0.067 -0.085 -0.182 0.010 -0.083 -0.051 -0.083 0.020
(0.23) (0.35) (0.66) (0.05) (0.35) (0.21) (0.32) (0.08)
Additional variables
Instability 0.013 0.021
(0.13) (0.17)
Government fractionalization 0.074 0.190
(0.24) (0.57)
Currency crises, dummy 0.280** 0.230*
(2.52) (1.98)
Coalition government, dummy 0.030 -0.020
(0.24) (0.14)
Direct presidential, dummy 0.274* 0.414**
(1.84) (2.19)
Veto players drop (percent) -0.055 -0.132
(0.19) (0.50)
Method GMM Fixed eff. Fixed eff. Fixed eff. Fixed eff. Fixed eff. Fixed eff. Fixed eff.
Number of observations 282 341 313 326 338 342 339 296
Number of countries 64 64 62 64 64 64 61
R-squared 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.33
Arellano-Bond test (Pr > z) 0.51
Sargan-Hansen test (Prob > chi2) 0.63
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the respective area of the economic freedom index (“reforms”). Standard errors are clustered at the country level, * denotes
significant at 10% level ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. Base categories are “no and other profession” and “no university education.” All regressions
include a dummy for each country and five-year-period.
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delay in the adoption of a reform increases with the number of parties in a coali-
tion government. Empirical support for this argument is provided in de Haan
et al. (1999), showing that the number of parties in the government affects the
growth rate of public debt.30 As the growth rate of debt is most likely linked
to some change in policies, this suggests that it is easier to conduct such policy
changes when the government is less fractionalized. We thus also include vari-
ables that proxy for political systems and constellations. We employ a dummy
that is one if the current government is a coalition of at least two parties, and
zero otherwise. We further include a dummy for direct presidential systems,
and the percentage of veto players that drop. The data on political systems and
constellations are taken from Beck et al. (2001).
The remaining columns of Table 3.7 show the additional variables. As can
be seen, two of the additional variables are significant at conventional levels.
At the five percent level reforms are more likely at times of crises. This is in
line with the theoretical model of Drazen and Grilli (1993) and the empirical
findings of Drazen and Easterly (2001). The dummy for direct presidential is
positive and significant, suggesting that reforms are more likely in presidential
systems. Note, however, that this variable varies rarely over time, so the fixed
effects estimate relies on few observations. Turning to the impact of profession
and education, our main results are unchanged: reforms are significantly more
likely during the tenure of former entrepreneurs and other scientists. The ex-
ception is column 3, where the impact of former entrepreneurs is marginally
insignificant when the (insignificant) government fractionalization variable is
introduced. However, the coefficient is again significant at the ten percent level
when all additional control variables are included at the same time (column 8).
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have analyzed whether politicians’ education and profession
matters for the introduction of market-liberal reforms. Employing panel data
over the period 1970–2002, we presented empirical evidence based on a novel
30See also Roubini and Sachs (1989), who find that the size of government depends on politi-
cal power dispersion in parliament.
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data set covering profession and education of over 500 political leaders from 73
countries prior to entering office.
Overall, our results show that education and professional background of
politicians are associated with the implementation of market liberalizing re-
forms. According to our results, reforms are more likely to occur if the head of
government has been an entrepreneur before entering into politics. Personal ca-
pabilities required to manage a company thus seem to be advantageous in pro-
moting economic reform. Moreover, during the tenure of former professional
scientists reforms are more likely, while there is no robust impact of politicians’
education. We provide evidence that the time in office and political leaning of
the incumbent’s party matter for the overall effect of some politicians. Specif-
ically, reforms are more likely the longer former economists stay in office. It
seems that economists have to get familiar with their new position before they
can successfully organize political support for policy reforms. The tenure of an
entrepreneur belonging to a left-wing party is associated with higher reform ac-
tivity than the tenure of a member of a right-wing party with the same previous
profession. This finding supports Cukierman and Tommasi (1998), who argue
that reforms are easier to implement for politicians that are not suspected to act
for ideological reasons.
Arguably, selection of politicians with various backgrounds might also be
driven by the need to reform, giving rise to potential endogeneity. However, as
Dreher and Lamla (2007) show, profession and education of politicians is almost
idiosyncratic. While politicians with different profession and education pursue
different policies, voters can usually choose between few candidates running
for office only. They can thus not freely select a candidate with a certain pro-
fession and education, but only between profession and education of few op-
ponents. Thus, while reversed causality can not be ruled out completely, it is
unlikely to be important here.
In summary, our analysis confirms that the personal background of incum-
bents may be important. Our results support the World Bank’s (World Bank,
2005) claim of “a growing appreciation among economists that education [of
politicians] may be important because of its role in inculcating civic values.”
What are the policy implications of these results? Do they imply that it might
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actually be desirable that people would vote for experts only? Clearly, other
characteristics of politicians also matter for successful policy, profession and
education alone do not guarantee success. In addition, the focus of our analysis
was restricted to economic policy reforms. Arguably, other policy dimensions
are equally or evenmore important thanmarket-oriented reforms. Whether and
to what extent those types of education and profession identified here as being
supportive for market-liberal reforms are also successful in other areas is hence
an interesting question. Consequently, the effect of education and profession of
heads of government on fiscal policy is discussed in the following chapter. The
study of other policy fields remains for future research.
As an obvious extension, the focus of the analysis might be broadened to the
entire cabinet instead of just looking at the heads of governments. This may be
done in several ways. First, similar to the analysis presented above, it might be
interesting to study whether the professional background of ministers matters
for their own field of policy, and whether the impact of politicians differs be-
tween policy fields. Whether the type of field ministers or those of the head of
government dominates policy outcomes is also a question we leave for future
research. Furthermore, different types of head of governments might choose
different types of ministers, giving rise to interesting interactions. Our analy-
sis provides a starting point for many interesting questions on the impact of
education and profession of politicians on policy outcomes.
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3.6 Tables
Table 3.8: Variable definitions and sources
Variable Description Source
Economic Freedom Composite index of economic freedom. Ranges from 0-10, with
higher values reflecting greater freedom.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Area 1 Size of Government Index. Ranges from 0-10, with higher values
reflecting greater freedom.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Area 2 Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights Index. Ranges
from 0-10, with higher values reflecting greater freedom.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Area 3 Access to Sound Money Index. Ranges from 0-10, with higher
values reflecting greater freedom.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Area 4 Exchange with Foreigners Index. Ranges from 0-10, with higher
values reflecting greater freedom.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Area 5 Regulation of Credit, Labour and Business Index. Ranges from
0-10, with higher values reflecting greater freedom.
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
Growth per capita GDP per capita growth (constant 2000 US$). World Bank (2006)
Linguistic fractionalization Fractionalizationj = 1−∑
n
i=1 s
2
ij with sij being the share of group
i in countryj.
Alesina et al. (2003)
Civil liberties Index ranging from 1 to 7; rescaled so that higher values reflect
more liberty.
Freedom House (2002)
Aid (percent of GDP) Actual international transfer of financial resources or of goods or
services valued at the cost to the donor, less any repayments of
loan principal during the same period. Grants by official agen-
cies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee.
World Bank (2006)
Time in office Number of years the incumbent has been in office. Various sources
Left wing governments Dummy variable that is one for left-wing governments, and zero
otherwise.
Beck et al. (2001)
Instability First principal component of various instablity indicators (num-
ber of assassinations, strikes, guerilla warfare, major crises, riots,
and revolutions in a particular country and year, and the number
of successful coups d’etat).
Dreher (2006)
Currency Crises A country is defined as experiencing a currency crisis when in-
dex covering the rate of change of the exchange rate and inter-
national currency reserves is one standard deviation greater than
the index mean.
Dreher and Karb (2006)
Government fractionalization Probability that two random draws will produce legislators from
different parties.
Beck et al. (2001)
Coalition government, dummy Dummy taking the value one if the current government is a coali-
tion of at least two parties.
Beck et al. (2001)
Direct presidential, dummy Dummy for systems with unelected executive presidents and
presidents who are elected directly or by an electoral college.
Beck et al. (2001)
Veto players drop (percent) Counts the percent of veto players who drop from the govern-
ment in any given year. In presidential systems, the veto play-
ers are the president, the largest party in the legislature, and the
largest party in the Senate; for parliamentary systems, veto play-
ers are defined as the PM and the three biggest coalition mem-
bers.
Beck et al. (2001)
Control of all houses, dummy Party of head of government controls all relevant houses. Beck et al. (2001)
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Table 3.9: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation
Economic Freedom, initial 5.61 3.65 7.90 1.04
Reform index (change in economic freedom) 0.20 -1.80 2.50 0.58
Area 1, initial 5.30 1.10 8.40 1.54
Area 1, change 0.13 -3.00 4.80 0.88
Area 2, initial 5.09 1.25 8.30 1.87
Area 2, change 0.16 -2.40 3.90 1.00
Area 3, initial 6.73 2.55 9.40 1.49
Area 3, change 0.36 -6.40 6.10 1.60
Area 4, initial 5.80 2.20 9.05 1.61
Area 4, change 0.27 -2.80 3.20 0.84
Area 5, initial 5.15 2.50 7.30 1.08
Area 5, change 0.13 -1.45 3.30 0.62
Growth per capita 1.99 -8.97 10.67 2.59
Linguistic fractionalization 0.30 0.01 0.90 0.27
Civil liberties, initial -3.36 -7.00 -1.00 1.88
Civil liberties, change 0.12 -2.00 4.20 0.73
Aid (percent of GDP) 2.07 -0.03 38.84 4.38
Time in office 5.35 1.00 32.50 4.78
Left wing governments 0.37 0.00 1.00 0.44
Instability -0.04 -0.43 2.49 0.48
Currency Crises 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.27
Government fractionalization 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.37
Coalition government, dummy 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.50
Direct presidential, dummy 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.49
Veto players drop (percent) 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.16
Control of all houses, dummy 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.49
Note: Based on estimation sample, Table 3.2, column 1
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Table 3.10: Areas and components of the Economic Freedom Index
Area 1: Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes and Enterprises
1A General gov’t consumption as share of total consumption
1B Transfers and subsidies as a share of GDP
1C Gov’t enterprises and investment as a share of gross investment
1D Top marginal tax rate
1Di Top Marginal Income Tax Rate
1Dii Top Marginal Income and Payroll Tax Rate
Area 2: Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights
2A Judiciary independence
2B Impartial courts
2C Protection of intellectual property
2D Military in Politics
2E Law and Order
Area 3: Access to Sound Money
3A Avg. growth of money (last 5 years) minus growth of real GDP (last 10 years)
3B Standard deviation of annual inflation (last 5 years)
3C Annual inflation (most recent year)
3D Freedom of citizens to own foreign currency bank accounts (domestically and abroad)
Area 4: Freedom to Trade Internationally
4A Tarrifs
4Ai International trade tax revenues (% of trade sector)
4Aii Mean tariff rate
4Aiii Standard deviation of tariff rates
4B Regulatory Trade Barriers
4Bi Hidden import barriers
4Bii Costs of importing
4C Actual vs. expected size of trade sector
4D Difference between official and black mkt exchange rates
4E International Capital Market Controls
4Ei Access of Citizens to foreign captial markets/foreign access to domestic capital markets (GCR)
4Eii Restrictions in Foreign Capital Market Exchange/Index of capital controls among 13 IMF categories
Area 5: Regulation of Credit, Labour, and Business
5A Credit Market Regulation
5Ai Ownership of banks
5Aii Competition in domestic banking
5Aiii Extension of credit
5Aiv Interest rate regulations (leading to neg. rates)
5Av Interest rate controls
5B Labor Market Regulations
5Bi Impact of minimum wage
5Bii Hiring and firing practices
5Biii Labor force share with wages set by centralized collective bargaining
5Biv Unemployment insurance
5Bv Use of conscripts
5C Business Regulations
5Ci Price controls
5Cii Administrative Conditions/Entry of New Business
5Ciii Time with government bureaucracy
5Civ Starting a new business
5Cv Irregular payments
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Chapter 4
The Impact of Political Leaders’
Profession and Education on Public
Finance
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The Impact of Political Leaders’ Profession and Edu-
cation on Public Finance1
4.1 Introduction
The political economy literature on public debt and deficits has so far concen-
trated on three main aspects: politicians, voters, and political institutions. Early
contributions to the literature have mainly concentrated on opportunistic and
partisan motives of policymakers that intend to maximize support from the
electorate, or use fiscal policy to benefit their own constituencies, and on distri-
butional conflicts, either caused by politicians with heterogeneous preferences
or by social groups competing in the distribution of resources, while the more
recent literature has shifted the focus towards the influence of political institu-
tions on public finance.
The early literature on opportunistic motives concentrates on the strategic
manipulation of public expenditures by policymakers trying to get re-elected.
The key argument here is that politicians can gain support from the electorate
by providing high levels of debt financed public expenditures, and hence in-
crease the issuance of public debt beyond the optimal level, as voters are subject
to fiscal illusion, i.e. they underestimate the future tax burden of today’s pub-
lic deficits. Studies on the partisan influence on fiscal policy argue that fiscal
policy is determined by political ideology, i.e. that left-wing governments tend
to overspend on social issues and to boost the economy, while the right runs a
more prudent fiscal policy.
The literature on the effect of distributional conflicts on fiscal policy can
be grouped into three main branches. The first claims that policymakers are
tempted to tie the hands of successors with different preferences through the
strategic use of deficits, while the second branch of this literature argues that
necessary fiscal adjustments are postponed, and hence the fiscal stance is wors-
ened, due to conflicts about the distributional consequences of the fiscal adjust-
ment. The third branch argues that overspending is a result of a common pool
1This chapter is based on Mikosch and Somogyi (2009).
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problem, i.e. of the conflict of different groups over the distribution of public
funds.
This literature already links fiscal outcomes to characteristics of the political
system, to government fragmentation, polarization, and ideology. An in depth
analysis of political and fiscal institutions is given in the literature focusing on
the effects of rules, procedures and practices in the budgetary process. Here, the
focus lies on differences in the aggregation process of the conflicting interests
mentioned above, and on the implementation of fiscal policy.
However, the political economy literature can only claim partial success in
explaining public deficits and public debt, as all politico-economic approaches
taken together can only explain about fifty percent of international differences
in government debt (Franzese, 2001). This leaves a lot of room for new expla-
nations, and finding a new explanation for variations in fiscal policy is the task
of this study.
Therefore, we take a step further by going back to start, that is, we focus
on policymakers. Differences in preferences and strategic interaction between
politicians play a major role in the current literature explaining the emergence
and persistence of public deficits. Differing preferences were, however, not ex-
plained, but merely assumed. In this chapter, we argue that one source of dif-
ferent preferences lies in the different socialization of policymakers, which is
reflected by their education and profession.
This view is supported by the recent, and growing, literature connecting pol-
icy outcomes and personal traits of politicians. This strand of the literature ar-
gues that it matters who the actual leader is, that the peer group of the political
leader makes a difference, and that the education and profession of a policy-
maker contributes to the shaping of his personal values, resulting in different
outcomes both at the macro level (GDP, Inflation) and also at the micro level,
especially in differences in the opportunistic behavior of policymakers.
We consequently argue that the socialization, the character and preferences
– short: the personality – of policymakers, shaped by their education and pro-
fession, is a key determinant of fiscal performance. Employing panel data over
the period 1970–2004, we present empirical evidence based on our data set cov-
ering profession and education of political leaders prior to entering office from
93
22 OECD countries. In a nutshell, our results show that education and profes-
sion indeed matter for fiscal policymaking, that former civil servants and mil-
itary officers generate higher deficits than the other groups of politicians, that
the policies of professional politicians differs depending on their education, that
partisanship depends on the former profession and peer group of the politician,
and that institutional sclerosis reduces the positive influence of economists on
the budget surplus.
We test our hypothesis that the education and profession of policymakers
matters for fiscal policy using pooled time-series cross-section (panel) data for
22 OECD countries for the period of 1970–2004. The chapter proceeds as fol-
lows: The next section gives an overview of the literature on the political econ-
omy of fiscal policy and on personal characteristics of policymakers and policy
outcomes. The data and method of our empirical study are presented in Section
4.3. Section 4.4 presents our results, Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
In this chapter, we argue that differences in the personality of policymakers,
as proxied by their education and profession, are an additional explanation for
international differences in public finance.
In most early contributions to the literature on public deficits and debt, pref-
erences of and strategic interaction between political actors, i.e. between politi-
cians, voters or social groups, play a major role, while the more recent literature
has shifted its focus towards the institutions of the budgetary process.
In their seminal contributions on opportunistic behavior of policymakers,
Wagner (1976) and Buchanan andWagner (1977) argue that voters overestimate
the value of (current) government expenditure and underestimate the resulting
future tax burden. To win the favor of voters, opportunistic incumbents will
hence run deficits to finance current overspending. A related inter-temporal ap-
proach is taken by Browning (1975), Tabellini (1991, 2000) and Cukierman and
Meltzer (1989), who argue that current generations vote in favor of issuing gov-
ernment debt, which has to be repaid by generations that do not yet take part
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in the voting process. Nordhaus (1975) links this to the occurrence of election
years, resulting in the now vast literature on political business cycles. Following
Nordhaus (1975) and the subsequent literature, policymakers run deficits before
elections to stimulate the economy or to benefit specific groups that are decisive
for the election outcome. Elections are then followed by expenditure cuts, lead-
ing to a politically induced business cycle. However, these expenditure cuts
will not be sufficient to offset the past excessive spending, leading to a cyclical
ratcheting effect in public debt.2 These early models however imply that vot-
ers are subject to fiscal illusion, i.e. that they make consistent mistakes and are
repeatedly fooled by politicians. However, Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff
(1990) show that opportunistic spending can lead even rational voters to vote
for the incumbent, under the assumption that there is imperfect information
about the policymaker’s competence, and if the size of government spending is
a signal of competence. The empirical findings on political business cycles are
however mixed. Using samples including developed and developing countries,
Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Brender and Drazen (2005, 2008) find neither
a significant change in public expenditure or public deficits prior to elections,
nor an effect of expansionary fiscal policy on re-election prospects. For samples
covering only developing countries, however, Schuknecht (1996) and Shi and
Svensson (2006) find evidence on the existence of political budget cycles. These
results are however due to the effect of transition countries, i.e. new democra-
cies, and vanish after the transition to democracy (Brender and Drazen, 2005).
Recently, Aidt et al. (2009) find evidence for the strategic manipulation of fiscal
policy before an election using a sample of 578 Portuguese municipalities. Fur-
thermore, they find opportunistic behavior to be more pronounced the smaller
the winning margin in the election is.
The conventional wisdom on the partisan effect (Hibbs, 1977; Alesina, 1987)
on fiscal policy has it that the left tends to use fiscal policy as a counter-cyclical
tool, resulting in larger spending, and is more prone to use redistributive mea-
sures, resulting in higher tax rates, while the right is less inclined to engage in
such activism. While the empirical evidence on the partisan effect on tax rates
and the size of government is rather clear (Allers et al., 2001; Bjørnskov, 2005),
2See e.g. Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004) and Balassone et al. (2008).
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the literature studying the effect of political ideology on public deficits finds
either a deficit increasing effect of left-wing governments (Alesina et al., 1993),
no effect (de Haan and Sturm, 1994, 1997) or even a deficit-lowering effect of
left-wing governments (Garrett and Lange, 1991).
Distributional conflicts between policymakers, or between social groups,
are at the core of another strand of the literature. A strategic interaction ap-
proach is taken by Persson and Svensson (1989), Alesina and Tabellini (1990),
and Tabellini and Alesina (1990), who look at differences in preferences con-
cerning the composition of public spending and the total size of the govern-
ment budget. They argue that policymakers strategically issue debt in order to
tie the hands of a possible successor from another party, i.e. to limit the succes-
sor’s leeway in policymaking once he is in power, leading to an overissuance
of debt compared to what would be optimal. In a similar approach, Aghion
and Bolton (1990) argue that policymakers make strategic use of debt policy
to endogenously affect election outcomes. The idea is that by influencing the
economic environment that an opponent will inherit after an election, the in-
cumbent can affect the electorate’s expectation of macroeconomic performance
under that opponent, which in turn influences the election probability of the op-
ponent. The empirical evidence on this channel is however rather mixed. For
example, Lambertini (2003) finds no evidence for strategic manipulation in US
states and OECD countries. Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) however find empirical
support using a sample of Swedish municipalities.
Alesina and Drazen (1991) argue that disagreement between groups about
the burden of taxation leads to delay in fiscal adjustments, and hence to per-
sistent and probably worsening deficits. The model was extended by Spolaore
(1993), who shows that coalition governments would delay fiscal adjustment
relative to single party governments. In addition, he finds that this inefficiency
is increasing in the number of parties in the government. However, Drazen
(2000, p. 693) argues that the effect could go either way, as a larger number of
parties in the government gives way to the formation of sub-coalitions. Roubini
and Sachs (1989) argue that coalition members have different constituencies
with possibly divergent interests. They face a prisoner’s dilemma with respect
to budget cuts, as all the partners prefer comprehensive budget cuts with re-
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spect to the continuing large deficits. However, each of them has an incentive
to protect a particular part of the budget from cuts. The non-cooperative so-
lution prevails over the cooperative one and therefore the budget does not get
adjusted. Similar results on the sources of government deficits and persistent
growth of public debt are found in common property (pork barrel) models3,
where interest groups try to expend resources to try to get a larger share of
some common property.
This literature already links fiscal outcomes to characteristics of the political
system, to government fragmentation, polarization, and ideology. A detailed
analysis of political and fiscal institutions is given in the literature focusing on
the effects of rules, procedures and practices in the budgetary process. Here,
the focus lies on differences in the aggregation process of the conflicting inter-
ests mentioned above, and on the implementation of fiscal policy. Specifically,
the literature looks at the effectiveness of explicit fiscal rules, such as numerical
targets or balanced budget rules, and at rules determining the design of, voting
on and implementation of the budget. Von Hagen (1992) studies the effect of
procedural rules on fiscal outcomes for a sample of European countries, finding
that greater hierarchy and larger transparency in the budgetary process increase
fiscal discipline. Similar conclusions are drawn byAlesina et al. (1999), studying
a sample of Latin American countries. Empirical evidence on other institutional
variables, such as the number of government lawyers, differences between pres-
idential and parliamentary systems or federal vs. centralistic states, is however
rather weak and mixed.4
Recently, there is a growing literature connecting personal traits of politi-
cians with actual policy outcomes. Jones and Olken (2005) show that who is
the head of government matters for economic growth, as they find that unpre-
dictable changes in a country’s leadership due to the incumbent’s death can trig-
ger changes in the GDP growth rate. The consequences of unexpected changes
in leadership are found to be substantial: Following a leader’s death, the vari-
ability of GDP growth increases by 31 percent.
The relationship between the peer groups of politicians and policies that
3See e.g. Velasco (1998).
4See e.g. Roubini and Sachs (1989), Grilli et al. (1991).
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benefit the respective group, or are in line with the peer groups’ views, are stud-
ied by Pande (2003), Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), and Washington (2006).
Pande (2003) looks at the effect of reservation of political mandates for mem-
bers of disadvantaged castes and tribes in India and finds that this has resulted
in an increase in targeted transfers to these groups. A similar regulation for In-
dian women has led to policies benefiting especially women (Chattopadhyay
and Duflo, 2004). Finally, Washington (2006) finds that US congressmen with
daughters are substantially more likely to vote in-line with feminist views.
The relationship between a person’s education and his or her behavior in
economic decision making has been studied by Frank et al. (1993, 1996), Frey
et al. (1993), Frey and Meier (2003) and Rubinstein (2006). Frank et al. (1993)
report evidence that students of economics tend to be more selfish and less co-
operative than students of other faculties. In a natural experiment, Frey and
Meier (2003) find substantial differences in donation behavior between students
of various faculties. However, they find that it is not economists, but business
students that are more selfish. In addition, they find that these differences are
not due to a brainwash during the studies, but due to a self-selection of selfish
people into the respective fields of study. Rubinstein (2006) conducts a survey
among students of four different faculties at Tel Aviv University, among read-
ers of an Israeli business newspaper and among Harvard PhD students, finding
strong differences in attitudes towards profit maximization and firing workers
between students and former students of different faculties. Such differences in
behavior might of course not only be limited to current or recent students, but
are likely to remain during the lifetime of a person. In addition to the educa-
tion, other influences might shape a person’s preferences and attitudes, a clear
candidate being the profession the person exerts after receiving his education.
Consequently, the impact of education and profession on policymaking has
also been in the focus of previous literature. Recent empirical evidence is pro-
vided by Go¨hlmann and Vaubel (2007), who show that the effectiveness in con-
trolling inflation is directly linked to the education and profession of the central
bank’s governing council members. Personal career ambitions are found to af-
fect the performance of central bankers by Adolph (2004). Concerning the edu-
cation of politicians, Duflo (2005) shows that the reservation of political power
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for historically disadvantaged groups and women in India did not influence
the quality of decision making, even though this brought relatively inexperi-
enced and uneducated politicians to power. Evidence leading in the opposite
direction is presented by Besley et al. (2005), who show that differences in the
performance of Indian village politicians are linked to politicians’ education. In
particular, education significantly reduces the probability that a politician uses
his power in an opportunistic way.
Opportunistic behavior, as discussed above, is one main reason for excessive
public deficits. In addition, distributional conflicts leading to overspending can
be assumed to result in different policy outcomes if policymakers are influenced
by their peer group. In this study, we hence concentrate on the effect of the
personal characteristic traits of policymakers as determinants of public deficits.
4.3 Data and Methodology
As outlined above, we investigate the influence of political leader’s education
and profession on the government surplus.
We use pooled cross-section time-series (panel) data for 22 OECD countries
covering the period from 1970–2004. Our main dependent variable is the pri-
mary public surplus in percent of GDP as provided by the OECD (2009) Eco-
nomic Outlook database. As main explanatory variables, we use the educa-
tion and profession data that has been described in detail in Section 3.2 of the
previous chapter. The full data set contains data on the education and for-
mer profession of more than 500 heads of states from 73 countries for the pe-
riod of 1970 to 2005. Profession is split into ten subcategories in the original
dataset, we regroup them into eight categories: politicians, economic scientists,
entrepreneurs, union executive and workers (‘blue collars’), managers (‘white
collars’), lawyers, other scientists and heads of government with other profes-
sions, the difference to the original data set being the merge of the groups union
executive and workers into one single group and other profession and military
professionals into another single group. Education is measured with the help
of seven sub-categories, with a separate group for political leaders with univer-
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sity education in political sciences, economics, law, natural sciences and other
university education, as well as two groups for leaders with non-university ed-
ucation and unknown education, respectively. This classification is more fine
grained as in the previous Chapter 3 due to a larger number of available ob-
servations, except for military professionals, which are now grouped into the
‘other’ professions category. 5
Furthermore, we employ various political economy variables taken from
the Beck et al. (2001) database of political institutions in order to test for the
theories presented in the literature overview. Specifically, we use a dummy
variable indicating whether the head of government is from a left wing party
(leftchiefparty),6 and a variable indicating the time the party of the chief exec-
utive has been in office so far (prtyin).7 In order to check for fractionalization
(Roubini and Sachs, 1989) and war-of attrition effects as postulated by Alesina
and Drazen (1991) and Spolaore (1993), we employ a variable measuring the
fragmentation within the government (govfrac).8 The strength of the govern-
ment is measured by a variable indicating the majority degree the government
has in the legislature (maj). In order to control for the effects of different politi-
cal systems, we use a dummy variable (system) taking the value 1 if the country
has parliamentary system, and zero otherwise.9 Political business cycle theories
are implemented into our empirical model with a dummy variable indicating
whether there is a legislative election in a specific year (legelec). Whether the
leeway of a national government concerning fiscal policy is restricted by the
regulations of the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union (con-
vergence criteria before the introduction of the Euro, Stability and Growth Pact
thereafter) is controlled for by a dummy variable.
In addition to these political economy variables, we include some variables
5In Chapter 3, the number of countries in the sample is larger, but the number of observations
is lower, as the dependent variable is available only on a five-yearly basis.
6Names in parentheses are the names of the series in the original data set of Beck et al. (2001).
7See Section 3.4 of the previous chapter on the interplay between profession, education, time
in office and economic reforms.
8See also Ricciuti (2004).
9In the original source, political systems are categorized into three types: Direct presidential,
strong president elected by assembly and parliamentary. In line with the literature (see e.g.
Campos and Giovannoni, 2007), we regroup them into the two categories described above.
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reflecting the countries’ current economic condition. These are the growth in
GDP,10 which is taken from World Bank (2009), and the change in the unem-
ployment rate, which was collected from various sources.
Finally, in line with Volkerink and de Haan (2001), we control for a bud-
getary item that is not in the hand of the current government, but a result of
past fiscal policy: Gross government interest payments. Data for this variable
was also taken from OECD (2009). Exact definitions and descriptive statistics
for all variables are provided in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 in Section 4.6 at the end of
this chapter.
In our model we view the government budget surplus in country i at time
t as a function of the education and/or profession of the head of government
and a set of country-specific controlling factors. Hence, the equations estimated
take the following form:
surplusit = α + β1pro fit + β2educit + γXit + ηt + ǫit, (4.1)
where surplusit represents the primary government surplus as a percentage
of GDP, pro fit is the vector of professions of the head of government in country
i at time t, and educit represents education. X is the vector of control variables,
ηt are fixed country effects, while ǫit is the disturbance.
The regressions are estimated using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS).
This allows estimation in the presence of AR(1) autocorrelation within panels
and cross-sectional heteroskedasticity across panels.11
We also report results using two alternative estimators in order to test for the
robustness of our results, the first being pooled OLS with a lagged dependent
variable and robust standard errors clustered at the country level (which is iden-
tical to the within-groups (fixed effects) estimator). The inclusion of a lagged
10The correlation coefficient between GDP growth and inflation is 0.81. We consequently drop
inflation from our sample.
11The FGLS estimator has been shown to perform efficiently under heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation as compared to standard panel estimators. Note that the FGLS correction for
a single AR(1) term is unlikely to cause the standard errors to be flawed as would be the case
employing the Parks correction with individual AR(1) terms for each country (Beck and Katz,
1995, p. 637). The procedure of estimation employed here is standard in the recent literature.
See e.g. Kilby (2006).
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dependent variable potentially leads to inconsistent coefficient estimates. The
inconsistency arises because the fixed effects transformation induces a negative
correlation between the transformed lagged dependent variable and the trans-
formed error term. This is often referred to as the Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981).
However, this correlation vanishes with large T, in which case the fixed effect
estimator is consistent (Arellano, 2003). Judson and Owen (1999) show that for
T > 30, Nickell bias in fixed effects models with a lagged dependent is of mi-
nor concern. They furthermore show that for T > 30, this estimation procedure
performs better than the one-step and two-step GMM estimators proposed in
Arellano and Bond (1991). Hence, in our panel with 34 years, T is large enough
for inconsistency not to be a serious concern. Finally, we employ the panel cor-
rected standard errors estimator as suggested by Beck and Katz (1995), correct-
ing for first-order autocorrelation. As a further robustness check, we estimate
three separate equations for each model, the first including both education and
profession variables, the other two excluding one of the categories. This is done
to deal with possible collinearity between some of the profession and education
categories.
One might argue that voters vote for certain types of politicians in certain
(adverse) economic situations, which would cause endogeneity problems in
our analysis. However, we have not found a single occasion where a politician
has used his education or profession as an argument in an electoral campaign.
Hence, we believe that endogeneity is not an issue here. Furthermore, Dreher
and Lamla (2007)12 show that selection of politicians with various backgrounds
is almost idiosyncratic. They establish that profession and education of politi-
cians is clearly not related to fundamental political and economic variables. The
next section presents the results.
4.4 Results
Table 4.1 presents results of the regressions including the dummies for profes-
sion and education of the chief government politician both simultaneously and
12See the discussion of their results in Section 3.2 and the respective Table 3.11 in Section 3.6
of the previous chapter.
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separately in addition to the covariates discussed in the previous section. We
omit the categories ‘whole work life politician’ and ‘politics education’. Hence,
the interpretation of all results regarding the impact of a politician’s profession
or education is relative to these baseline groups. In columns 1-3 we report the
results of the FGLS estimations, columns 4-6 show the estimations using pooled
OLS and columns 7-9 present the results from the estimations with panel cor-
rected standard errors.
As can be seen, all economic control variables are significant and of the ex-
pected sign across all regressions. The GDP growth rate is found to be positively
related to the budget surplus. An increase in the unemployment rate leads to
a significant decrease in the budget surplus. The same result is found for the
growth rate of government interest payments.
Turning to the political control variables, we find very interesting results.
First, we find strong evidence for the effectiveness of fiscal rules. The coefficient
of the dummy variable for countries subject to the regulations of the Maastricht
treaty is significant and positive across all regressions.
Furthermore, and in line with the preceding literature (de Haan and Sturm,
1994, 1997), we find no significant effect of political ideology, as measured by
the dummy for left wing parties.
A remarkable result is found for the dummy variable indicating the occur-
rence of election years. So far, the empirical literature has found evidence for
the existence of political budget cycles only using local-level data or data from
developing or transition countries, or in studies looking at revenues or single
budgetary items, while there was no measurable effect on the budget balance in
studies using data only from developed countries and established democracies.
We however are the first to find strong evidence for such politically induced
cycles in the budget balance also for OECD countries, as the coefficient of the
dummy variable for election years is negative and significant throughout all
regressions.13 This difference to the previous literature is possibly due to our
inclusion of profession and education variables in the regression, which might
have removed an omitted variables bias. This lends further support to the con-
13This finding is robust to the exclusion of countries defined as new democracies in Brender
and Drazen (2005) from our sample (Greece, Korea, Portugal, Spain).
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Table 4.1: Profession, Education, and Budget Surplus, 1970–2004.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Lagged dependent 0.690*** 0.705*** 0.707***
[14.65] [16.18] [16.73]
GDP growth 3.976 4.731* 5.034** 8.734** 9.182* 9.273** 5.219*** 5.948*** 6.980***
[1.57] [1.84] [2.00] [2.12] [2.01] [2.13] [3.02] [3.18] [4.02]
Change in unemployment rate -0.640*** -0.601*** -0.569*** -0.656*** -0.635*** -0.635*** -0.670*** -0.616*** -0.604***
[8.51] [7.83] [7.78] [7.92] [7.70] [7.77] [12.72] [10.57] [11.57]
Growth in government interest
payments
-2.326*** -2.171*** -2.171*** -2.002** -1.861** -1.839** -2.913*** -2.665*** -2.782***
[4.19] [3.93] [4.02] [2.45] [2.45] [2.25] [7.49] [7.17] [7.31]
Maastricht treaty 1.002*** 1.106*** 1.117*** 0.571* 0.613* 0.582* 1.307*** 1.380*** 1.352***
[3.34] [3.57] [3.64] [1.73] [1.75] [1.91] [7.72] [8.26] [7.40]
Left wing chief executive party -0.219 -0.286 -0.102 -0.171 -0.219 -0.080 -0.131 -0.203 -0.028
[1.03] [1.35] [0.50] [0.85] [1.20] [0.39] [0.69] [1.01] [0.17]
Chief executive party’s years in
office
0.038** 0.027 0.029* 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.037***
[2.18] [1.57] [1.69] [0.44] [0.49] [0.32] [5.72] [5.24] [5.17]
Government fractionalization 1.336** 0.959 1.048* -0.042 -0.040 -0.038 0.769* 0.545 0.586
[2.11] [1.54] [1.69] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [1.91] [1.36] [1.53]
Majority degree of government
in legislature
0.211 0.281 0.072 1.055 1.157 0.934 0.720 1.062 0.636
[0.21] [0.28] [0.07] [1.07] [1.18] [0.98] [1.02] [1.44] [1.07]
Legislative election -0.237** -0.244** -0.223** -0.370** -0.355** -0.377** -0.227*** -0.228*** -0.233***
[2.26] [2.33] [2.17] [2.38] [2.19] [2.46] [2.79] [2.73] [3.19]
Profession
science economics 0.100 -0.518 -0.575 -0.468 -0.177 -0.658
[0.13] [0.75] [0.78] [0.57] [0.43] [1.64]
entrepreneur 0.348 0.355 0.004 0.026 0.188 0.222
[0.44] [0.50] [0.02] [0.12] [0.54] [0.61]
manager/white collar -0.659* -0.895** -0.877** -0.948** -0.919*** -1.166***
[1.68] [2.46] [2.58] [2.13] [2.69] [3.34]
union executive or worker/blue
collar
0.881* 0.364 -0.173 -0.361 0.311 -0.263
[1.82] [0.80] [0.44] [0.61] [1.01] [0.97]
lawyer 0.032 0.463 -0.006 0.018 0.021 0.282
[0.08] [1.34] [0.02] [0.06] [0.07] [0.90]
profession: other science 1.453** 0.563 0.677 0.112 1.273** 0.393
[2.29] [1.02] [1.01] [0.24] [2.53] [0.83]
profession: other -0.954* -1.091** -0.946*** -0.993*** -1.352*** -1.515***
[1.78] [2.10] [3.35] [2.90] [3.73] [3.96]
Education
unknown -1.104* -1.007 -0.462 -0.648 -1.059*** -0.984***
[1.76] [1.61] [0.52] [0.68] [3.03] [3.05]
not university -0.029 -0.335 0.037 -0.533 -0.129 -0.647*
[0.05] [0.62] [0.11] [1.16] [0.33] [1.90]
economics -0.745 -0.739 0.117 -0.267 -0.596 -0.746**
[1.32] [1.49] [0.31] [0.59] [1.52] [2.47]
law 0.252 0.309 0.105 0.054 0.083 0.111
[0.50] [0.71] [0.26] [0.14] [0.26] [0.47]
natural science -1.684** -0.845 -0.906 -0.759 -1.630*** -1.080***
[2.27] [1.25] [1.67] [1.06] [3.32] [2.84]
other university -1.270** -1.270** -0.434 -0.721 -1.396*** -1.650***
[2.16] [2.30] [1.00] [1.43] [3.97] [4.68]
Method FGLS pooled OLS PCSE
Observations 527 527 527 526 526 526 528 528 528
R-squared 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.31 0.27 0.27
Joint signif. (Prob>chi2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets Robust t statistics in brackets z statistics in brackets
Notes: The dependent variable is the primary government surplus as a percentage of GDP. All regressions contain fixed effects at the country level or country dummies (not
reported). In columns 4-6, standard errors are clustered at the country level. Base categories: education: political science / profession: whole work life politician. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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sideration of personal characteristics of policymakers in the analysis of fiscal
policy.
The evidence for the effect of the other political control variables is rather
weak. We find some evidence for an increase in the surplus, the longer the
chief executive’s party has been in office. This might reflect the effect of expe-
rience in implementing policies and in organizing majorities in the parliament
that younger governments lack to some extent. Government fractionalization is
also found to increase the surplus. This seems counterintuitive at first sight, but
is in line with an argument brought forth in Drazen (2000, p. 693), who argues
that the negative effect of the distributional conflict between several govern-
ment parties might be offset by the possibility to form sub-coalitions. Finally,
we find some evidence for a deficit increasing effect of parliamentary systems,
as compared to presidential systems, and no significant effect of the majority
degree of the government party in parliament.
Concerning our specific research question our results reveal that profession
and education of politicians indeed matter. The dummies are jointly signifi-
cant at the one percent level, with one exception in column 6 (pooled OLS with
standard errors clustered at the country level and separate inclusion of the ed-
ucation variables), where the covariates are only jointly significant at the ten
percent level.
Turning to the individual impact of the different profession and education
categories,14 we find a robust negative influence of former managers or white
collar workers on the public surplus. This can be explained by the fact that
a large part of this group of white collar workers is made up by former civil
servants and former employees of public authorities and publicly owned com-
panies. These findings hence support the results of the literature linking policy
outcomes to the effect of demands from or views of the peer group of a policy-
maker,15 and might also be evidence for a partisan effect, where ideology is not
measured by party affiliation, but by the values of the politician’s peer group.
Furthermore, we find a significantly negative effect on the budget surplus of
14Note again that all results are relative to the base categories, ‘whole work life politician’ and
‘education in political science’.
15See e.g. Washington (2006).
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politicians in the ‘other’ professions group. This group comprises politicians
with professions in fields that are possibly less relevant for policymaking than
having experience in law, as a union executive or as an economic researcher.
However, and most importantly, also former military officials are part of this
group. Military officials can be reasonably assumed to have a strong preference
for spending on military goods. This again lends support to the hypothesis that
politicians are influenced by the views and values of their peer group. These
findings are not only robust to the variations in the estimation method, but also
to the exclusion of the education categories from the list of variables (Columns
2, 5 and 8).
The evidence on the individual impact of the education categories is rather
weak. This is however in line with our findings in Chapter 3. We find some ev-
idence for a negative effect on the budget surplus for three groups: politicians
with ‘other university’ education, politicians with a degree in natural sciences,
and politicians with unknown (or no) education. The results for the ‘other uni-
versity’ group supports our reasoning on the peer group effect above, as this
group again comprises also high-ranked military officials with education from
universities or military academies, while the negative coefficient of the group of
politicians with unknown or no tertiary education shows that being educated
at all matters for policymaking.
So far, we found that the impact of education is rather vague. However, go-
ing more into detail, we can show that education indeed matters. More specif-
ically, we test whether politicians that have been politicians for all or most of
their work life (‘whole work life politicians’) differ in their fiscal policies, de-
pending on their education. This question is important as a relatively large
share of the head of governments are ‘whole work life politicians’ (the ‘whole
work life politicians’ category comprises about 40 percent of all the profession
observations). Therefore, we interact the ‘whole work life politicians’ category
with the education categories ‘economics’, ‘law’ and ‘political science’.16
The results of this exercise is shown in Table 4.2. Again, we use three differ-
ent estimators to check the robustness of our results. As can be seen, our results
16The choice of these three education categories is driven by the amount of available obser-
vations.
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for the economic and political control variables are robust to the inclusion of
the interaction terms. The same holds for the results concerning the profession
categories, while some of the education categories turn insignificant. However,
the education category ‘law’ is now significantly positive. This is extremely
interesting when seen in combination with the result of the interaction term be-
tween law education and ‘whole work life politician’. The coefficient of this
interaction term is negative and significant across all regressions. This means
that while professional lawyers run lower deficits than the average whole work
life politician, those whole work life politicians with law education run signifi-
cantly larger deficits than the average. The flip side of this effect is the positive
coefficient of the interaction term between whole work life politicians and polit-
ical science education. As former law students (and to some extent also former
economics students, as indicated by one negative and significant coefficient)
run surpluses below average, the sign of those politicians with political science
education is positive.
In the regressions shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, we did not find evidence
for partisan behavior in fiscal policy making, as the coefficient of the dummy
variable for left-wing governments has been insignificant throughout all re-
gressions. Now, we test whether such partisan behavior, as measured by po-
litical ideology, is only insignificant on average, but present for different sub-
categories of politicians. Therefore, we interact the dummy variables for the
profession categories ‘professional economist’, ‘lawyer’, ‘union executive’, and
‘whole work life politician’ with the dummy variable for left-wing govern-
ments.
Table 4.3 presents the results for the interactions of political leaning and the
profession of a head of government, again using three different estimation tech-
niques. The odd numbered columns present the results including both the pro-
fession and education variables, while the even numbered columns show the
regressions excluding the education variables.
Our previous results for the economic and political control variables remain
robust across all specifications. The same is the case for the linear terms of the
profession and education variables. Concerning the effect of political ideology
on the fiscal policymaking of the different categories of politicians, we find a
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strongly negative effect of left-wing economists on the public budget surplus.
This effect is robust to all variations in the estimation procedure. Hence, we find
robust evidence for the existence of partisan behavior for the group that is most
likely to be influenced by ideology – or schools of thought – in economic policy
making: Economists. Our results imply that left-wing economist, influenced by
Keynesian economics, run significantly larger public deficits than the average
former economic researcher in the position of a head of government. The co-
efficient of the interaction terms for the other profession groups is insignificant
across all regressions, suggesting that ideology does not make a difference for
these groups. For the group of former union executives and blue collar workers
this finding comes as no surprise, as almost all politicians in this category are
left-wing anyways.
Previous research suggests that policy outcomes also depend on experience.
For example, Roubini and Sachs (1989) suggest that there is a tendency towards
larger deficits in countries characterized by a short average tenure of govern-
ment. They argue that budget reductions require political consensus which is
harder to achieve by weaker governments, which can (inter alia) be proxied by
expected tenure of office. So far, we have not found a significant effect of the
time the governing party has spent being the ruling party prior to the entry of
the current incumbent into office. However, we suspect that there are differen-
tial effects between the different types of politicians. We thus include an interac-
tion term between profession/education, and the number of years that the chief
executive’s party has been in office before the chief executive was elected.17
17Using the time in office of the chief executive himself did not yield significant results.
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Table 4.2: Profession, Education, and Budget Surplus, 1970–2004, interactions of profession
and education.
(1) (2) (3)
Lagged dependent 0.688***
[14.24]
GDP growth 4.225* 9.231** 5.653***
[1.67] [2.12] [3.65]
Change in unemp. rate -0.629*** -0.643*** -0.661***
[8.42] [8.54] [13.64]
Growth in govt. interest payments -2.234*** -1.811** -2.820***
[4.03] [2.19] [7.54]
Maastricht treaty 1.008*** 0.604* 1.311***
[3.38] [1.80] [8.01]
Left wing chief executive party -0.210 -0.118 -0.137
[0.98] [0.52] [0.79]
Chief executive party’s years in office 0.038** 0.016 0.046***
[2.20] [0.59] [6.87]
Government fractionalization 1.324** 0.026 0.753**
[2.10] [0.04] [1.96]
Majority degree of govt. in legislature 0.088 0.876 0.635
[0.09] [0.88] [0.96]
Legislative election -0.229** -0.384** -0.229***
[2.18] [2.40] [3.05]
Profession
science economics -0.658 -1.017 -1.169**
[0.69] [1.19] [2.48]
entrepreneur -0.400 -0.442 -0.583
[0.47] [1.02] [1.64]
manager/ white collar -1.294** -1.331*** -1.655***
[2.49] [2.96] [4.14]
union executive/ blue collar 0.257 -0.513 -0.464
[0.38] [0.85] [0.99]
lawyer -1.080* -0.798 -1.061**
[1.85] [1.61] [2.18]
other science 0.559 0.130 0.356
[0.76] [0.18] [0.67]
other -1.398** -1.207** -1.799***
[2.24] [2.79] [4.41]
Education
unknown 0.228 0.704 0.318
[0.26] [1.02] [0.40]
not university 1.539* 1.295*** 1.425*
[1.69] [3.04] [1.92]
economics 1.090 1.532** 1.508*
[1.07] [2.69] [1.72]
law 2.702** 1.965*** 2.517**
[2.52] [3.29] [2.54]
natural science 0.219 0.570 0.245
[0.20] [0.77] [0.24]
other university 0.293 0.798 0.151
[0.33] [1.70] [0.20]
Interaction terms
Whole work life politicians w/ econ. education -0.731 -0.489 -1.196**
[0.95] [0.62] [2.51]
Whole work life politicians w/ law education -1.491*** -0.984*** -1.464***
[2.59] [2.87] [3.34]
Whole work life politicians w/ pol. sci. education 1.186 1.326*** 1.294*
[1.35] [3.02] [1.69]
Method FGLS pooled OLS PCSE
Observations 527 526 528
R-squared 0.80 0.32
Notes: The dependent variable is the primary government surplus as a percentage of GDP. All regressions contain fixed effects at the country level or country dummies (not
reported). In column 2, standard errors are clustered at the country level. Base categories: education: political science / profession: whole work life politician. Note that the
profession and education categories add up to 100 per cent and interactions with the base category can hence be included. Absolute value of z statistics (col.1), robust t statistics
(col. 2), and z statistics (col. 3) in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 4.3: Profession, Education, and Budget Surplus, 1970–2004, interactions of profession
and political leaning.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged dependent 0.689*** 0.704***
[15.22] [16.90]
GDP growth 5.051** 5.555** 9.537** 9.912* 6.056*** 6.524***
[1.99] [2.17] [2.19] [2.05] [3.40] [3.39]
Change in unemp. rate -0.630*** -0.590*** -0.643*** -0.626*** -0.667*** -0.613***
[8.25] [7.60] [7.48] [7.04] [12.25] [10.36]
Growth in govt. interest payments -2.273*** -2.123*** -2.045** -1.922** -2.935*** -2.686***
[4.12] [3.87] [2.58] [2.61] [7.54] [7.25]
Maastricht treaty 1.021*** 1.101*** 0.592 0.625 1.323*** 1.383***
[3.39] [3.55] [1.66] [1.67] [8.31] [8.31]
Left wing chief executive party -0.154 -0.082 -0.059 -0.055 -0.070 0.009
[0.49] [0.27] [0.26] [0.26] [0.24] [0.03]
Chief executive party’s years in office 0.038** 0.026 0.010 0.009 0.040*** 0.040***
[2.13] [1.51] [0.35] [0.34] [5.17] [4.80]
Government fractionalization 1.531** 1.064 0.104 0.041 0.995** 0.682*
[2.32] [1.64] [0.15] [0.06] [2.46] [1.73]
Majority degree of govt. in legislature 0.346 0.338 0.999 1.049 0.827 1.113
[0.35] [0.34] [0.97] [1.01] [1.15] [1.47]
Legislative election -0.221** -0.227** -0.365** -0.348* -0.216*** -0.216***
[2.10] [2.17] [2.25] [2.07] [2.69] [2.61]
Profession
science economics 0.930 0.265 -0.121 -0.071 0.496 -0.051
[1.14] [0.36] [0.15] [0.08] [1.40] [0.15]
entrepreneur 0.415 0.336 0.105 0.100 0.260 0.212
[0.53] [0.47] [0.37] [0.45] [0.76] [0.59]
manager/ white collar -0.702 -1.056*** -0.881** -0.994** -0.886** -1.293***
[1.63] [2.68] [2.43] [2.26] [2.46] [3.52]
union executive/ blue collar 0.804 0.246 0.005 -0.180 0.610* -0.079
[1.32] [0.42] [0.01] [0.28] [1.89] [0.31]
lawyer 0.043 0.424 -0.078 -0.073 0.063 0.290
[0.08] [1.02] [0.16] [0.21] [0.18] [0.92]
other science 1.381** 0.458 0.662 0.071 1.251** 0.261
[2.15] [0.83] [0.86] [0.15] [2.44] [0.57]
other -0.930* -1.198** -0.917*** -1.019*** -1.218*** -1.583***
[1.65] [2.23] [3.18] [3.29] [3.29] [4.05]
Education
unknown -1.136* -0.446 -1.111***
[1.68] [0.47] [3.10]
not university -0.114 0.018 -0.220
[0.18] [0.04] [0.52]
economics -0.756 0.106 -0.629
[1.31] [0.25] [1.53]
law 0.241 0.149 0.067
[0.45] [0.31] [0.20]
natural science -1.550** -0.877 -1.606***
[2.06] [1.37] [3.07]
other university -1.333** -0.438 -1.540***
[2.10] [0.78] [4.01]
Interaction terms
Professional economist, left wing -2.563** -2.496*** -1.804** -1.787** -2.311*** -2.343***
[2.55] [2.59] [2.81] [2.48] [2.88] [2.63]
Lawyer, left wing -0.049 -0.125 0.024 0.045 0.004 -0.151
[0.11] [0.29] [0.07] [0.14] [0.01] [0.34]
Union executive, left wing 0.074 -0.051 -0.363 -0.495 -0.470 -0.518
[0.11] [0.08] [0.86] [1.18] [1.11] [1.28]
Whole work life politician, left wing 0.029 -0.244 -0.047 -0.185 0.158 -0.184
[0.07] [0.64] [0.12] [0.64] [0.52] [0.59]
Notes: The dependent variable is the primary government surplus as a percentage of GDP. All regressions contain fixed effects at the country level or country dummies (not
reported). In columns 3 and 4, standard errors are clustered at the country level. Base categories: education: political science / profession: whole work life politician. Note that
the profession and education categories add up to 100 per cent and interactions with the base category can hence be included. Absolute value of z statistics (col.1+2), robust t
statistics (col. 3+4), and z statistics (col. 5+6) in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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The results of the respective estimations are shown in Table 4.4. We have
again employed three different estimation techniques to check the robustness
of our results. The odd numbered columns present the results of the estima-
tions including education and profession variables simultaneously, while the
even numbered columns show the results of the regressions excluding the ed-
ucation variables. As can be seen, the results concerning the economic and po-
litical control variables are fairly robust also to this variation in the estimation
procedure. The same is the case for the linear terms of the education and profes-
sion variables, with one exception: We now find some evidence for a surplus-
increasing effect of former economic researchers. However, looking at the inter-
action terms with the party’s time in office, we find that this effect is the lower,
the longer the party of the head of government has been the ruling party. Hence,
it seems that if economists come into power directly after a regime change, they
are able to get fiscal policy under their control and exert a positive effect on the
surplus. However, if the economist is elected into an administrative environ-
ment that has long been in place, this positive effect is reduced, possibly due to
the protection of vested rights of the past administration and growing inflexi-
bility of the administrative body over time. This finding hence lends support to
the theory of institutional sclerosis put forth by Olson (1982), which claims that
the influence of vested interest groups increases over time, causing detrimental
effects on economic performance.18
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have studied the effect of the education and former profes-
sion of political leaders on fiscal policy. We have argued that education and
profession shape a person’s values, his behavior and his attitudes towards eco-
nomic and political decision making. Using panel data for 22 OECD countries
covering the period of 1970–2004, we have found substantial evidence that pro-
fession and education do matter for fiscal policy making.
18See e.g. Heckelman (2000), Horgos and Zimmermann (2009) and Wilson et al. (2010) for
empirical evidence of institutional sclerosis.
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Specifically, we have found that education and profession per se matter, in-
dicated by the joint significance of the respective variables. Concerning the spe-
cific fields, we have found strong negative effects of former white collar workers
(including civil servants and public officials) and the group comprising former
military officials on the government surplus. We have further found that edu-
cation makes a difference even when we look at only one professional group.
Here, we have found that heads of governments that have been politicians for
their whole professional life cause higher deficits if they have a degree in law.
Furthermore, we have found partisan behavior in fiscal policy making not only
in the form of a peer group effect of former public servants and military of-
ficials, but we also find that strong evidence for partisan behavior when we
interact profession and political leaning. This is especially interesting, as we,
in line with the literature, find no effect of political ideology on fiscal policy
outcomes per se. Finally, we find evidence for Olson (1982)’s theory of institu-
tional sclerosis, as the positive effect of economists on fiscal policy is reduced,
the longer the governing party has been in office. We furthermore are the first
to have found strong evidence for the existence of politically induced budget
cycles. Additionally, we have also shown that fiscal rules have a significantly
disciplining effect on fiscal policy.
Extrapolating our results, we can formulate the following general hypothe-
sis: In order to progress with political economy issues, researchers should not
narrow their focus to differences in political institutions. Instead, they should
paymore attention to differences between the political agents themselves, i.e. to
the different personal characteristics – gender, age, experience, cultural, social,
educational and professional background, political attitudes, personal values.
This and the previous chapter, which discussed the influence of education and
profession of heads of government on economic reforms, have added to the
initial steps into this direction that have already been taken by Chattopadhyay
and Duflo (2004) and Besley et al. (2005) who study the relation between politi-
cians and quality of decision making in India, by Jones and Olken (2005), who
investigate the effects of unexpected changes of heads of government on eco-
nomic growth, by Adolph (2004) and Go¨hlmann and Vaubel (2007), who study
the effects of central bankers’ characteristics on inflation.
113
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Table 4.5: Variable definitions and sources
Variable Definition Source
Primary govt. surplus, % of GDP Primary central government surplus
as a percentage of GDP
OECD (2009)
GDP growth Percentage change of GDP com-
pared to the previous year
World Bank (2009)
Change in unemployment rate Difference between unemployment
rate (in percent) in t and unemploy-
ment rate in t-1
various sources
Growth in government interest payments Percentage change in government
interest payments compared to the
previous year
OECD (2009)
Maastricht treaty Dummy for membership in EMU,
=1 for members, 0 otherwise
Various sources
Left wing chief executive party Dummy =1 if the party of the chief
executive is left wing
Beck et al. (2001)
Chief executive party’s years in office Number of years that the chief exec-
utive’s party has been in office be-
fore the chief executive was elected
Beck et al. (2001)
Government fractionalization Government fractionalization. Prob-
ability that two random draws will
produce legislators from different
parties.
Beck et al. (2001)
Majority degree of government in legislature Fraction of seats held by the govern-
ment party
Beck et al. (2001)
Legislative election =1 if there was a legislative election
in this year
Beck et al. (2001)
Profession
science economics Dummy for former economic re-
searcher
Dreher et al. (2009)
entrepreneur Dummy for former entrepreneur Dreher et al. (2009)
manager/white collar Dummy for former office worker Dreher et al. (2009)
union executive or worker/blue collar Dummy for former union executives
or blue collar worker
Dreher et al. (2009)
lawyer Dummy for former lawyer Dreher et al. (2009)
politician Dummy for whole work life politi-
cian
Dreher et al. (2009)
other science Dummy for former researcher in a
field other than law, political science
or economics
Dreher et al. (2009)
other Dummy for all other former occupa-
tions
Dreher et al. (2009)
Education
unknown Dummy for unknown education Dreher et al. (2009)
not university Dummy for politician w/o univer-
sity degree
Dreher et al. (2009)
economics Dummy for degree in economics or
business
Dreher et al. (2009)
law Dummy for degree in law Dreher et al. (2009)
politics Dummy for degree in political sci-
ence
Dreher et al. (2009)
natural science Dummy for degree in natural sci-
ence
Dreher et al. (2009)
other university Dummy for a degree in a field other
than the ones above
Dreher et al. (2009)
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Table 4.6: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Primary govt. surplus, % of GDP 528 0.02 3.20 -9.96 9.53
GDP growth 528 0.08 0.05 -0.05 0.27
Change in unemployment rate 528 0.09 1.03 -2.86 5.10
Growth in government interest payments 528 0.09 0.16 -0.24 0.78
Maastricht treaty 528 0.33 0.47 0 1
Left wing chief executive party 528 0.42 0.49 0 1
Chief executive party’s years in office 528 7.52 7.72 1 40
Government fractionalization 528 0.27 0.27 0 0.83
Majority degree of government in legislature 528 0.54 0.10 0.11 0.93
Legislative election 528 0.28 0.45 0 1
Profession
science economics 528 0.03 0.17 0 1
entrepreneur 528 0.02 0.16 0 1
manager/ white collar 528 0.12 0.32 0 1
union executive or worker/blue collar 528 0.10 0.31 0 1
lawyer 528 0.22 0.42 0 1
politician 528 0.38 0.48 0 1
other science 528 0.06 0.24 0 1
other 528 0.09 0.29 0 1
Education
unknown 528 0.04 0.20 0 1
not university 528 0.12 0.33 0 1
economics 528 0.21 0.41 0 1
law 528 0.37 0.48 0 1
politics 528 0.14 0.34 0 1
natural science 528 0.07 0.25 0 1
other university 528 0.07 0.26 0 1
Notes: Based on regression sample of Table 4.1, Column 1.
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Chapter 5
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Tax Competition and Income Sorting: Evidence from
the Zurich Metropolitan Area1
5.1 Introduction
Since the seminal contribution of Tiebout (1956), a strong focus of the literature
on fiscal federalism has been put on the analysis of market-like competition
between jurisdictions. Tiebout showed that by voting with one’s feet, there ex-
ists a mechanism that can reveal individual preferences for local public goods.
Hence, fiscal decentralization appears to be efficiency enhancing, as it allows
people with similar preferences concerning the provision of public goods to
settle in communities that provide public goods at levels close to their prefer-
ences.2
Many of the results in this literature3 rest on the assumption that households
differ in their preference for public goods, but have equal incomes. The influ-
ence of income heterogeneity on households’ locational decisions and the local
provision of public goods were first studied by Ellickson (1971) and Westhoff
(1977).4 A core result of these models is the income segregation hypothesis. It
postulates that if rich households esteem public goods less than poor house-
holds, fiscal federalism induces self sorting of the population by income. Fol-
lowing Schmidheiny (2006a), this clustering of rich and poor is even stronger in
case of progressive tax schedules.
In this study, we use community-level data from the Swiss canton of Zurich
to study the influence of income taxes on the distribution of households accord-
ing to their taxable income. The situation in Swiss cantons is quite unique, as
the progressiveness of the tax schedule is set at the cantonal level, while the
communities within the canton can set the effective tax burden by applying a
tax multiplier to the cantonal tax schedule. This enables us to study the effects
1This Chapter is based on Schaltegger et al. (2009).
2Similarly, Oates (1972) argues in his ‘decentralization theorem’ that there are no advantages
associated with a centralized provision of public goods since differences in public good at the
local level reflect differences in preferences across these jurisdictions.
3See Oates (1999), Wilson (1999) and Wilson and Wildasin (2004) for surveys.
4See also Ross and Yinger (1999) for a survey.
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of tax differentials on the choice of residence within an economically and cultur-
ally homogeneous region. Using panel IV regressions covering the years 1991–
2003 and 171 communities and spatial error regressions for the 171 communities
in 2003, we find substantial evidence for the income segregation hypothesis in
the canton of Zurich.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses previous
theoretical and empirical findings. Section 5.3 gives an introduction to the tax
system in Switzerland and in the Canton of Zurich. The subsequent section
presents the data. The results of the empirical analysis are discussed in section
5.5. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Theoretical Foundations and Empirical Evidence
Tiebout (1956)’s paper on the efficiency properties of fiscally induced migra-
tion has inspired many scholars in different fields of the public finance litera-
ture (see Oates, 2006, for an overview). The segregation hypothesis is one of
the central propositions in multi-community models in the tradition of Tiebout.
Endogenous segregation means that different people choose different locations
in equilibrium. While the Tiebout model focuses on heterogeneity of prefer-
ences, Ellickson (1971) and Westhoff (1977) focus on income as the main cause
of difference. Several mechanisms have been proposed that explain why rich
households make different choices than poor households (see Ross and Yinger
(1999), for property tax models and Schmidheiny (2002), for income tax mod-
els). Similar to the classic Tiebout model, one strand of the literature argues that
rich and poor households differ in their preferences for public goods, which in
turn will induce income sorting if tax rates, and hence levels of public goods
provision, differ among jurisdictions. Another strand of the literature investi-
gates the effect of the income elasticity for housing and the stylized fact that
housing prices are typically higher in low tax communities (Epple et al., 1993;
Stadelmann and Billon, 2010). If housing is a normal good, housing expenditure
becomes less important with increasing income, which means that rich house-
holds will benefit more from low taxes than they will lose from high housing
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prices. These studies, however, have assumed that tax rates are flat. In two
more recent papers, Schmidheiny (2006a) and Schmidheiny and Hodler (2006)
draw on the empirical fact that income taxes are progressive and that local ju-
risdictions can often only set tax levels within a given tax scheme. High income
households are then more likely to choose low tax communities, as their tax
burden is relatively higher due to the progressiveness of the tax schedule.
Except for the two latter papers, the studies discussed above suggest strict
income sorting, which is not observed empirically. De Bartolome and Ross
(2003, 2004) solve this issue by introducing commuters and commuting cost into
a model of fiscal competition and derive multiple equilibria with both income
sorting and incomemixing. Schmidheiny (2006b) derives imperfect income seg-
regation in a model where households differ in both income and preferences for
housing.
The segregation hypothesis of the Tiebout type models has been challenged
by a number of empirical studies. A first strand of research investigates the
equilibrium predictions of multi-community models using data on aggregate
community characteristics.
Epple and Sieg (1999) and Epple et al. (2001) estimate the household prefer-
ence parameters of a full equilibriummodel where the local income distribution
and local policy variables are simultaneously determined. They show that the
differing income quantiles across 92 communities in the Boston area can be ex-
plained by the model predictions. Using data from US federal states, Bakija and
Slemrod (2004) find that wealthy retirees change their state of residence to avoid
high state taxes. However, Conway and Rork (2008) do not find this effect. They
look at the relationship between tax benefits for the elderly in the US and find no
effect of these benefits on the mobility of retirees. Feld and Kirchga¨ssner (2001)
regress the share of seven income classes in Swiss cantons and main cities on
income tax rates. They find a strong negative relationship between the tax rate
and the share of rich households.
Schmidheiny (2006a) studies the locational choice of households in the Swiss
metropolitan region of Basel and finds that rich households are substantially
more likely to move to low tax communities than poor households.
The study closest to ours is Schmidheiny and Hodler (2006) who simulate a
120
model of locational choice with progressive taxes at the federal level and a local
tax multiplier using income and tax data from the canton of Zurich. Schmid-
heiny andHodler (2006)’s study generates twomain insights. First, their model,
calibratedwith real-life values from the canton of Zurich, produces income sort-
ing effects, and second, they find that, due to income sorting, the resulting ac-
tual tax progressiveness is lower than intended by the cantonal tax scheme, as
high income individuals are more likely to reside in low tax communities, while
low income individuals tend to live in high tax communities, which flattens the
effective progressiveness of the tax scheme relative to the intended progressive-
ness.
A different strand of the literature that is highly relevant for our study is the
literature on the capitalization of local fiscal policy in property prices. Follow-
ing the seminal paper of Oates (1969), a large number of studies5 have found
that, among other variables, tax-expenditure packages do capitalize into prop-
erty prizes. The findings on the extent of capitalization are however mixed. For
example, Stadelmann (2009) finds that full capitalization is only possible if the
elasticity of supply on the housing market is zero. In all other cases, capitaliza-
tion will be imperfect, and zero, if supply of housing is perfectly elastic.
In this study, we show that income sorting effects are not only an outcome
of a theoretical model, but can also be observed empirically in the case of the
Zurich metropolitan area. To our best knowledge, we are the first to study in-
come sorting using panel data from a small6 and culturally homogeneous re-
gion. Hence, we are not only able to make use of cross-sectional variation, as is
the case in e.g. Feld and Kirchga¨ssner (2001), but can also take account of varia-
tions in tax rates and income shares over time. We also include the house price
channel discussed above, which is often ignored in the literature on tax com-
petition and income sorting (an important exception is Feld and Kirchga¨ssner
(1997) with their analysis of the Tiebout-Hypothesis within Switzerland). Fur-
thermore, by using data from one single canton we avoid having to take ac-
5See e.g Oates (1973), Pollakowski (1973), Yinger et al. (1988), Stull and Stull (1991) and most
recently Stadelmann and Billon (2010).
6The Canton of Zurich with its 171 communities is only slightly larger than London, UK.
The largest distance of a community in the canton to the city of Zurich, which is roughly in the
center of the canton, is 36km.
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count of factors determining the decision to move that are hard to measure or
even not measurable, such as differences in mentality, attachment to the local
community, family ties, or differences in the school system.
5.3 Tax Competition in the Canton of Zurich
Switzerland has a federalist constitution granting tax autonomy to the sub-
federal governments. The Swiss federation consists of 26 states, the so-called
cantons. The cantons are divided into roughly 3,000 communities of varying
size, population, culture and language. All three state levels finance their ex-
penditures essentially by their own taxes and fees. While the federal govern-
ment is mainly financed by indirect taxes such as VAT, customs duties and ex-
cise dues, the cantons and communities largely rely on direct taxes. Income
taxes account for 60 per cent of cantonal and 84 percent of communal tax rev-
enue. However, in addition the federal government levies a highly progressive
and profit-yielding income tax which – in return for 17 percent of the revenues
– is administrated by the cantons and has an equalizing effect across cantons.
Second, a withholding tax on capital income by 35 percent is levied and will be
refunded in case of declaration in the income tax form (Feld, 2000).
The cantons organize their tax systems autonomously within the constitu-
tional requirements and legal specifications by the federal harmonization law.
For example, they decide upon the level of income and corporate taxes and the
degree of tax progression as well as the level of tax exemptions (Feld, 2000).
The individual communities in turn can set a tax multiplier for income and
corporate taxes on the cantonal tax tariff. The communal income tax is then the
cantonal tax rate multiplied by the communal tax multiplier. Income is taxed at
the community of residence, which has led to the grouping of low tax suburban
communities around large Swiss cities such as Basel and Zurich. Figure 5.1
displays the distribution of the local income tax multiplier among the 171 local
communities of the canton Zurich for the fiscal year 2003.
As Figure 5.1 reveals, the light-colored low-tax communities are sorted around
the lake of Zurich, whereas the dark-colored high-tax communities are located
122
Figure 5.1: Local income tax burden in the Canton of Zurich, 2003.
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Source: Statistisches Amt des Kantons Zu¨rich (2009b), own graph.
near Winterthur. Compared to Figure 5.1, Figure 5.2 displays the correspond-
ing local tax revenues per tax payer. The picture shows that while some of the
high-communities in the eastern part of the canton also generate high tax rev-
enues per tax payer, also some of the low-tax communities near Zurich are able
to generate above-average tax revenues per tax payer.
Tax competition in many countries is constrained by tax equalization pro-
grams. This is also the case in Switzerland on the federal as well as on the
cantonal level (Schaltegger and Frey, 2003). In the canton of Zurich, for ex-
ample, there are horizontal and vertical tax equalization programs that limit tax
competition among communities: First, there is a program that redistributes tax
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Figure 5.2: Local income tax revenues per tax payer in the Canton of Zurich, 2003.
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Source: Statistisches Amt des Kantons Zu¨rich (2009b), own graph.
revenues from the communities with the highest per capita tax bases to those
with the lowest. Second, the canton of Zurich subsidizes the communities with
the highest tax multipliers. Despite the existence of tax equalization schemes,
differences in local taxation are still substantial. In the canton of Zurich, the tax
multiplier for the fiscal year 2008 of communities with the highest tax multiplier
(137 percent) is almost 1.75 times higher than that of the community with the
lowest tax multiplier (79 percent), with an arithmetic mean of 121.4 percent and
a median of 127 percent.
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5.4 Data and Empirical Strategy
In this study, we use community level data from all 171 communities, grouped
in 12 different districts in the Swiss canton of Zurich (for definitions of the vari-
ables and summary statistics see Tables 5.5 and 5.6 at the end of this chapter).
We choose the canton of Zurich for our analysis, as the canton is the core eco-
nomic region of Switzerland and attracts the largest share of immigration and
intra-Swiss relocation, i.e. the number of locational choices to be done in the
canton of Zurich can be assumed to be substantial. Data were collected from
the Swiss Federal Office of Statistics, the Swiss Department of Finance, and the
Zurich Cantonal Office of Statistics.
The dependent variables are the shares of different income groups (individ-
ual taxable income) in the population of a community. Since the income group
ratios vary between zero and one and are therefore censored, they are trans-
formed to log odds. If p is the share of an income group of a community, then
p/(1− p) is the corresponding odds, and the logit of the share is the natural
logarithm of the odds.
In the original source, there exist 14 classes of individual taxable income,
which have been set by the cantonal statistical office. Data on income classes
are available for the years 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2003. The box plot in Figure 5.3
shows the average shares of the 14 income classes in the population among the
171 local communities in the Zurich metropolitan area over the whole period of
observation.7 From the box plot, we can also conclude that endogeneity in the
form of rich people voting for low tax rates should not bias our empirical re-
sults, as the highest income group (>200,000 CHF p.a.) is never in the majority.
This is even the case when we sum up the three top income groups (all citizens
with incomes above 100,000 CHF p.a.). Hence, we concentrate on the classical
Tiebout (1956) effect of voting with one’s feet.
As our main explanatory variables, we use the local tax multiplier and the
average tax multiplier of the other communities in the same district. If there
exists inter-jurisdictional sorting according to the incentives given by tax com-
petition with a progressive tax rate and varying tax multipliers, we expect a
7At the time of writing, one Swiss Frank equalled 0.94 US$ and 0.70 EUR.
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Figure 5.3: Income shares for 14 income classes over 171 communities, 2003
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negative impact of the own tax multiplier on the share of high income residents
and vice versa for low-income residents. For the average tax multiplier of the
neighboring communities, the opposite should appear as long as there is tax
competition: The share of high-income residents is positively associated with
high tax burdens in neighboring communities and vice versa for low-income
residents. An additional variable of main interest, as argued above, is the land
price, as fiscal policies might at least partially capitalize into land or property
prices. We hence expect land prices to be positively linked to income, as high
income earners can afford the higher housing prices caused by partial capital-
ization of attractive tax schemes. Related to land prices are two of the control
variables, airport noise and highway connection. Both variables might not fully
capitalize into housing prices (Stadelmann, 2009) and hence need to be con-
trolled for. We expect airport noise to have a negative effect on the share of high
income earners. The effect of a highway connection within or close to the com-
munity is unclear ex ante, as this might either proxy another source of noise and
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pollution, implying a negative effect, or it might imply a positive effect, if high
income earners esteem quick access to the highway system.
As further control variables, we use several socio-demographic variables
and variables proxying public goods spending and the fiscal stance of the com-
munity.
Since the level of publicly provided goods may influence residential deci-
sions (Oates, 1969) we include the following variables to proxy the level of pub-
lic goods provision in a community: Per capita payments to the cantonal public
transport association (which are directly linked to the frequency of e.g. bus and
train services), the share of pupils in the population visiting local public schools,
and the share of locally practicing physicians.
The fiscal stance of a community is measured by public debt per capita, net
wealth of the community and the revenue from (or need of) transfers from the
cantonal fiscal equalization scheme. All three variables are expected to be neg-
atively correlated with the shares of high income earners in a community, as a
bad fiscal stance implies the risk of future tax increases (see Eichenberger and
Stadelmann, 2009). A related variable is the unemployment rate. Ignoring the
unemployment rate would bias the results of our analysis of income sorting,
as a move from employment to unemployment is an exogenous and in most
cases temporary move from a higher income group into the low income group,
and not an endogenous change in the share of the low income group caused by
the choice of a residential location. In addition, an increase in unemployment
lowers the tax base of the community, as does a downturn in the business cycle,
which the unemployment rate is a proxy for.
The socio-demographic variables used in this study are the total population
and the share of elderly inhabitants (over age 65), the share of young inhabi-
tants (under age 15) and the share of foreigners. Total population is included
as we suspect that different income groups might have different preferences
concerning the size of the community they live in. The direction of this effect
is however ambiguous ex ante, as e.g. wealthier individuals might favor the
tranquility of the countryside or the cultural offerings and infrastructure of the
city. The shares of elderly and young are included due to their effects on taxable
income caused by tax exemptions for pension payments and child allowances.
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The share of foreigners needs to be controlled for, as a large part of the foreign-
ers is taxed under a different scheme which imposes identical tax rates on the
foreign residents of the canton, independent of the community they live in.
5.5 Empirical Analysis
5.5.1 Panel IV Estimations
In order to test the interjurisdictional sorting hypothesis, we regress the shares
of 14 income classes in the local communities on the community’s taxmultiplier,
the average neighboring tax multiplier in the district and the above mentioned
control variables. The following 14 equations are estimated:
log
(
pgit(
1− pgit
)
)
= α + βTit + γLandit + δTjt + Xit + ǫit, (5.1)
where the index i refers to the local communities within the territory of the
canton of Zurich (i = 1, . . . , 171), j denotes the average local community of the
12 districts within the canton Zurich (j = 1, . . . , 12) and the index t refers to the
fiscal year (t = 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003). log
(
pgit/
(
1− pgit
))
represents the share
of income class g, (g = 1, . . . , 14) among all taxpayers in a community i in year
t. Tit denotes the tax multiplier of community i in yeart, while Tjt is the average
tax multiplier of all other communities in the same district as community i.
Landit is the price per square meter for building land in community i in year t.
α is the constant, while β, δ, and γ are unknown parameters and ǫ it is an error
term. Xit is a matrix of explanatory variables specific to community i in year t.
We add 0.0001 to the percentage shares of the income classes before calculating
the log odds, as we would otherwise lose observations taking the value 0.
Testing for endogeneity clearly indicates endogeneity of the tax multipli-
ers and the land prices. To tackle the problem, we use an instrumental vari-
ables (IV) method. As instruments we use locational factors, namely the dis-
tance to the city of Zurich, a dummy variable if a community has a train sta-
tion, and dummy variables if the community is situated at Lake Zurich or Lake
Greifensee; and a political variable, the share of left wing parties in national
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elections, which took place in the years 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2003, which are
exactly the years that the income shares data is available for. To take account
of the panel structure of the data, we perform fixed effects regressions over the
12 districts. In line with the literature (see e.g. Allers et al., 2001) we expect
the tax rate to be the larger, the larger the share of left wing voters is, while
we expect political ideology to have no effect on the land price. Vice versa, we
expect no effect of train stations on the tax rate, while we do expect an effect
on land prices, though the effect is ambiguous ex-ante, as trains cause noise,
while train stations and access to public transport may increase land prices. In
addition, we expect a positive correlation with the view on Lake Zurich and the
Lake Greifensee in the suburban area of Zurich, and a negative correlation with
distance to Zurich in the case of land prices, while we have no predictions for
the effect of these locational factors on tax multipliers.
Table 5.1: First stage regression, 1991–2003
(1) (2)
Tax multiplier Land price
Left wing vote share in national elections 0.300*** -0.001
[4.03] [0.92]
Lake Zurich -6.358** 0.320***
[2.24] [6.26]
Distance to Zurich 0.894*** -0.010***
[10.93] [6.61]
Lake Greifensee -8.618** -0.251***
[2.19] [3.56]
Train station 0.029 0.033**
[0.03] [2.15]
Constant 91.183*** 0.815***
[32.35] [16.08]
Observations 684 684
Number of Districts 12 12
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Summary results for first stage regressions
Shea Partial R2 Partial R2 F(5, 663) P-value
Tax multiplier 0.036 0.094 17.42 0.000
Land price 0.057 0.150 23.69 0.000
Relevance tests
Anderson-Rubin Wald test F(5,663)= 10.24 P-val=0.0000
Anderson-Rubin Wald test Chi-sq(5)=52.84 P-val=0.0000
Stock-Wright LM S statistic Chi-sq(5)=43.77 P-val=0.0000
The first-stage results in Table 5.18 support the relevance of our instruments.
8The first stage regressions are identical for all income classes.
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We find that taxes are higher in left wing communities, while there is no ef-
fect of political ideology on land prices, and no effect of train stations on tax
rates, as expected. Tax rates are also found to be lower in communities at Lake
Zurich and at Lake Greifensee, while they are higher the further the community
is away from the city of Zurich. Land prices are found to be significantly higher
in communities situated at Lake Zurich, while they are lower in communities
located at Lake Greifensee, and in communities that are further away from the
city.
Table 5.2 reports the results of the second stage regressions of our analysis:
in line with the prediction of the theory, we find a significantly negative rela-
tionship between local tax multipliers and the share of the second and third
highest income group. The coefficient of the share of the highest income group
is also negative, but marginally insignificant. Furthermore, the negative effect
of the tax rates on the shares of high income earners tends to increase with in-
come. On the other hand, we find a significantly positive relationship with the
share of low income earners (below CHF 50,000 p.a.). The effect of the tax mul-
tipliers of neighboring communities, defined as the average tax multiplier of all
other communities in the same district, is even stronger. There, we find a pos-
itive and significant relationship between high income earners in community i
and the tax rates of all other communities already for individuals with incomes
above CHF 60,000. Again, the value of the coefficient tends to increase with the
income class. Consequently, we find also a negative relationship for incomes
below CHF 50,000. Hence, we do not only find strong evidence for the income
sorting hypothesis, as measured by the effect of the own tax multiplier, but we
also find that the relative size of the tax multiplier of similar and nearby com-
munities, measured by the average tax multiplier in the same district, exerts an
even stronger effect on the choice of residence.
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Concerning land prices, we also find our predictions about direction and
significance of the effect confirmed. Unsurprisingly, high income earners tend
to live in communities with high land prices (columns 9 to 14), while the oppo-
site is the case for low income earners (columns 3 to 6). The fact that both land
prices and tax rates exert a significant effect on the choice of residence leads us
to the conclusion that the capitalization of tax rates in house prices is imperfect.
Turning to our controlling variables, we first have a look at socio-demographic
variables. For retirees, we find that the share of people above the age of 65 de-
creases the share of people with high taxable income. The reason for this effect
is clear: pensions are lower than labor income, and they are only partially tax-
able. A similar reason explains the (less significant) positive effect of the share
of young people below the age of 15 on middle income shares, and a negative
one on the top income shares. Children reduce the taxable income (but not the
disposable income) of their parents due to child allowances. Concerning the ab-
solute size of the population, we find a slight tendency of rich people to prefer
smaller communities, while poorer people tend to live in larger communities.
The share of foreigners is not found to be significant. This might be due to the
fact that the Zurich area attracts not only low-skilled immigrants, but also large
amounts of high-skilled immigrants.
For the variables that proxy public goods provision, we find that low income
individuals seem to esteem public transport more than high income earners,
which is in line with the theory which suggests that poorer people prefer higher
levels of public goods provision. Similarly, poorer communities have larger
shares of pupils in locals schools than rich communities, where the effect is
the opposite. Medium income earners are found to prefer communities with a
larger share of local physicians, while the effect is negative at the low end of the
income distribution, and insignificant at the top end.
High income earners are also found to avoid high debt communities, and
hence future tax increases, while the opposite is the case for low income earn-
ers. Community net wealth, which also includes non-financial assets of a com-
munity, is found to have hardly any effect on residential choices. The income
distribution is also not significantly influenced by the changes in the unemploy-
ment rate.
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Airport noise seems to decrease the share of high income earners and to
increase the share of the medium income earners. Highway access, which also
proxies noise from highways, exerts a significantly negative effect on the income
shares above CHF 50,000.
5.5.2 Robustness Check
As a robustness check, we leave out all variables concerning public finances ex-
cept for the tax rates and public debt, all variables that proxy the amount of
public goods provision including highway access, and all socio-demographic
variables except for the unemployment rate, population size and the share of
foreigners in the second stage estimation. As Table 5.3 shows, our main re-
sults (see Table 5.2) remain robust to this drastic change in the regression setup.
Again, we find a community’s own tax multiplier to be positively related to
the shares of low income earners, and negatively related to the share of high
income earners. The reverse result holds for the tax rates of the district neigh-
bors: A higher average tax rate in neighboring communities is associated with
lower share of low income earners in the community, and a higher share of
high income earners. The effect of land prices on the choice of residence is also
unaltered, as are the effects of the remaining controlling variables, except for
the unemployment rate, which is now found to exert a significant effect on the
income distribution. The unemployment rate is found to increase the share of
people with high incomes, and to decrease the share of people with low taxable
income. At first sight, this seems counterintuitive. However, this can be easily
explained, as unemployment moves people either into the zero taxable income
group or completely out of the statistics. As low income earners are more likely
to be affected by unemployment than high income earners, an increase in un-
employment decreases the share of low taxable income earners in a community
and increases the share of high income earners.
133
T
a
b
le
5
.3
:
S
ec
on
d
st
ag
e
pa
n
el
IV
re
gr
es
si
on
,
di
st
ri
ct
fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s,
19
91
–2
00
3,
17
1
co
m
m
u
n
it
ie
s,
14
in
co
m
e
cl
as
se
s,
in
st
ru
m
en
te
d
va
ri
ab
le
s:
ta
x
m
u
lt
ip
li
er
an
d
la
n
d
pr
ic
e,
pa
rs
im
on
io
u
s
m
od
el
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
(1
3)
(1
4)
In
co
m
e
cl
as
s,
S
w
is
s
F
ra
n
ks
p.
a.
0
0-
9,
99
9
10
-1
9,
99
9
20
-2
9,
99
9
30
-3
9,
99
9
40
-4
9,
99
9
50
-5
9,
99
9
60
-6
9,
99
9
70
-7
9,
99
9
80
-8
9,
99
9
90
-9
9,
99
9
10
0-
14
9,
99
9
15
0-
19
9,
99
9
¿2
00
,0
00
Ta
x
M
u
lt
ip
li
er
0.
02
0*
*
0.
00
9*
*
0.
01
3*
**
0.
00
9*
0.
01
1*
**
0.
00
5
0.
00
0
-0
.0
04
0.
00
0
-0
.0
06
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
17
**
-0
.0
37
**
*
-0
.0
21
[2
.4
9]
[2
.2
0]
[2
.9
9]
[1
.7
1]
[2
.7
5]
[1
.4
0]
[0
.1
0]
[1
.5
9]
[0
.0
9]
[1
.2
5]
[0
.5
9]
[2
.0
6]
[3
.0
5]
[1
.0
1]
L
an
d
pr
ic
e
1.
15
7*
**
0.
25
9
-0
.3
44
-0
.9
63
**
*
-0
.6
52
**
*
-0
.5
03
**
*
-0
.3
52
**
-0
.0
76
0.
41
2*
*
0.
42
7*
1.
00
3*
**
1.
42
8*
**
1.
76
8*
**
4.
27
0*
**
[2
.7
6]
[1
.2
9]
[1
.6
2]
[3
.5
6]
[3
.2
4]
[3
.2
2]
[2
.5
7]
[0
.5
7]
[2
.1
6]
[1
.9
4]
[2
.9
7]
[3
.3
7]
[2
.8
5]
[3
.6
9]
N
ei
gh
bo
r
ta
x,
di
st
ri
ct
av
er
ag
e
-0
.0
08
*
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
09
**
*
-0
.0
15
**
*
-0
.0
10
**
*
-0
.0
05
**
0.
00
0
0.
00
4*
*
0.
00
5*
*
0.
00
5*
0.
01
1*
*
0.
02
2*
**
0.
03
4*
**
0.
04
8*
**
[1
.7
2]
[1
.2
5]
[3
.7
4]
[4
.7
8]
[4
.0
9]
[2
.3
4]
[0
.0
8]
[2
.0
1]
[2
.3
0]
[1
.9
2]
[2
.0
8]
[4
.6
9]
[4
.3
8]
[4
.0
9]
A
ir
po
rt
n
oi
se
-0
.0
88
-0
.0
41
-0
.0
38
-0
.0
39
0.
04
0
0.
10
1*
**
0.
09
5*
**
0.
08
2*
**
0.
05
3*
0.
06
5*
**
0.
01
9
-0
.0
49
-0
.1
74
**
-0
.2
59
**
[1
.6
4]
[1
.4
0]
[1
.3
9]
[1
.1
3]
[1
.4
3]
[4
.6
7]
[4
.9
9]
[4
.6
3]
[1
.7
6]
[2
.6
1]
[0
.4
8]
[0
.9
6]
[2
.2
3]
[2
.1
9]
S
ha
re
of
fo
re
ig
n
er
s
0.
00
5
-0
.0
01
0.
00
1
0.
00
2
0.
00
6*
**
0.
00
3*
*
0.
00
2
0.
00
2*
0.
00
2
-0
.0
03
*
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
09
**
*
-0
.0
12
**
-0
.0
03
[1
.5
3]
[0
.5
1]
[0
.6
9]
[1
.2
4]
[4
.2
0]
[2
.3
3]
[1
.3
0]
[1
.8
7]
[1
.3
8]
[1
.7
1]
[1
.0
2]
[2
.8
1]
[2
.2
7]
[0
.3
5]
P
op
u
la
ti
on
-0
.0
05
**
0.
00
0
0.
00
3*
**
0.
00
5*
**
0.
00
3*
*
0.
00
2*
0.
00
1
0.
00
0
-0
.0
03
**
*
-0
.0
03
**
*
-0
.0
05
**
*
-0
.0
07
**
*
-0
.0
07
**
-0
.0
17
**
[1
.9
8]
[0
.3
9]
[3
.0
5]
[2
.9
2]
[2
.1
8]
[1
.7
7]
[1
.2
0]
[0
.7
0]
[2
.8
9]
[2
.7
5]
[2
.6
9]
[2
.6
8]
[2
.2
0]
[2
.3
1]
U
n
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
ra
te
-0
.0
12
-0
.0
53
**
*
-0
.0
25
**
*
-0
.0
45
**
*
-0
.0
16
*
0.
02
0*
**
0.
03
6*
**
0.
02
1*
**
0.
02
8*
**
0.
02
5*
*
0.
02
7*
*
0.
01
6
-0
.0
39
-0
.0
48
[0
.6
3]
[5
.3
9]
[2
.8
8]
[3
.8
7]
[1
.9
1]
[2
.9
1]
[5
.4
2]
[3
.0
8]
[3
.4
6]
[2
.5
4]
[2
.0
6]
[0
.9
8]
[1
.4
1]
[1
.1
5]
D
eb
t,
p.
c.
-0
.3
08
**
-0
.0
48
0.
36
2*
**
0.
26
9*
**
0.
09
6
0.
00
4
-0
.0
54
-0
.2
39
**
*
-0
.2
97
**
*
-0
.5
48
**
*
-0
.4
39
**
-0
.4
37
**
*
-0
.7
82
**
*
-1
.0
32
**
[1
.9
9]
[0
.5
9]
[4
.3
6]
[2
.8
5]
[1
.3
7]
[0
.0
8]
[0
.9
5]
[3
.5
9]
[3
.6
3]
[6
.0
9]
[2
.2
1]
[3
.0
2]
[2
.7
5]
[2
.4
3]
T
im
e
tr
en
d
0.
39
2*
**
0.
09
7*
**
-0
.1
48
**
*
-0
.1
30
**
*
-0
.1
42
**
*
-0
.1
08
**
*
-0
.0
64
**
*
-0
.0
12
0.
04
8*
**
0.
08
7*
**
0.
14
1*
**
0.
24
1*
**
0.
39
5*
**
0.
50
1*
**
[1
2.
12
]
[6
.1
8]
[9
.1
0]
[6
.3
3]
[9
.6
8]
[8
.7
6]
[5
.2
4]
[0
.9
6]
[2
.7
9]
[4
.4
6]
[4
.7
5]
[7
.1
7]
[7
.0
9]
[5
.5
4]
C
on
st
an
t
-5
.7
60
**
*
-3
.7
56
**
*
-2
.5
08
**
*
-0
.7
78
-1
.4
25
**
*
-1
.4
07
**
*
-1
.7
63
**
*
-2
.2
21
**
*
-3
.6
25
**
*
-3
.2
50
**
*
-4
.8
80
**
*
-4
.3
99
**
*
-5
.0
07
**
*
-1
0.
23
7*
**
[5
.1
6]
[6
.9
1]
[4
.4
3]
[1
.1
7]
[2
.7
9]
[3
.3
8]
[4
.8
3]
[6
.3
0]
[7
.5
6]
[5
.9
2]
[5
.9
1]
[4
.1
7]
[3
.0
8]
[3
.5
5]
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
68
4
68
4
68
4
68
4
68
4
68
4
68
4
68
4
68
4
68
4
68
4
68
4
68
4
68
4
R
ob
u
st
z
st
at
is
ti
cs
in
br
ac
ke
ts
*
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
t
at
10
%
;*
*
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
t
at
5%
;*
**
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
t
at
1%
134
5.5.3 Spatial Correlation
In the estimations presented in the above section, we tackled the endogeneity
problem arising from the fact that land prices and tax rates are endogenous to
the income of a community’s inhabitants. In this section, we additionally ad-
dress two other issues. The first is the possibility that a community’s income
distribution is endogenous to the income distribution of neighboring commu-
nities, which may be the case because of clustering effects caused by e.g. an
increased attractiveness of community A due to a positive socio-demographical
change in the neighboring community B. A second related issue is spatial cor-
relation of the error terms which is caused by omitted spatial variables.
For our analysis, we use two different spatial weighting matrices. First, we
employ the inverse of the distance between the communities, and second, we
use a matrix containing a 1 if the communities share a common border and 0
otherwise. When computing the weighting scheme, the matrices are row stan-
dardized.
Using the standard specification tests as discussed in Anselin et al. (1996),
we find that we can exclude a spatial lag model. The tests indicate however the
existence of spatial correlation in the error term. This only holds whenwe apply
the inverse distance matrix as spatial weights. Using the matrix considering
only neighboring communities, we find no evidence for spatial correlation. A
first conclusion is thus that while individuals do care about tax rates of nearby
communities (within the same district, see Section 5.5) in choosing their place
of residence, there is no specific weight on the tax rates of directly neighboring
communities. As the tests however suggest spatial dependency in the error
terms, we estimate a spatial error model as described in Anselin (1988) and
Anselin and Bera (1998).
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The equations are estimated using Maximum Likelihood and take the fol-
lowing form:
log
(
pgi(
1− pgi
)
)
= α + βTit + γLandit + δTjt + ξXi + ǫi, (5.2)
with ǫ = λWǫ + u,
where log
(
pgi/
(
1− pgi
))
are the log odds of the respective income share g. ǫ
is a vector of spatially autocorrelated error terms, u is a vector of i.i.d. errors.
Ti is the tax multiplier of community i, Tjt the average tax multiplier of the
other communities in the same district as community i, and Landit is the price
for building land per square meter in community i in year t. Xi is a vector of
observations of the other explanatory variables,W is the spatial weights matrix
and λ, β, γ, ξ and δ are parameters.
We extend the spatial error model proposed by Anselin (1988) and Anselin
and Bera (1998) to tackle the endogeneity of tax multipliers and land prices and
instrument these variables using the same IV first-step estimations as in Section
5.5.
The results are presented in Table 5.4. The evidence for the income sorting
hypothesis is even stronger in this setup, as ourmain finding on the relationship
between income tax multipliers and the shares of the income classes is not only
robust to this change in the setup, but the significance of this effect increases
considerably. We find the tax multiplier to have a negative impact on the shares
of people with incomes above 60,000 CHF. Furthermore, for the higher income
classes the importance of the tax rate in the choice of location seems to increase,
as indicated by the (absolute) increase of the coefficient from middle to high
income classes. The effects of the average tax multipliers of the communities in
the same district, as well as the effect of the land price, lose significance in this
setup, as spatial correlation is now controlled for. The findings on the control
variables remain qualitatively robust, except for the public debt, which is now
insignificant for most of the income classes.
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5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have investigated the empirical validity of the inter-juris-
dictional income sorting hypothesis, which is a core result of the theoretical tax
competition literature. It states that in a system with fiscal federalism, individ-
uals differing in income and preferences for public goods and/or housing will
self-select into different communities, where communities differ in income tax
rates. This self-selection process will then lead to substantial differences in the
income distributions between the communities.
In our empirical analysis covering 171 communities over the share of 14 in-
come classes on the whole population in the Swiss canton of Zurich, we have
found ample evidence for the income segregation hypothesis. We provide em-
pirical evidence that high income earners are more likely to reside in low tax
communities especially if neighboring communities in the same district have
higher taxes. The opposite holds for low-income earners: they are more likely
to settle in high tax communities.
While the tax competition literature in the Tiebout tradition suggests that
this kind of income sorting enhances overall efficiency in the economy, the lit-
erature on education highlights also the negative aspects of income sorting.9
In general, advocates argue that fiscal federalism allows tailoring public goods
towards the specific needs of local residents, enhances efficiency while reduc-
ing inefficiency in public administration due to the pressure created by systems
competition. In addition, the more homogenous a local community, the more
targeted fiscal equalization schemes across the canton can work and the more
efficient the redistributive capacity of such a transfer program will be. Critics
argue on the other hand, that the opportunities of an individual are highly cor-
related with his or her neighborhood and social background. An uneven distri-
bution of high and low income individuals between communities is thus likely
to reduce human capital accumulation and social mobility, and to produce per-
sistent inequality and poverty traps. These social problems might be enforced
by increasing worldwide economic integration, as the literature suggests that
economic globalization leads to an increasing wage gap between low-skilled
9See e.g. Butler and Robson (2003) and Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn (2003).
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and high-skilled workers, and to an increasing taxation of the relatively more
immobile factor of production, namely labor.
In combination with the results of the income sorting literature, increasing
globalization can be expected to lead to an increase in income sorting in coun-
tries with income tax competition at the local level, yielding new challenges for
both politicians and researchers.
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5.7 Tables
Table 5.5: Variable descriptions
Variable Description Source
Taxable Income Class Percentage share of taxpayers in an
income class (taxable income)
Statistisches Amt des Kantons
Zu¨rich (1993, 1997, 2001, 2005)
Tax Multiplier Tax multiplier determining local
tax rates, percentage of cantonal
tax rate
Statistisches Amt des Kantons
Zu¨rich (2009b)
Land price Mean price per square meter in
Swiss Francs
Statistisches Amt des Kantons
Zu¨rich (2009b)
Neighbor tax, district average Average of tax multipliers of all
other communities in the district
Statistisches Amt des Kantons
Zu¨rich (2009b)
Left wing vote share in na-
tional elections
Sum of vote shares of left wing
parties (SP, GP, EVP) in national
elections
Statistisches Amt des Kantons
Zu¨rich (2009c)
Airport noise Dummy for communities that
need extra noise protection as
determined by the Zurich airport
authority
http://www.unique.ch/
dokumente/las_08_zrh04_
gwk_esii_v1.jpg
Highway access Dummy for highway access within
5km
http://www.gis.zh.ch
Lake Zurich Location at Lake Zurich http://www.gis.zh.ch
Lake Greifensee Location at Lake Greifensee http://www.gis.zh.ch
Distance to Zurich Distance to the city of Zurich, lin-
ear distance
Own calculations
Train station Dummy for train station in the
community
Zurich transport authority, ZVV
Share of elderly Share of inhabitants over 65 years
of age
Statistisches Amt des Kantons
Zu¨rich (2009a)
Share of young Share of inhabitants below age 15 Statistisches Amt des Kantons
Zu¨rich (2009a)
Share of foreigners Share of foreigners in total popula-
tion
Statistisches Amt des Kantons
Zu¨rich (2009a)
Population Absolute number of population Statistisches Amt des Kantons
Zu¨rich (2009a)
Share of pupils Share of pupils pre-school, ele-
mentary school, high school and
vocational education in total pop-
ulation
Statistisches Amt des Kantons
Zu¨rich (2009a)
Contributions to public trans-
port, p.c.
Per capita transfers to the Zurich
public transport authority (ZVV)
SStatistisches Amt des Kantons
Zu¨rich (2009a)
Physicians, p.c. Number of physicians per capita in
a community
Statistisches Amt des Kantons
Zu¨rich (2009a)
Unemployment rate Unemployment rate, percentage Bundesamt fu¨r Statistik (2009)
Revenue from fiscal equaliza-
tion, p.c.
Per capita transfers received from
the cantonal fiscal equalization
scheme
Statistisches Amt des Kantons
Zu¨rich (2009b)
Debt, p.c. Public debt per capita, Swiss
Francs
Statistisches Amt des Kantons
Zu¨rich (2009b)
Community net wealth, p.c. Public net wealth per capita, Swiss
Francs
Statistisches Amt des Kantons
Zu¨rich (2009b)
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Table 5.6: Summary statistics
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Taxable Income, log odds
0 684 -2.94 0.42 -4.80 -1.73
0–9,999 684 -2.82 0.24 -3.80 -2.20
10–19,999 684 -2.56 0.28 -3.25 -1.51
20–29,999 684 -2.23 0.28 -3.03 -1.39
30–39,999 684 -1.92 0.24 -2.86 -1.36
40–49,999 684 -1.88 0.19 -2.59 -1.23
50–59,999 684 -2.09 0.17 -2.94 -1.66
60–69,999 684 -2.39 0.17 -3.20 -1.90
70–79,999 684 -2.73 0.22 -4.03 -2.13
80–89,999 684 -3.08 0.27 -4.72 -2.43
90–99,999 684 -3.43 0.40 -9.21 -2.60
100–149,999 684 -2.63 0.43 -4.54 -1.78
150–199,999 684 -4.03 0.75 -9.21 -2.42
>200,000 684 -4.11 0.94 -9.21 -1.79
Tax Multiplier, per cent 684 113.87 13.33 69.00 131.00
Land price 684 0.61 0.26 0.15 3.27
Neighbor tax, district average 684 113.84 8.28 88.45 130.00
Left wing vote share (percentage) in
national elections
684 29.09 5.96 14.30 50.00
Airport noise 684 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
Highway access 684 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
Lake Zurich 684 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Distance to Zurich 684 17.80 7.66 0.00 36.00
Lake Greifensee 684 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
Train station 684 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00
Share of elderly 684 0.12 0.03 0.04 0.24
Share of young 684 0.19 0.03 0.11 0.31
Share of foreigners 684 12.94 7.42 1.00 42.10
Population, thousands 684 6.99 26.91 0.23 350.82
Share of pupils 684 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.08
Contributions to public transport,
thousands of CHF, p.c.
684 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.22
Physicians, p.c. 684 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Unemployment rate 684 1.90 1.36 0.00 7.50
Revenue from fiscal equalization,
thousands of CHF, p.c.
684 0.60 2.23 0.00 34.94
Debt, thousands of CHF, p.c. 684 0.38 0.15 -0.56 1.24
Community net wealth, thousands
of CHF, p.c.
684 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.02
Note: 14 income classes; explanatory variables based on estimation sample for income class 10.
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Chapter 6
Do Competitively Acquired Funds
Induce Universities to Increase
Productivity?
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Do Competitively Acquired Funds Induce Universi-
ties to Increase Productivity?1
6.1 Introduction
Universities and public research institutions are perceived as a central piece
of the national innovation system. During the past years, political pressure to
use research funding in a more economic manner has increased dramatically.
Consequently, the measurement and evaluation of university productivity has
become increasingly important in both the political and the academic sphere.
Third party funding, i.e. funding acquired from public and private sources in
a competitive way, is used as a proxy for research output and quality both in
the academic literature2 and in research policy. In the UK, public third party
funds are distributed via the Research Assessment Exercise, a large-scale oper-
ation that assigns a quality value to each research department and distributes
funds accordingly. Similarly, the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF)
which distributes the largest part of public third-party funding in Switzerland,
considers the acquisition of third-party funds a relevant indicator.
However, while the relevance of third-party funding for total research fund-
ing has increased and both politicians and academics consider third party fund-
ing as an important indicator for research productivity, there are few articles
analyzing the impact of different sources of third-party funding on university
productivity. Furthermore, both the theoretical and empirical findings are am-
biguous, indicating that further research in this area is required to allow policy-
makers to make evidence-based decisions (van der Ploeg and Veugelers, 2008).
This study attempts to shed some light on this relationship by analyzing the
effect of different funding resources on the productivity of Swiss university and
public research institution departments (henceforth denoted university depart-
ments). Unlike some of the previous literature, we do not analyze the effect
of funding restrictions (see e.g. Mensah and Werner, 2003; Kempkes and Pohl,
1This chapter is based on Bolli and Somogyi (2009).
2See e.g. Cohn et al. (1989), Izadi et al. (2002) and Mensah and Werner (2003).
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2008; Kuo and Ho, 2007). Instead, we use the distinction between third-party
funding stemming from public and private donors to analyze the impact on the
productivity of university departments directly. We use survey data from the
year 2005 to estimate a system of production function equations, where the in-
cluded outputs are the number of master degrees,3 the number of scientific pub-
lications and the intensity of technology transfer. We examine the explanatory
power of the share of funding stemming from private and public third-party
sources for the productivity of natural science, mathematics, physics, medicine,
and economics departments.
We add to the existing literature by including a measure for technology
transfer in our analysis. By distinguishing between public and private third-
party funding, our approach allows us to identify the differences between the
two funding sources in the innovation stages of basic research and applied re-
search, measured by scientific publications and technology transfer intensity.
Using a simultaneous equations (3SLS) approach, we account for the possible
endogeneity between the different outputs.
Furthermore, we address the problem of endogeneity between the ability to
acquire third-party funding and productivity using three approaches. First, we
analyze the impact of third-party funding for universities where reverse causal-
ity is not present separately, second, we exploit the variance within universities
to account for unobserved heterogeneity and third, we implement an IV estima-
tion instrumenting the share of private funds in third party funding. A further
advantage of the study is that the use of data at the department level ensures the
proximity to the decision making unit while comprising the whole university
sector as opposed to a single university. Finally, we present the first estimates
for the relationship between the funding structure and productivity in Switzer-
land.
We find a significant effect of both private and public third-party funds on
productivity. The effects differ between the different outputs. Public and pri-
vate third party funds have no effect on teaching productivity, meaning that
3In 2005, Swiss Universities awarded all students with a degree (licentiat) equivalent to an
M.Sc. in the anglo-saxon system. Bachelor’s degrees did not exist at the time and are hence not
included in this study.
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third party funds do not add to the teaching financed by the universities’ ba-
sic funding. Considering the production of scientific publications, we find that
both funding types have a significantly positive impact on productivity. These
findings are robust to the inclusion of technology transfer as a third output
into the estimated system. Private funds exert a significantly positive effect on
technology transfer productivity, while there is no measurable impact of public
funds.
Our results also reveal that productivity of each output type differs across
institution types and scientific fields. For example, medical departments are less
productive in teaching than the baseline category, engineering departments, but
more productive in producing scientific publications. Universities of Applied
Sciences are found to be more productive in teaching, and less productive in sci-
entific publications than the baseline category, which are the Federal Institutes
of Technology. Our results are robust to a battery of robustness checks.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.2 discusses the theoretical
framework and Section 6.3 summarizes the existing empirical evidence. Sec-
tions 6.4 and 6.5 describe the data and the methodology applied in the estima-
tions. The estimation results are discussed in Section 6.6. Section 6.7 concludes.
6.2 Theoretical Framework
While the competitiveness of the grant application process per se might induce
productivity gains, this chapter analyzes the distinction between public and
private third party funds and the different effects of these funds on productivity.
The relationship between a researcher and the donor of third-party funds is
typically modeled in a principal-agent framework (see e.g. Kivisto¨, 2005). The
donor is the principal and the researcher is the agent. If the two have different
utility functions, the principal faces a trade-off between monitoring and accept-
ing diverging outcomes caused by information asymmetry and uncertainty. The
relationship is further complicated by the presence of multiple principals with
different utility functions, notably public and private donors, which will choose
different levels of monitoring. The optimal level of monitoring chosen by the
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principals depends on the innovation stage, i.e. whether we look at basic re-
search or applied research. Hence, the effect of different sources of third-party
funding depends on several interrelated aspects: the type of the donor (pub-
lic or private), which defines the monitoring intensity chosen by the donor, the
innovation stage and the different influence channels of monitoring on produc-
tivity. We will try to shed light on the workings of these different aspects in the
following paragraphs of this section.
The monitoring intensity of private donors is expected to increase in the in-
novation stage (basic research vs. applied research) due to two reasons. First,
the relevance of creative control increases with the innovation stage (Aghion
et al., 2008b). Second, the monitoring costs are decreasing in the innovation
stage as the absorptive capacity of private donors is geared towards applied re-
search. This implies that we expect the monitoring intensity and consequently
the impact of private third-party funding on research productivity to increase
in the innovation stage. It is even possible that monitoring is not profitable
for early stages of the innovation process, in which case no monitoring by pri-
vate donors takes place at all. The choice of monitoring intensity by public
donors, however, follows a different logic. In the short-run, politicians decide
upon the monitoring intensity exogenously. In the long-run, politicians decide
upon monitoring intensity endogenously as well. Presumably, the absorptive
capacity of public donors is better for basic research and worse for applied re-
search. Therefore the expected degree of monitoring of public donors increases
less with the innovation stage than the monitoring intensity of private donors.
Third-party funding, either directly or through monitoring by donors, in-
fluences research productivity through three main channels. The administration
effect and the misallocation effect decrease productivity, while discipline effect in-
creases it.
The first channel concerns the administrative work that comes along with
third party funding. The acquisition of external funds requires the investment
of time and money. Furthermore the principal might require the researcher to
enclose details about the work progress, thereby affecting productivity nega-
tively due to the additional work caused bywriting reports. We call this channel
the administration effect.
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The second channel is caused by information asymmetry and different util-
ity functions between the donor and the researcher (see e.g. Kivisto¨, 2005). Be-
cause of the difference in the utility functions, the principal has an interest to
control the agent’s behavior by restricting the use of funds. This may cause be-
havioral distortions and a suboptimal outcome, as these restrictions are based
on incomplete information of the principal and will therefore lead to misalloca-
tion of resources (see e.g. Schiller and Liefner, 2006). Hence, we call this channel
the misallocation effect.
The third channel causes research productivity to increase. This channel is
based on the same information asymmetry as themisallocation effect. The effect
on research productivity is however positive, as restrictions on the use of funds
also limit the possibilities of the researcher to pursue his own goals and to use
funds in an inefficient way (see e.g. Niskanen, 1971, 1975). We call this effect the
discipline effect.
The presence of multiple, adverse channels implies that even in a frame-
work of binarily modeled monitoring decisions, the impact on the productivity
of universities is ambiguous, implying that it remains an empirical issue. The
theoretical relationship becomes even more convoluted if the intensity of mon-
itoring is modeled continuously, i.e. if the donor does not only decide whether
to monitor or not, but if he also chooses the intensity of monitoring.
The administration effect increases with monitoring intensity, i.e. with the
amount of time the researcher devotes to reporting and justifying his behavior.
The misallocation and discipline effects on the other hand decrease if monitor-
ing intensity increases. As the researcher reports his behavior more accurately,
the information asymmetry diminishes. Therefore resources can be allocated
in a more optimal way, and the researcher’s opportunities to pursue his goals
decrease. This implies that the administration effect, which lowers productiv-
ity, is increasing in monitoring intensity, while the misallocation effect, which
also lowers productivity, and the discipline effect, which increases productivity,
both decrease the more intense monitoring is done.
A further modeling complication is the potential non-linearity of these ef-
fects. An example is that while the first draft of the research plan might actu-
ally increase productivity, reporting each step will be very unproductive for the
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Table 6.1: Summary of theoretical effects of public and private third party funding on research
productivity.
Effect of innovation stage
Adm., mis. and disc. effects on pro-
ductivity
Effect of monitoring intensity on
adm., mis. and disc. effects
∂monit.private
∂innov.stage
>
∂monit.public
∂innov.stage
∂productivity
∂adm.e f f .
< 0
∂adm.e f f .
∂monit.
> 0
∂mis.e f f .
∂innov.stage
< 0
∂productivity
∂mis.e f f .
< 0
∂mis.e f f .
∂monit.
< 0
∂monit.private
∂innov.stage
> 0
∂productivity
∂disc.e f f .
> 0
∂disc.e f f .
∂monit.
< 0
researcher. The discipline effect will be largest in the beginning as the informa-
tion asymmetry is diminished the strongest. As monitoring intensity increases
further, the information asymmetry decreases more slowly and the utility func-
tions of the donor and the researcher become more congruent. Furthermore the
danger of crowding out intrinsic motivation becomes more relevant (see e.g.
Frey, 1997, on the interplay between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation).
The relationship between the misallocation effect and monitoring intensity
is even less clear as multiple reasons for nonlinearity exist. First, as mentioned
above, the diminishing information asymmetry causes it to decrease. Second,
themisallocation effect depends on the innovation stage as proposed by Aghion
et al. (2008b). They develop a model in which the benefits of creative control are
highlighted. Assuming that the main advantage of academia over the private
research sector is the ability to experiment, they show that the optimal location
of research depends on the innovation stage. The more advanced an idea is, the
stronger are the benefits from developing it in the private sector and vice versa.
This indicates that the relevance of who has creative control in the research pro-
cess varies by innovation stage and so does the misallocation effect. Restraining
the researcher is hence the more detrimental, the more basic the research project
is. Third, the impact of the funder having creative control is nonlinear per se.
The more detailed the research report needs to be, the more the monitoring
process will have the character of ex-ante monitoring thereby decreasing the re-
searcher’s leeway more severely. The issue is further complicated by the fact
that the degree of monitoring can be determined endogenously.
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The three channels through which third-party funding might affect pro-
ductivity are opposing and non-linear, and depend positively or negatively on
monitoring intensity. Table 6.1 gives an overview of the opposing effects. There-
fore theoretical predictions about the direction of the total effect of these three
channels are ambiguous, implying that the net impact of public and private
third-party funding on research productivity is an empirical issue. Further-
more, we assume that basic research is geared towards scientific publications,
while applied research is more likely to lead to technology transfer. Hence, the
net effect of private and public funding is expected to differ between different
output types.
6.3 Literature Review
A number of recent papers study the effect of different third-party funding
sources on research productivity or efficiency and the different channels de-
scribed in the previous section. Many of these papers are outcomes of the dis-
cussion on New Public Management (NPM), which describes the trend to in-
troduce new government schemes in public science systems, leading to a move
from a system with large operative competencies of the government authori-
ties and individual independence in research and teaching of the researchers
towards a system of greater steering competencies on the side of the research in-
stitutions and the researchers, and stronger hierarchy within the research insti-
tutions, i.e. a system where university management has greater power over the
researchers.4 The discussion in this strand of the literature is centered around
several dimensions of governance, e.g. direct government interference, man-
agerial self-governance, academic self-governance and stakeholder guidance
(following de Boer et al., 2007a,b).
An empirical study of the influence of these aspects on research efficiency
in Germany is presented by Schubert (2009), who finds significant relationships
between the introduction of NPM government schemes, proxied by the the per-
ceived influence of the deans and presidents and the existence of personnel quo-
4See e.g. Leisyte and Kizniene (2006) and Schubert (2009) and the references cited therein.
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tas, goal agreements, accounting schemes, research councils and regular evalu-
ations, where all variables but accounting schemes, which decreases efficiency,
exert a positive influence on research efficiency. Translated into our framework,
Schubert (2009) finds evidence for the efficiency-lowering administration effect
(accounting schemes) and the efficiency-enhancing discipline effect (goal agree-
ments, evaluations).
Evidence on the relationship between research productivity and regulation
of research institutions by the state is presented by Aghion et al. (2008a). They
showmacroeconomic evidence for the misallocation effect, in the sense that au-
tonomy, and productivity are positively related. A research institution is consid-
ered autonomous, in this study, if it has legal status and can conclude contracts,
and if its governing bodies can determine with a considerable degree of free-
dom the policies and practices needed to accomplish its mission. The findings
of Aghion et al. (2008a) are hence in line with the NPM literature. In a related
study, Aghion et al. (2009) find a significant positive impact of autonomy on the
Shanghai university ranking (Liu and Cheng, 2005), suggesting that a decrease
in the misallocation effect increases productivity. Similar evidence is presented
by Kempkes and Pohl (2008), who examine the productivity of German univer-
sities and find that universities are more productive, the more independent they
are, and Duh and Kuo (2006), who analyze a Taiwanese amendment that grants
universities more autonomy and find that the effect increased productivity.
Financial autonomy is studied by Mensah and Werner (2003) and Kuo and
Ho (2007). Mensah and Werner (2003) evaluate the impact of financial auton-
omy on the efficiency of universities, using the share of unrestricted assets as
a measure for financial flexibility. Applying a stochastic frontier methodology,
they find a positive correlation between restriction and efficiency. This finding
is supported by Kuo and Ho (2007) who examine a change in the budget regime
in Taiwan that has led tomore flexibility of the utilization of private funds. They
find a negative impact of the policy adoption on the efficiency of universities.
A negative correlation between (financial) autonomy and efficiency can be in-
terpreted as evidence for the discipline effect.
The influence of competition between research institutions and research pro-
ductivity has been studied in a number of papers. Aghion et al. (2009) show that
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competition for research funding increases the Shanghai university ranking of
the research institution, which is evidence for the discipline effect. Similarly,
Butler (2003) finds that introducing a competitive funding distribution scheme
based on output counts has increased the share of Australia’s publications listed
in the Institute of Scientific Information (ISI) index despite declining resources,
indicating the presence of a disciplining effect. She further presents evidence of
the misallocation effect, as the quality of publications measured by the share of
citations has stagnated in the same period. Similarly, Agasisti (2009) analyzes
the relationship between competition and tertiary education in Italy, finding a
positive effect on efficiency, and Abbott and Doucouliagos (2009) find that com-
petition for overseas students increases university productivity in Australia.
Direct evidence on the accumulated effect points to a mild positive influence
of third-party funding. Cherchye and Abeele (2005) find a positive correlation
between the share of total third-party funding and research efficiency. How-
ever, Cherchye and Abeele (2005) also split third party funding into funds from
scientific research grants and contract research funds, and find that the positive
effect of total third party funding is driven by scientific research grants, while
contract research funds exert a negative effect on research efficiency. Bonac-
corsi et al. (2006) analyze the impact of private funding on efficiency and find
a U-shaped correlation for Italian universities, for which private funding is of
rather limited relevance though. Using data on individual researchers at Louis
Pasteur University, Carayol and Matt (2006) distinguish between public and
private third-party funding and find a small effect of public funds on individ-
ual productivity but not of private funds. Similarly, Robst (2000, 2001) shows
that the share of tuition in the total budget has no effect on the productivity of
the university system and individual institutions.
Jansen et al. (2007) and Schmoch and Schubert (2009) present evidence on
the relation between third party funding and research efficiency in Germany,
where the system of university financing is very similar to the Swiss one. The
two related papers, which use the same data set, study the effect of third party
funding on research efficiency in four different academic fields. Overall, both
papers find an inverted U-shaped relation between third party funding and the
total number (i.e., not the per-capita number) of academic publications in a re-
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search group. This means that up to a certain point additional third-party funds
increase the number of publications, while beyond this point (which varies
among the academic fields), additional funds decrease the number of publi-
cations. They argue that this is due to the fact that the number of researchers
increases with the third party funds acquired, which induces transaction costs
and coordination problems which decrease productivity, ultimately leading to
a negative total effect. Schmoch and Schubert (2009) additionally find that the
effect does not only depend on the academic field, but also on the donor of the
funds, and that these donor effects also vary between the different fields, with
different functional forms. However, they do not distinguish between private
and public financing as we do in this study, but look at public funds from the
German Research Association and the German governments, while EU funds
are grouped together with industry funds, and all other third party funds are
put in a residual group. For example, they find that for nano-technology, the
inverted U-shaped relationship holds for all sources of funds but for EUmoney,
which exerts a negative effect throughout. For astrophysics however the pic-
ture is totally different, with an insignificant net effect caused by U-shaped and
inverted U-shaped effects that cancel each other out.
6.4 Data
In Switzerland four types of public research institutes exist: cantonal universi-
ties, federal institutes of technology, universities of applied sciences and federal
research institutions. Of the ten cantonal universities, only those in Lucerne
(only social sciences and theology), Lugano (only social sciences and architec-
ture) and St. Gallen (only economics, law and management) limit the range of
covered disciplines, while the others offer a broad spectrum. The federal insti-
tutes of technology in Zurich and Lausanne focus on engineering, natural sci-
ences, mathematics and physics. The universities of applied sciences have been
pure teaching institutions until the mid nineties. Their mandate was broad-
ened to include applied research in the disciplines they cover: Engineering,
management, social work, pedagogy, health professions and fine arts. Besides
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these three types of higher education institution, there are four governmental
research institutions: the Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Tech-
nology (EAWAG), the Research Institute for Material Sciences and Technology
(EMPA), the Swiss Federal Institute for Forest, Snow and Landscape Research
(WSL) and the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI) which conducts research on energy
technologies and elementary particles physics.
In 2005, KOF Swiss Economic Institute conducted a survey among Swiss
university departments and public research institutions. The questionnaire was
sent to the directors of the research institutions and the heads of university de-
partments.5 The sample covers only fields related to technology and science:
Engineering, natural sciences, mathematics, physics, medicine, economics and
business administration. 241 of the 630 questionnaires were returned, imply-
ing a response rate of 38.3%. As not all of the respondents have answered all
questions, our analysis includes a maximum of 187 observations. The response
rate varies substantially between the types of institutions (see Table 6.9 in Sec-
tion 6.8 for more details). As a consequence, the cantonal universities are un-
derrepresented, while federal institutes and universities of applied sciences are
overrepresented.6
The data entails the number of master degrees measuring teaching output.
Research output is quantified as the number of papers published in scientific
journals. The survey further contains several questions concerning the rele-
vance of various technology transfer channels. The respondents attribute a
value between one and five to each channel, where one refers to ‘not important’
and five to ‘extremely important’. The channels are divided into five groups:
‘Informal contacts’, ‘Technical facilities’, ‘Training’, ‘Research collaboration’ and
‘Consulting’. The number of questions within each group ranges from two to
nine. If the answers to the questions in the different groups were averaged after-
wards to get one number measuring technology transfer, the different number
of answers in each group would imply different weights between the groups.
Therefore we construct our measure for technology transfer as the sum of the
5The questionnaire is available in German, French and English at http://www.kof.ethz.
ch/surveys/structural/panel/wissensaustausch_2005.
6For more information concerning the data, see Arvanitis et al. (2008).
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average relevance in each group.
Labor input is available by the categories ‘Professor’, ‘Post doc’, ‘Graduate’,
‘Technical Staff’ and ‘Administrative Staff’. Due to multicollinearity problems,
we aggregate professors, postdocs and graduates to ‘Academic Staff’ and tech-
nical staff and administrative staff to ‘Administrative Staff’ (Filippini and Lep-
ori (2007) report similar problems). Furthermore, the data entails information
about the share of labor devoted to the activities teaching, basic research and
applied research.7 We combine the information about labor inputs and labor
activity shares to construct labor inputs by activity. Thereby, we assume that
labor activity shares are the same across input classes, i.e. that all labor input
categories devote the same share of time for each activity.
Finally, the data includes information about financial resources of each de-
partment. Besides the overall budgets, the respondents disclose the share of
third-party funds from governmental sources and from the business sector. We
use this information to construct the two variables at the heart of this analy-
sis. We denote third-party funds from the business sector divided by the to-
tal funds as ‘BudgetSharePrivate′ and for third-party funds from governmental
sources ‘BudgetSharePublic′. The latter mainly contains funds from the two
Swiss research promotion agencies ‘Swiss National Science Foundation’ (SNSF)
and ‘Innovation Promotion Agency’ (CTI). The remaining funds consist of the
global budget of universities from various sources. Summary statistics are pre-
sented in Table 6.10 in Section 6.8.
In order to retain a substantial number of observations, we add 0.1 to all ob-
servations to eliminate observations taking the value 0. This procedure ensures
that corner solutions are feasible despite the logarithmic production function
specification. Thereby it allows university departments to specialize in the out-
put mix. 180 of the total 241 observations have no missing values in the utilized
variables.
7See question 28.
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6.5 Methodology
In order to assess the effect of private and public third party funding on produc-
tivity, we regress the three output dimensions – master degrees, publications
and technology transfer intensity – of the university departments on the share
of private and public third party funding. To account for potential complemen-
tarities of the output dimensions, we employ three stage least squares (3SLS)
estimations. In the first stage, 3SLS uses the predicted values resulting from a
regression of each endogenous variable on all exogenous variables included in
the system as instruments for all endogenous variables. In the second stage,
the covariance matrix of the equation errors is estimated consistently using the
residuals from the two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation of each equation.
In the third stage, GLS estimation employing the covariance matrix estimated
in the second stage and the instruments in place of the endogenous variables is
performed.
The equations estimated take the following form
Outputi = α + β1Publici + β2Public
2
i + γ1Privatei + γ2Private
2
i
+ δLabori + ξXi + ǫi,
(6.1)
where the dimension i refers to the analyzed department and bold variable
names indicate vectors. Outputi represents the respective output measure and
Publici and Privatei give the shares of public and private funds in third party
funding. As we have argued above, the effects of third-party funding on re-
search productivity may be non-linear. As some of the previous literature on
research productivity and third party funding has indeed found U-shaped rela-
tionships, we do not only include linear terms of the variables of main interest,
but also squared terms.
Labori is a vector of labor inputs, containing the amount of labor input dif-
ferentiated by ‘Academics’ (Acad), and ‘Technical and Administrative Staff’
(Other). We adjust total labor input by the share of work devoted to teaching,
basic research and applied research in the equations formaster degrees, publica-
tions and technology transfer, respectively. In order to account for complemen-
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tarities between labor inputs, Labori enters in the form of a translog function,
i.e. entails quadratic terms of inputs as well as their interactions.
Xi is a vector of control variables that contains dummy variables for the
following scientific fields: Natural Sciences, Medicine, Economics and Busi-
ness, Mathematics and Physics. The base category is engineering. Furthermore,
dummy variables for the institution types ‘University’, ‘University of Applied
Sciences’ and ‘Federal Research Institute’ capture the differences to the base cat-
egory ‘ETH Swiss Federal Institute of Technology’. Finally, the vector of control
variables includes the log of the total budget per employee to account for dif-
ferences in the available budget. ǫi refers to the normally distributed error term
with mean zero and variance σǫ.
A problem to identify the effect of funding on productivity is that the quality
of researchers might influence the ability to acquire third-party funding. Since
our data set does not allow accounting for research quality directly, our esti-
mates might suffer from an omitted variable bias. However, this drawback is
not as substantial as it might seem. In our baseline setup, the direction of the
bias, if it exists in our case, would be predictable (Robst, 2000). It is reasonable to
assume that research quality and the acquisition of external funds are positively
correlated. In this case, the true research output of departments with above av-
erage output quality would be underestimated. Consequently our estimates for
the coefficient of third party funding would be underestimated, implying that
the correlation between productivity and the share of external funds would be
actually higher than our estimates show.
We use three alternative approaches to tackle the econometric problems of
endogeneity due to omitted variable bias and reverse causality. However, as
the survey was designed to capture technology transfer, only one of these ap-
proaches allows tackling endogeneity of public third-party funding, implying
that a causal interpretation of our findings is more convincing for private fund-
ing.
The first approach separates departments based on a survey questionwhether
technology transfer has increased research funding resources.8 If this question
8See question 5.1 in the questionnaire http://www.kof.ethz.ch/surveys/structural/
panel/wissensaustausch_2005.
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is answered with yes, reverse causality and consequently endogeneity exists.
We distinguish non-winners from winners, where we define winners as depart-
ments that have gained additional financial resources from technology trans-
fer. We include two variables for private funding in our estimations, which
capture the impact for non-winners (‘Budget Share Public Non-Winners) and
(‘Budget share Private Non-Winners’) and winners (‘Budget Share Private Win-
ners’) separately. Concretely, we multiply private funding shares by a dummy
for non-winners and winners, respectively. 9 This approach allows us to assess
whether our results are solely driven by departments for which reverse causal-
ity is present.
Our second approach to tackle endogeneity in the estimation consists of
exploiting within-university estimation by including university fixed effects,
thereby controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, e.g. quality differences. This
approach has the advantage that it accounts for unobserved heterogeneity for
both public and private funding, while the other approaches only address prob-
lems related to private funding.
These two approaches are corroborated by a traditional instrumental vari-
able (IV) approach, which solves the problems of measurement error in research
output due to omitted quality, reverse causality and any remaining endogene-
ity bias (see e.g., Angrist and Krueger (1991) and Angrist and Krueger (2001)).
We instrument the share of private funding by the answers to two questions
concerning financial motives for engaging in technology transfer with private
companies.10
We furthermore take into account the possibility that the effects of third
party funding on productivity vary by academic field, as has been found by
9I.e., the first variable, ‘Budget Share Private Non-Winners’, gives the value of the share
of third-party funding if the department has not gained additional financial means from tech-
nology transfer (non-winners) and zero, if the department has gained (winners), as well as a
corresponding variable, ‘Budget Share Private Winners’, for winners, that gives the value of the
share of third party funding if the department has gained additional financial means (winner)
and zero, if the department has not gained additional funds from technology transfer.
10The research departments were asked to rank several financial motives to engage in tech-
nology transfer with private companies on a 1 (not important) to 5 (extremely important) scale.
The options used as instruments here are ‘resources for expanding basic research’ and ‘com-
mercial success’. See question 4.1 in the questionnaire.
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Schmoch and Schubert (2009). This may arise if the production technology
varies by discipline. We tackle this issue by dropping individual disciplines
from our sample in order to check if our results are driven by single disci-
plines. In addition, we drop medical departments and economics departments
together, keeping a sample of only science fields.11 We find that our results are
robust to these variations in the sample.
Finally, we test whether our results are robust to the introduction of alter-
native measures of labor inputs in the regression specification. Specifically, we
report specifications that do not adjust for the share of work devoted to a par-
ticular activity, implying that we include total labor inputs in all three output
specifications. In addition, we allow all of the activity adjusted labor inputs to
affect all outputs by including all of them in each equation.
6.6 Results
Table 6.2 displays the results of three stage least square estimations. Columns
1a-b and 2a-b show the results for the estimations including teaching and pub-
lications as output variables, while columns 3a-c and 4a-c also include tech-
nology transfer as a third output. The odd numbered columns contain linear
estimations, while the even numbered columns also feature squared terms of
the budget shares.
11Due to the small number of observations by field, regressions for single fields are not feasi-
ble.
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The production function estimations behave well in the sense that the coef-
ficients of academic labor inputs are positive and significant with the exception
of the technology transfer equation, where it is marginally insignificant.
Administrative and technical staff is found to be positively related to the
production of academic publications, but not for teaching and technology trans-
fer. The interaction term between Academic and Administrative and Technical
staff reveals that an increase in the number of non-academic staff per academic
employees reduces productivity in the fields of teaching and technology trans-
fer, possibly because academics need to spend more time on coordinating the
work of non-academic staff members. A larger budget per employee is found to
increase productivity in respect to scientific publications. This coefficient might
capture the fact that the price of labor inputs depends on its quality. Alterna-
tively it might reflect gains from capital endowment.
The dummy variables for scientific fields reveal that medical departments
are significantly less productive in teaching than engineering departments, which
is our base category. The same holds for Math and Physics departments. The
opposite is the case for the production of basic research, as measured by sci-
entific publications. In this field, Medical Departments and Math and Physics
departments outperform engineering departments. Economics and Business
departments are found to be more productive in teaching. Finally, Math and
Physics departments are found to be significantly less productive in technology
transfer than engineering departments.
Universities of Applied Sciences, in line with their mission, are found to be
more productive in teaching, and less productive in basic research than Federal
Institutes of Technology. In the field of technology transfer, Universities of Ap-
plied Sciences do not differ significantly. The same is the case for the other types
of research institutions in the field of technology transfer. Cantonal Universities
are also found to be less productive in basic research than the Federal Institutes
of Technology.
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Turning to our variables of main interest, the shares of public and private
third party funding, we find significant effects for both public and private fund-
ing. These effects vary between the different outputs, and remain largely unaf-
fected by the inclusion of technology transfer intensity as a third output dimen-
sion.
We find no significant effect of private funding on teaching output, and a
weak negative effect of public funding, as indicated by a negatively significant
squared term. Private funding exerts a significantly positive effect on the pro-
duction of scientific publications. The same holds for public third party fund-
ing. Private funding is positively related to technology transfer, while public
funds have no significant effect in this respect. As private funds are often re-
lated to applied research projects, the interpretation of this finding is straight-
forward. The positive impact of public third-party funding on scientific publi-
cations is plausible since the Swiss research policy is geared towards the pro-
motion of basic research, and hence the share of public funds mainly impact
basic research production, which is more likely to result in publications than
applied research. Quantitatively, one might suspect that the effect of public
funds on publications is even larger than the estimated coefficient would sug-
gest, as we might underestimate the correlation between third-party funds and
productivity due to a possible endogeneity problem. The positive impact of
private funding on basic research might be due to synergies between applied
research and basic research. Furthermore, private funds for applied research
might induce researchers to shift other funds that have been previously used
for applied research to the production of basic research. Employing Wald tests
for differences in the size of the effect of public and private third party funds on
research output, we find that the (insignificant) coefficients in the regressions for
teaching output are not significantly different from each other (columns 1a-4a).
The same is the case for publication output (columns 1b-4b). In the regressions
for technology transfer (columns 3c-4c), we find that the effect of private funds
is significantly larger than the (insignificant) effect of public funds, supporting
our above finding that private funds promote applied research.
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6.6.1 Reverse Causality, Unobserved Heterogeneity and Endo-
geneity
To tackle the endogeneity problems discussed above, we employ three different
approaches. First, we separate departments that have gained additional finan-
cial means through technology transfer from those that have not gained addi-
tional funds and include an interaction term between the private funding share
and a dummy variable capturing whether conducting technology transfer has
increased the available research funding. Comparing the coefficients of these
two groups reveals the presence of reverse causality. Assuming that our esti-
mates are unbiased, the two coefficients for winners and non-winners are the
same, while a higher coefficient for winners indicates reverse causality. Second,
we introduce institution fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity at
the university level, e.g. differences in research quality. Finally, we instrument
the share of private funds using an IV approach.
Table 6.3 shows the results of the first (columns 1a-b and 2a-c) and the sec-
ond (columns 3a-b and 4a-c) approach. For the first approach, the results for the
control variables remain stable in general, except for effect of Math and Physics
departments on teaching productivity, which is still negative, but now insignif-
icant.
Concerning the effect of public funds, columns 1a-b reveal that public funds
are not associated with larger productivity in basic research. Public funds are
also insignificant, as before, in the fields of teaching and technology transfer.
The effect of private funds, differentiated by winners and non-winners, are
again found to exert significantly positive effects on both publications and tech-
nology transfer intensity. The effect is significant for both winners and non-
winners, with a larger effect for non-winners, indicating no reverse causality.
Columns 3a-b and 4a-c of Table 6.3 show the results of the estimations con-
trolling for unobserved heterogeneity by including university fixed effects, mean-
ing that we exploit within-university variation to identify the effect of third-
party funding shares. Our results from Table 6.2 are also robust to this variation
of the setup.
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The results of our third approach, the IV estimations are shown in Tables 6.4
(first stage) and 6.5 (second stage). We instrument the share of private funds in
third party financial means with the answers to two questions on the financial
motives for engaging in technology transfer with private companies. The share
of public funds is not instrumented due to the lack of a suitable instrument. De-
partments were asked to rank several financial motives to engage in technology
transfer with private companies on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (not important)
to 5 (extremely important). The motives used as instruments here are ‘resources
for expanding basic research’ and ‘commercial success’.
The test statistics show that these are valid instruments, i.e. are significantly
related to the share of private funding and the p-value of the over-identification
test lies above 10%.12 The instruments are however somewhat weak, with an
F-statistic of 4.20 in the regressions excluding technology transfer and 4.38 in
the regressions including technology transfer13 Again, we estimate two setups
that include and exclude technology transfer.
The results largely confirm those of the base estimation. Third party funds
from both private and public sources do no affect teaching productivity. Fur-
thermore, while the share of public third party funds has no impact on technol-
ogy transfer productivity, private funding enhances productivity in this dimen-
sion. However, the results in respect to publication productivity deviate some-
what from the above findings. Specifically, while the share of public third party
funding is significant in the specification excluding technology transfer (column
1b), it becomes marginally insignificant when technology transfer is accounted
for (column 2b). Conversely, private funding is insignificant in column 1b, but
turns significant once we include technology transfer. These findings are in line
with our theoretical considerations as well as with Bolli and Somogyi (2009)
who suggest that the impact of public third party funding is more pronounced
for basic research, while private donors focus more on applied research and
technology transfer.
12The p-values of the Sargan statistic for individual instrumental variable estimations in re-
spect to master degrees, publications and technology transfer are given by 0.23, 0.21 and 0.81,
respectively.
13Note however that the general rule of thumb that F should be larger than 10 (Staiger and
Stock, 1997) only applies in models with only one instrument.
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Table 6.4: IV methodology, first stage
(1) (2)
Acad. Staff Teaching -0.437** -1.022*
(0.200) (0.590)
Admin. Staff Teaching 0.321* 0.773
(0.191) (0.566)
Acad. Staff Teaching, sq. -0.009 0.195
(0.057) (0.305)
Admin. Staff Teaching, sq. 0.020 0.171
(0.066) (0.295)
Acad.*Admin. Teaching -0.022 -0.396
(0.081) (0.590)
Acad. Staff Basic Research 0.470** 0.304
(0.226) (0.235)
Admin. Staff Basic Research -0.458** -0.451**
(0.209) (0.222)
Acad. Staff Basic Res., sq. -0.018 0.037
(0.080) (0.081)
Admin. Staff Basic Res., sq. -0.045 -0.069
(0.064) (0.065)
Acad.*Admin. Basic Res. 0.066 0.013
(0.114) (0.114)
Acad. Staff App. Res. 0.825
(0.525)
Admin. Staff App. Res. -0.449
(0.492)
Acad. Staff App. Res., sq. -0.211
(0.317)
Admin. Staff App. Res., sq. -0.144
(0.315)
Acad.*Admin. App. Res. 0.407
(0.624)
Budget per employee -0.235* -0.182
(0.124) (0.124)
Natural Science -0.753* -0.437
(0.400) (0.396)
Medicine -1.570*** -1.547***
(0.394) (0.388)
Economics and Business 0.092 0.192
(0.316) (0.313)
Math and Physics -1.466*** -1.169**
(0.516) (0.509)
Univ. of App. Sci. 0.458 0.332
(0.426) (0.425)
University 0.646* 0.539
(0.338) (0.333)
Federal Res. Inst. 0.759 0.185
(0.542) (0.545)
Budget share public 0.111 0.116
(0.099) (0.096)
Instrument 1 0.305*** 0.311***
(0.081) (0.078)
Instrument 2 0.182** 0.170**
(0.085) (0.082)
Constant 1.416 0.684
(1.469) (1.465)
Obs. 158 158
R-squared 0.39 0.47
Column 1: Excluding Technology Transfer, Column 2: Including Technology Transfer.
Instrument 1 is the TT motive intensity of “Acquisition basic research funds”. Instru-
ment 2 is the TT motive intensity of “Commercialization.” ***, ** and * indicate sig-
nificance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent levels. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
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6.6.2 Robustness
In order to evaluate the robustness of our results, we drop individual disciplines
from our sample to exclude that our results are driven by single disciplines. The
results are presented in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. In addition to dropping single fields,
we drop medical departments and economics departments together (columns
6a-b / 6a-c in both tables), keeping a sample of only science fields. Table 6.6
reports the results for the regressions excluding technology transfer, while tech-
nology transfer is included in Table 6.7. We find that our results are generally
robust to these variations in the sample, the only exception being that the coeffi-
cient of public funding in the regression for publication output turns marginally
insignificant.
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In our final robustness check, we test the robustness of our results to the
variation of the definition of labor input in order to take into account possible
synergies between the fields. Table 6.1214 repeats our basic specification, while
Table 6.13 includes the total labor input in all regressions. Finally, Table 6.14
presents estimations including all separate labor input types simultaneously in
all regressions. Our main findings are again robust to this variation in the setup.
6.7 Conclusions
The measurement and evaluation of university productivity has become in-
creasingly important during the past years, both in the academic discussion and
in research policy. Third party funding is frequently used as a proxy for research
output and quality in both fields. However, while the relevance of third-party
funding has increased both in the political sphere and the academic literature,
there are few articles analyzing the impact of different sources of third-party
funding on research productivity. Furthermore, both the theoretical and em-
pirical findings are ambiguous, indicating that further research in this area is
required to allow policymakers to make evidence-based decisions.
In this study, we have filled this gap and analyzed the effect of public and
private third party funding on the productivity of Swiss research institutions.
Furthermore, we have extended the literature by the inclusion of technology
transfer, which both economists and politicians perceive the universities’ third
mission, as a third output in the analysis. The results suggest that both public
and private third party funds exert a positive effect on basic research produc-
tivity. Furthermore, we have found that private third party funds significantly
increase technology transfer productivity, while neither private nor public third
party funds have an effect on teaching productivity.
Our results are robust to a battery of robustness checks. We tackle the issue
of endogeneity using three different approaches and find that our results remain
largely unaltered. We further introduce several alternative measures of labor
input. Our results are also robust to this variation. We also vary the sample
14The tables are shown in Section 6.8.
172
and drop individual academic fields to check whether the results from one field
drive our results. We find that this is not the case, and find the same when
we drop economics and medicine departments, keeping only natural science
departments in the sample.
The extension of our results to other countries depend on the similarities of
the research system of the country in question with the Swiss system. The Ger-
man and Austrian systems are very similar, concerning political responsibilities
for research policy, the organization of universities and, most importantly, the
process of distribution of (public) third party funds. Both Swiss public research
funding organizations, CTI and the SNSF, use peer-review processes includ-
ing international experts to monitor the funded research. The same is the case
for the German ‘Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft’ (DFG) and the Austrian
’Fonds zur Fo¨rderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung’ (FWF). Presumably,
this procedure promotes productivity more than a strict bureaucratic approach.
Our results may therefore apply less to countries that organize research funding
distribution and monitoring in a different way.
A limitation of this study is that while the categories public and private
funds might capture quite heterogeneous funding sources, our data only al-
lows the separation of these two broad categories. It is left to future research to
delve deeper into the issue and analyze the impact of more accurately specified
funding sources on the behavior of researchers.
The estimation of dynamic effects provides an additional direction of future
research, as this study, due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, studies only
static effects. Dynamic effects might arise, because if external funds flow to the
most productive researchers, the less productive researchers will acquire less
funding resources. This opens the possibility of selection, either through self-
selection based on income or promotion decision by supervisors. This might
have an impact on the average researcher quality and consequently on research
productivity.
A further politically relevant topic not addressed in this study is that third-
party fundsmight have effects on the behavior of researchers beyond the impact
on productivity. Of particular relevance for politicians is the possibility that pri-
vate third-party funding induces the researcher to devote more time and effort
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to applied projects, thereby reducing the work devoted to basic research (see
e.g. Florida and Cohen, 1999; Geuna, 2001; Schiller and Liefner, 2006; Banal-
Estan˜ol and Macho-Stadler, 2008). Finally, the present state of research does not
identify the relevance of individual channels but only the aggregate correlation.
Disentangling these effects might be a further interesting path of research.
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6.8 Tables
Table 6.9: Population, Data Sample and Response Rates by Department
Institutions Population Sample Response Rate (%)
ETH-Domain
Swiss Federal Inst. of Technology Zurich 87 45 51.7
Swiss Federal Inst. of Technology Lausanne 31 12 38.7
Federal Research Institutes 11 11 100.0
Cantonal University of
Basle 32 11 34.4
Berne 84 33 39.3
Fribourg 17 5 29.4
Geneva 46 15 32.6
Italian Switzerland 9 2 22.2
Lausanne 69 12 17.4
Neuchaˆtel 22 6 27.3
St. Gallen 21 8 38.1
Zurich 74 22 29.7
University of Applied Sciences of
Berne 13 9 69.2
Central Switzerland 10 5 50.0
Eastern Switzerland 36 14 38.9
Italian Switzerland 7 2 28.6
Northwestern Switzerland 27 17 63.0
Western Switzerland 12 4 33.3
Zurich 22 8 36.4
Total 630 241 38.3
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Table 6.10: Summary Statistics of Variables
Variable Variable Description Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Output
Publications* Scientific Publications 187 -0.13 1.44 -3.69 3.22
Teaching* Number of Master Degrees 187 -0.16 1.50 -3.00 3.40
Technology Transfer* Form Intensity Weighted Technology
Transfer
187 -0.12 0.41 -0.99 0.54
Input
Acad. Staff Total* Full-time Academic Staff Total 187 0.10 1.15 -2.48 3.32
Other Staff Total Full-time Administrative and Technical
Staff Total
187 0.11 1.96 -8.62 4.91
Acad. Staff Teaching* Full-time Academic Staff Teaching 180 -0.30 2.31 -12.93 3.16
Other Staff Teaching Full-time Administrative and Technical
Staff Teaching
180 -0.18 2.74 -11.63 4.19
Acad. Staff Basic Research* Full-time Academic Staff Basic Research 180 -2.70 5.77 -12.86 4.17
Other Staff Basic Research* Full-time Administrative and Technical
Staff Basic Research
180 -2.20 5.46 -11.43 6.01
Acad. Staff App. Res.* Full-time Academic Staff Applied Re-
search
180 -1.00 3.87 -13.12 3.83
Other Staff App. Res.* Full-time Administrative and Technical
Staff Applied Research
180 -0.90 3.99 -11.97 5.25
Budget per Employee* Budget per Employee in Swss Franks 187 11.40 0.88 7.32 12.84
Scientific Field
Engineering Engineering (Dummy) 187 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00
Natural Science Natural Sciences (Dummy) 187 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Medicine Medicine (Dummy) 187 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
Economics and Business Economics and Business (Dummy) 187 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00
Math and Ohysics Mathematics and Physics (Dummy) 187 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
University Types
Fed. Inst. Tech Federal Institute of Technology
(Dummy)
187 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
Fed. Res. Inst Federal Research Institute (Dummy) 187 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00
Univ. of App. Sci. University of Applied Sciences
(Dummy)
187 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
University Cantonal University (Dummy) 187 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
Budget Shares
Budget Share Public* Public Third-Party Funds/Total Funds
in
Budget Share Private* Private Third-Party Funds/Total Funds
in
Instruments
Winner Dummy indicating whether TT has in-
creased funding
161 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00
Instrument 1 Financial Motive for TT: Basic Research 164 3.00 1.44 1.00 5.00
Instrument 2 Financial Motive for TT: Commercialisa-
tion
164 2.60 1.34 1.00 5.00
*logged values
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Table 6.12: Labor Input Variation, basic specification
Output Teaching Publications Tech. Transfer
(1a) (2a) (1b) (2b) (2c)
Acad. Staff Teaching 0.591*** 0.591*** Acad. Staff Basic Research 0.244*** 0.244*** Acad. Staff App. Res. 0.046
(0.094) (0.094) (0.078) (0.078) (0.029)
Admin. Staff Teaching -0.051 -0.052 Admin. Staff Basic Research 0.209*** 0.208*** Admin. Staff App. Res. 0.035
(0.078) (0.078) (0.061) (0.061) (0.024)
Acad. Staff Teaching, sq. 0.110*** 0.111*** Acad. Staff Basic Res., sq. 0.057 0.058 Acad. Staff App. Res., sq. 0.022**
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.010)
Admin. Staff Teaching, sq. -0.009 -0.009 Admin. Staff Basic Res., sq. 0.028*** 0.028*** Admin. Staff App. Res., sq. 0.005*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003)
Acad.*Admin. Teaching -0.077* -0.078* Acad.*Admin. Basic Res. -0.054 -0.055 Acad.*Admin. App. Res. -0.025**
(0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.012)
Budget per employee 0.165 0.166 Budget per employee 0.302*** 0.303*** Budget per employee 0.014
(0.101) (0.101) (0.075) (0.075) (0.031)
Natural Science -0.329 -0.328 Natural Science 0.265 0.265 Natural Science -0.068
(0.294) (0.294) (0.216) (0.216) (0.091)
Medicine -1.236*** -1.235*** Medicine 0.555** 0.556** Medicine -0.077
(0.316) (0.316) (0.238) (0.238) (0.096)
Economics and Business 0.701*** 0.700*** Economics and Business -0.229 -0.230 Economics and Business -0.052
(0.252) (0.252) (0.182) (0.182) (0.077)
Math and Physics -0.555* -0.555* Math and Physics 0.587** 0.588** Math and Physics -0.295***
(0.336) (0.336) (0.260) (0.260) (0.104)
Univ. of App. Sci. 0.787*** 0.786*** Univ. of App. Sci. -1.651*** -1.652*** Univ. of App. Sci. 0.019
(0.251) (0.251) (0.241) (0.241) (0.075)
University 0.066 0.066 University -0.399** -0.399** University 0.035
(0.253) (0.253) (0.186) (0.186) (0.077)
Federal Res. Inst. 0.205 0.206 Federal Res. Inst. 0.095 0.098 Federal Res. Inst. -0.208
(0.404) (0.404) (0.301) (0.301) (0.128)
Budget share public 0.066 0.066 Budget share public 0.116** 0.116** Budget share public -0.013
(0.076) (0.076) (0.054) (0.054) (0.022)
Budget share private 0.043 0.043 Budget share private 0.135*** 0.135*** Budget share private 0.096***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.046) (0.046) (0.019)
Constant -1.985* -1.990* Constant -3.330*** -3.336*** Constant -0.203
(1.154) (1.154) (0.858) (0.858) (0.354)
Obs. 180 180 Obs. 180 180 Obs. 180
R-squared 0.51 0.51 R-squared 0.72 0.72 R-squared 0.42
Columns 1a-b: Excluding Technology Transfer, Columns 2a-c: Including Technology Transfer. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10
per cent levels. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 6.13: Labor Input Variation, total labor input
Output Teaching Publications Tech. Transfer
(1a) (2a) (1b) (2b) (2c)
Acad. Staff Total 0.795*** 0.795*** Acad. Staff Total 0.361*** 0.361*** Acad. Staff Total 0.020
(0.098) (0.098) (0.066) (0.066) (0.031)
Admin. Staff Total -0.060 -0.060 Admin. Staff Total 0.249*** 0.249*** Admin. Staff Total 0.080***
(0.074) (0.074) (0.050) (0.050) (0.024)
Acad. Staff Total, sq. 0.080 0.080 Acad. Staff Total, sq. 0.027 0.027 Acad. Staff Total, sq. -0.001
(0.066) (0.066) (0.045) (0.045) (0.021)
Admin. Staff Total, sq. -0.007 -0.007 Admin. Staff Total, sq. 0.039*** 0.039*** Admin. Staff Total, sq. 0.009**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004)
Acad.*Admin. total -0.142*** -0.142*** Acad.*Admin. total -0.027 -0.027 Acad.*Admin. total -0.006
(0.052) (0.052) (0.035) (0.035) (0.016)
Budget per employee 0.103 0.103 Budget per employee 0.272*** 0.272*** Budget per employee 0.013
(0.098) (0.098) (0.067) (0.067) (0.031)
Natural Science -0.215 -0.215 Natural Science 0.321* 0.321* Natural Science -0.190**
(0.286) (0.286) (0.194) (0.194) (0.091)
Medicine -1.492*** -1.492*** Medicine 0.226 0.226 Medicine -0.248***
(0.299) (0.299) (0.203) (0.203) (0.096)
Economics and Business 0.713*** 0.713*** Economics and Business -0.117 -0.117 Economics and Business -0.055
(0.245) (0.245) (0.167) (0.167) (0.078)
Math and Physics -0.673** -0.673** Math and Physics 0.717*** 0.717*** Math and Physics -0.456***
(0.328) (0.328) (0.223) (0.223) (0.105)
Univ. of App. Sci. 1.126*** 1.126*** Univ. of App. Sci. -1.841*** -1.841*** Univ. of App. Sci. 0.027
(0.258) (0.258) (0.175) (0.175) (0.082)
University 0.130 0.130 University -0.316* -0.316* University 0.012
(0.244) (0.244) (0.166) (0.166) (0.078)
Federal Res. Inst. -0.076 -0.076 Federal Res. Inst. -0.115 -0.115 Federal Res. Inst. -0.175
(0.408) (0.408) (0.277) (0.277) (0.130)
Budget share public 0.006 0.006 Budget share public 0.251*** 0.251*** Budget share public 0.002
(0.073) (0.073) (0.050) (0.050) (0.023)
Budget share private -0.000 -0.000 Budget share private 0.082** 0.082** Budget share private 0.089***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.041) (0.041) (0.019)
Constant -1.333 -1.333 Constant -2.903*** -2.903*** Constant -0.145
(1.120) (1.120) (0.760) (0.760) (0.358)
Obs. 187 187 Obs. 187 187 Obs. 187
R-squared 0.53 0.53 R-squared 0.77 0.77 R-squared 0.37
Columns 1a-b: Excluding Technology Transfer, Columns 2a-c: Including Technology Transfer. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10
per cent levels. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 6.14: Labor Input Variation, all separate labor inputs
Output Teaching Publications Tech. Transfer
(1a) (2a) (1b) (2b) (2c)
Acad. Staff Teaching 0.549*** 0.007 Acad. Staff Basic Research 0.160 0.171 Acad. Staff App. Res. 0.022
(0.161) (0.311) (0.121) (0.120) (0.082)
Admin. Staff Teaching 0.036 0.441 Admin. Staff Basic Research 0.136 0.097 Admin. Staff App. Res. -0.003
(0.151) (0.295) (0.108) (0.107) (0.075)
Acad. Staff Teaching, sq. 0.074 -0.166 Acad. Staff Basic Res., sq. 0.062 0.081* Acad. Staff App. Res., sq. 0.088***
(0.046) (0.121) (0.041) (0.043) (0.034)
Admin. Staff Teaching, sq. -0.014 -0.149* Admin. Staff Basic Res., sq. 0.015 -0.028 Admin. Staff App. Res., sq. 0.038
(0.016) (0.088) (0.012) (0.027) (0.038)
Acad.*Admin. Teaching -0.031 0.342* Acad.*Admin. Basic Res. -0.061 -0.046 Acad.*Admin. App. Res. -0.132*
(0.052) (0.199) (0.045) (0.055) (0.069)
Acad. Staff Basic Research 0.068 0.088 Acad. Staff Teaching 0.154 -0.219 Acad. Staff Teaching -0.005
(0.176) (0.176) (0.110) (0.213) (0.091)
Admin. Staff Basic Research -0.081 -0.116 Admin. Staff Teaching 0.158 0.434** Admin. Staff Teaching 0.018
(0.157) (0.157) (0.103) (0.201) (0.086)
Acad. Staff Basic Res., sq. 0.057 0.065 Acad. Staff Teaching, sq. 0.031 -0.073 Acad. Staff Teaching, sq. -0.086**
(0.059) (0.063) (0.032) (0.082) (0.035)
Admin. Staff Basic Res., sq. 0.008 -0.075* Admin. Staff Teaching, sq. 0.021** -0.049 Admin. Staff Teaching, sq. -0.018
(0.017) (0.039) (0.011) (0.060) (0.026)
Acad.*Admin. Basic Res. -0.072 -0.010 Acad.*Admin. Teaching -0.033 0.137 Acad.*Admin. Teaching 0.113*
(0.066) (0.080) (0.036) (0.136) (0.058)
Acad. Staff App. Res. 0.540* Acad. Staff App. Res. 0.406** Acad. Staff Basic Research 0.000
(0.279) (0.191) (0.051)
Admin. Staff App. Res. -0.327 Admin. Staff App. Res. -0.216 Admin. Staff Basic Research 0.054
(0.257) (0.175) (0.046)
Acad. Staff App. Res., sq. 0.256** Acad. Staff App. Res., sq. 0.110 Acad. Staff Basic Res., sq. -0.005
(0.115) (0.079) (0.018)
Admin. Staff App. Res., sq. 0.245* Admin. Staff App. Res., sq. 0.124 Admin. Staff Basic Res., sq. -0.005
(0.131) (0.090) (0.011)
Acad.*Admin. App. Res. -0.481** Acad.*Admin. App. Res. -0.214 Acad.*Admin. Basic Res. 0.014
(0.235) (0.161) (0.023)
Budget per employee 0.164 0.153 Budget per employee 0.296*** 0.289*** Budget per employee 0.001
(0.101) (0.101) (0.069) (0.069) (0.029)
Natural Science -0.318 -0.109 Natural Science 0.146 0.311 Natural Science -0.123
(0.302) (0.305) (0.207) (0.209) (0.089)
Medicine -1.181*** -1.224*** Medicine 0.545** 0.504** Medicine -0.084
(0.322) (0.316) (0.221) (0.216) (0.092)
Economics and Business 0.738*** 0.798*** Economics and Business -0.082 -0.011 Economics and Business -0.075
(0.252) (0.249) (0.173) (0.170) (0.073)
Math and Physics -0.514 -0.380 Math and Physics 0.624*** 0.677*** Math and Physics -0.250**
(0.353) (0.351) (0.242) (0.240) (0.103)
Univ. of App. Sci. 0.893*** 0.932*** Univ. of App. Sci. -1.633*** -1.625*** Univ. of App. Sci. 0.074
(0.329) (0.325) (0.226) (0.222) (0.095)
University 0.021 0.061 University -0.410** -0.384** University 0.020
(0.254) (0.252) (0.174) (0.172) (0.074)
Federal Res. Inst. 0.274 -0.006 Federal Res. Inst. 0.287 0.020 Federal Res. Inst. -0.151
(0.409) (0.421) (0.280) (0.287) (0.123)
Budget share public 0.062 0.045 Budget share public 0.209*** 0.200*** Budget share public -0.019
(0.078) (0.077) (0.054) (0.053) (0.023)
Budget share private 0.053 0.014 Budget share private 0.140*** 0.105** Budget share private 0.111***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.043) (0.043) (0.018)
Constant -1.969* -1.991* Constant -3.238*** -3.266*** Constant -0.066
(1.156) (1.151) (0.793) (0.786) (0.336)
Obs. 180 180 Obs. 180 180 Obs. 180
R-squared 0.52 0.54 R-squared 0.76 0.77 R-squared 0.50
Columns 1a-b: Excluding Technology Transfer, Columns 2a-c: Including Technology Transfer. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10
per cent levels. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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